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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 NEW QUESTIONS
Why do people have hostile attitudes towards members of ethnic outgroups? One of the classical 
answers is that ethnic hostility is an unintended effect from social categorisation (Brown, 2000; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Everyone categorises social stimuli 
to make the world we live in comprehensible, drawing boundaries between the ethnic group one 
identiﬁ es with (i.e. the ethnic ingroup) and ethnic outgroups. Because people strive to achieve 
or maintain a positive social identity, the ethnic ingroup is positively evaluated (Brown, 2000; 
Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Ingroup favouritism, in turn, is often accompanied by 
outgroup derogation (Coenders, 2001; Sumner, 1959 [1906]). Social categorisation is a sufﬁ cient 
condition for ethnic hostility to arise, as explicated within Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Brown, 
2000; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The ubiquitous presence of competition between 
ethnic groups for scarce resources – whether economic or cultural, actual or perceived – further 
increases hostile stances directed to ethnic outgroups, according to Realistic Conﬂ ict Theory 
(Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Coser, 1956; Gijsberts, Hagendoorn, & Scheepers, 2004; 
Quillian, 1995; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). 
Each and every one of us is cognitively predisposed to ethnic hostility and has more 
or less hostile attitudes towards speciﬁ c ethnic outgroups – or is at least liable to develop 
ethnic hostility. It is however the ‘more or less’ that I am interested in, and the extent to which 
characteristics of individuals and forces within society turn less into more and vice versa. The core 
question this book will address is: what might be the sociological reasons for the fact that some 
people belonging to particular ethnic groups, situated in a speciﬁ c time and place, hold more (or 
less) ethnic hostility than others? 
Ethnic hostility may be deﬁ ned as the set of unfavourable evaluative responses, either 
cognitive (thoughts), affective (feelings) or behavioural (action), to members of ethnic outgroups. 
Ethnic hostility may thus be regarded as a general term to encapsulate a multitude of related 
phenomena such as ethnic prejudice (attributions about groups or members of groups, by virtue 
of their membership in the group, that are disparaging and hostile, false, or at least without 
warrant, and rigidly held (Sniderman, Peri, De Figueiredo, & Piazza, 2000a)), perceptions of 
ethnic-group threat (individual perceptions of inter-group conﬂ ict of interest (Coenders, 2001)), 
ethnic stereotypes (the inﬂ exible generalisation of traits of individuals to perceptions of the group 
as a whole (Stephan & Stephan, 2000)), ethnic social distance (the non-acceptance of members of 
outgroups as marriage partners, neighbours, friends, etc. (Bogardus, 1928; Hagendoorn, 1995)), 
feelings of distrust, and for ethnic migrants, a lack of identiﬁ cation with the host country. 
Of course, the quest for sociological explanations for ethnic hostility is not new (Allport, 
1979 [1954]; Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bogardus, 1928; Gijsberts 
et al., 2004; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Olzak, 1992; Pettigrew, 1980; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, 
Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Sherif & Sherif, 1953), but notwithstanding the profound heritage 
of sociological research on this topic, there are still important unresolved issues regarding the 
nature and dynamics of ethnic hostility. To some extent this is due to the fact that many previous 
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scholars focused on static or current characteristics of individuals (and the groups they belong 
to) that would presumably affect ethnic hostility. I do not question the importance of current 
characteristics of individuals, but this book contends, following the main theoretical frameworks 
commonly used to explain ethnic hostility, that more ‘dynamic’ explanations should be taken into 
account as well, such as experiences of social mobility. Furthermore, in the chapters to come I will 
argue as to why it is likely that (changes in) conditions of the local living environment will have 
an impact on ethnic hostility as well, next to characteristics of individuals. So far, the impact of 
social mobility and of relatively small geographical units like municipalities and neighbourhoods 
on ethnic hostility has received little attention (for exceptions, see: Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2004; 
Lubbers, Coenders, & Scheepers, 2006 ). In the ﬁ rst section of this book I will therefore pursue 
shedding more light on the core question of this book by addressing the more speciﬁ c sub-
question: To what extent do experiences of social mobility and characteristics of the local living 
environment affect indicators of ethnic hostility, next to the more traditional static characteristics 
of individuals?
The phenomenon of ethnic hostility has traditionally been approached from a majority 
perspective – how to explain ethnic hostility among members of society’s dominant ethnic group 
directed at members of ethnic minority groups. Only recently has a minority perspective come 
to the fore in the Netherlands, most notably by Gijsberts and colleagues (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 
2004, 2005, 2007; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009). The mechanisms causing ethnic hostility among 
minority groups are however still less well understood than the mechanisms among dominant 
ethnic groups. This book applies a multi-ethnic group perspective on ethnic hostility whenever 
possible. For Part 1 this entails investigating the possible differential impact of the local living 
environment on ethnic hostility among natives directed to different ethnic outgroups, and on 
ethnic hostility among different ethnic ingroups directed to the ethnic outgroup. In Part 2 of this 
book it is my aim to scrutinise several important questions regarding the effect of educational 
attainment on ethnic hostility that arise from a multi-ethnic group perspective. These questions 
are explicated below.
For ethnic minority groups, the lack of hostility towards the host country and its ethnic 
majority is an indicator of the level of cultural integration. The integration of ethnic minorities 
into the host society also has a structural dimension besides a cultural one (Berry, 1997). The 
structural dimension of integration refers, among other things, to the extent to which members of 
ethnic minority groups are as equally represented as the native population at different educational 
levels (Van Tubergen, 2004). To what extent structural integration is associated with socio-cultural 
integration is subject of academic debate. Whereas empirical quantitative research has consistently 
shown that educational attainment is an important determinant of ethnic hostility among society’s 
dominant ethnic group (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003) – higher education being associated with 
less ethnic hostility – the relationship between educational attainment and indicators of ethnic 
hostility and cultural integration is by no means clear for ethnic minority groups. This relationship 
is the subject of investigation in Part 2 of this book.
Scholars have argued that changing distributions of educational levels across social 
categories, hence the change in homogeneity of educational categories in terms of cognitive 
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skills, are related to changes in the strength of the negative effect of education on indicators 
of ethnic hostility among society’s dominant ethnic groups (Jaspers, 2008). Analogously, since 
educational degrees are unequally distributed across ethnic groups within Dutch society (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2008), effects of education on ethnic hostility may differ across the major ethnic 
groups in the Netherlands. Unfortunately, an accurate and detailed description of the educational 
integration of minorities in the Netherlands has been missing. A study on differences in the effect 
of education on ethnic hostility across ethnic groups is therefore incomplete without ﬁ rst paying 
attention to differences in educational integration across ethnic groups. Part 2 of this book aims 
to come closer to answering the core question by addressing the following sub-questions: To what 
extent and why do trends in ethnic educational differentials exist?, and: To what extent and why 
does educational attainment affect ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities?
The considerations outlined above have led to the following book structure. In Part 
1, The Impact of Social Mobility and the Local Living Environment on Ethnic Hostility, I pursue 
to identify novel determinants of ethnic hostility among native Dutch and the major ethnic 
minority groups in the Netherlands. I expect to ﬁ nd these in experiences of social mobility and in 
characteristics of local living environments. By applying a dynamic, a local context and a multi-
ethnic group perspective, I will provide new empirical tests for theoretical frameworks commonly 
applied to explain ethnic hostility; Ethnic Competition Theory (Coenders, 2001; Scheepers et 
al., 2002), which integrates Social Identity Theory and Realistic Conﬂ ict Theory, and Contact 
Theory (Allport, 1979 [1954]; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).1 Part 2, Educational Attainment and Ethnic 
Hostility among Ethnic Minorities, ﬁ rst zooms in on the educational integration of ethnic minority 
groups in the Netherlands and assesses the tenability of a rational action-based theory for school 
transition decisions, the Breen-Goldthorpe model (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Goldthorpe, 2000), 
within a multi-ethnic setting. Part 2 ends with a study on the effects of educational attainment 
on indicators of ethnic hostility among the different major ethnic groups within the Netherlands. 
The multi-ethnic group perspective is very apparent in Part 2.
Part 1 deals with sub-questions belonging to the domain of sociology’s overarching 
research question regarding the level of social cohesion within society. In Part 2, by ﬁ rst studying 
ethnicity-based educational differentials, I shift my attention to sociology’s research tradition of 
social inequality, which deals with the haves and have-nots in society. I will also argue that these 
two research traditions are linked, since here I will posit that the effect of education on ethnic 
hostility is likely to depend on the distribution of educational attainments across ethnic groups. 
1.2 THE SETTING OF THIS BOOK: THE NETHERLANDS
At the presentation of the Scientiﬁ c Council for Government Policy’s rapport ‘Identiﬁ cation with 
the Netherlands’ (WRR, 2007), 27 September 2007, Princess Máxima of the Netherlands spoke the 
words: “The Dutch identity does not exist” (RVD, 2007). This statement provoked many reactions, 
such as asserting that the Dutch do have a national identity (e.g.”Máxima: ‘Nederlandse identiteit 
nog niet ontdekt’,” 2007; Zonnevylle, 2007), and that it is a mistaken and dangerous conclusion 
to equal questioning the Dutch identity with arguing that there is no Dutch identity (Ankersmit, 
1. Introduction | New questions
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2007). Others complemented Máxima for pointing out that there is not one monolithic identity 
but, as the WRR itself argues in the report, it is all about the formation of identities in the 
plural (Karacaer, 2007). See Engelen (2008) for a scientiﬁ c summary of the debate following the 
publication of ‘Identiﬁ cation with the Netherlands’.
Not that long ago, many Dutch thought of the Dutch identity as one encompassing ethnic 
tolerance, and the Netherlands was known abroad for its multiculturalism (Entzinger, 2003). The 
typical ‘Dutch tolerance’ of the previous century was not restricted to ethnic minorities alone, it 
included for example tolerance towards euthanasia and homosexuality as well (Jaspers, 2008). 
Even more generally, the Netherlands has traditionally been a country whose residents expressed 
high levels of (political) trust (Pharr & Putnam, 2000). But whereas more and more people have 
come to terms with homosexuality and attitudes on euthanasia have become more accommodating 
(Jaspers, Lubbers, & De Graaf, 2007), ethnic hostility has not witnessed a consistent decline 
– instead, it has ﬂ uctuated heavily and far right voting has increased in the Netherlands, as it has 
in many other European societies during the last two decades (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 
2002; Norris, 2005).
Within the ideology of multiculturalism, cultural diversity was considered to be a goal 
in itself. In line with this ideology, minorities in the Netherlands were stimulated to retain their 
ethnic identity. In the 1970s, this was expected to facilitate the anticipated re-migration of guest 
workers of the 1960s and 1970s – which in the case of Turkish and Moroccan guest workers did 
not take place. The Netherlands granted Suriname independence in 1975, which caused migration 
rates to increase sharply. In the 1980s, migration from the Dutch Antilles increased as well 
(see Lucassen & Penninx, 1997 for an overview of the migration history of the Netherlands). 
But also after the Dutch government recognised in the 1980s that the Netherlands was faced 
with permanent immigration, it kept supporting the development and preservation of minorities’ 
ethnic identities. It was assumed that strong group identiﬁ cation and cultural integration (or 
emancipation) within one’s ‘own’ ethnic group would smooth inter-ethnic group relations and 
consequently lead to a minimal necessary integration within the Dutch society as a whole. In 
this time period, non-national migrants who lived in the Netherlands for a minimum period of 
ﬁ ve years received local voting rights, and with government subsidies minority groups founded 
schools, made ethnic television programs and built places of worship (see Blok, 2004 for an 
overview of the development of Dutch integration policies). 
The Dutch integration policies of today can no longer be characterised as multicultural, 
instead they resemble more closely the ideology of assimilation in which minority members are 
expected to abandon their cultural identity and adopt the dominant group’s way of life. Some 
scholars argue that the strong current emphasis on civic integration in the Netherlands is a sharp 
break with the past (Joppke, 2004). Three key catalysing events in the 2000-2002 period worth 
mentioning are: First, the inﬂ uential newspaper contribution of Paul Scheffer ‘The Multicultural 
Drama’ in 2000 (Scheffer, 2000), in which he convincingly argued that multiculturalism policies 
have led to the socio-economic marginalisation of ethnic minorities. Second, the attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York. This and other Muslim terrorist attacks fuelled fear of Muslim 
minorities and supposedly illustrated the clash of Western and Muslim civilizations (cf. Gonzalez, 
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Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Huntington, 1993; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Strabac 
& Listhaug, 2008). Third, the rise of the political party LPF (List Pim Fortuyn). Its leader, the 
ﬂ amboyant politician Pim Fortuyn, fuelled discontent, openly challenged multiculturalism, wanted 
to put an end to Muslim immigration (“Fortuyn: grens dicht voor islamiet,” 2002) and was strongly 
in favour of assimilation policies. During the elections of May 2002, his political party caused a 
landslide in the Dutch political scene even tough he was murdered by a Dutch environmentalist 
before the elections took place.
Others state that Dutch multicultural practices have been challenged as early as the 
beginning of the 1990s, by people like the leader of the liberal party (VVD) at that time, Frits 
Bolkestein (e.g. Bolkestein, 1991), but also that “multiculturalism was never accepted or practised 
as fully as suggested in more stereotypical depictions of Dutch integration politics” (Vink, 2007, 
p. 2). However, most experts will probably agree that especially in the last decade, tensions 
between native Dutch and minority groups became more visible and more explicitly a subject of 
debate. More or less simultaneously, integration policies toughened.
Ethnic tension certainly became manifest when in November 2004 Theo van Gogh, a 
publicist and cineaste, was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri for his views about Islamic culture 
which he ventilated in his typical, blunt ‘van Gogh style’. Mohammed Bouyeri was a child of 
Moroccan immigrants. He had successfully completed intermediate general secondary education 
(HAVO) and was also otherwise seemingly well integrated into Dutch society (Buijs, Demant, & 
Hamdy, 2006). The case of Bouyeri thus exempliﬁ es how educational integration and cultural 
integration do not always go hand in hand. His case is certainly not unique though: Mohammed 
Sidique Khan and Shedzad Tanweer, two of the British Muslims behind the 7 July 2005 London 
bombings, studied at Leeds Metropolitan University (“Proﬁ le: Mohammad Sidique Khan,” 2007; 
“Suicide bombers’ ‘ordinary’ lives,” 2005). Several scholars therefore speak of an integration paradox 
(Buijs et al., 2006; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009; Shaw, 2002; Werbner, 2001). The understanding 
that educational integration is not always related to less ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities 
illustrates the relevance of my study in Chapter 7 on the general effect of education on ethnic 
hostility among a representative sample of ethnic minorities. 
Shortly after the assassination of van Gogh, mimicking the vocabulary of George W. Bush 
after 9/11, Gerrit Zalm, Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands at that time, declared war on 
terrorism (“Kabinet verklaart terreur de oorlog,” 2004). His choice of words was heavily criticised 
because the term ‘war’ in Dutch (oorlog) is almost solely used to refer to a war between countries 
and not to indicate a strong effort over a long period of time to get rid of something. What Zalm 
probably meant to get across is that he would support tougher immigration and integration 
policies. As a reaction to the assassination of van Gogh, several arson attacks on mosques and an 
Islamic elementary schools took place or were attempted. According to the national newspaper 
de Volkskrant, many people felt as being on the brink of falling into a canyon of chaos, hate and 
escalating violence (Wagendorp, 2004). 
The attacks of members of minority groups directed to (members of) the host country are 
extreme examples of a faltering cultural integration process. Lacking cultural integration will often 
take on more subtle forms (e.g. ethnic prejudice, ethnic distance, lack of identiﬁ cation with the 
1. Introduction | The setting of this book: The Netherlands
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host country). Also note that many migrants integrate within Dutch society successfully and that 
‘integration problems’ have not been limited to Muslim minority groups alone. The problematic 
integration of many Antillean migrants arriving in the last two to three decades has also received 
much media attention lately (“CDA en PvdA willen harde aanpak jongeren; bovengemiddeld vaak 
werkloos en crimineel,” 2008; Emmer, 2007; “Meer geld en aandacht voor jonge Antillianen,” 
2008).  Antillean youth has been severely overrepresented in crime statistics (Blom, Oudhof, 
& Bijl, 2005). Economic self-sufﬁ ciency among Antilleans is low compared to native Dutch. 
This is partly due to the high prevalence of single-parent families among Antilleans (Statistics 
Netherlands, 2008). As a consequence of the lacking structural integration of many Antilleans in 
the Netherlands, migration from the Antilles to the Netherlands has been actively discouraged by 
the Dutch government since 1998 (Tweede Kamer, 2001). 
Understanding the processes that give rise to ethnic hostility and a lacking integration 
of ethnic minorities, which threaten the social cohesion of the Dutch society, have become more 
important than ever for the Dutch. Explanations supported by empirical evidence are called for. 
My focus, as stated above, lies on explanations situated in experiences of social mobility, in 
characteristics of the local living environments and on understanding the effect of educational 
attainment on ethnic hostility. To derive hypotheses I will heavily rely on Ethnic Competition Theory 
(Coenders, 2001; Scheepers et al., 2002) and Contact Theory (Allport, 1979 [1954]; Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006), parsimonious, theoretical frameworks that provide explanations for ethnic hostility 
among both dominant ethnic groups and ethnic minority groups within every conceivable 
country. The long tradition of multiculturalism and the recent shift towards assimilation make the 
Netherlands an interesting case to test the hypotheses derived from these theories. The availability 
of unique data – both at the individual and at the contextual level – allows the incorporation of a 
dynamic perspective, a local-context perspective and a multi-group perspective.2 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK
1.3.1 Part 1: The Impact of Social Mobility and the Local Living Environment on Ethnic Hostility
Chapter 2, Social Mobility and Ethnic Hostility
Educational attainment and current social class are among the most important predictors of ethnic 
hostility, at least among society’s dominant ethnic groups. From different theories, such as Ethnic 
Competition Theory (Coenders, 2001; Scheepers et al., 2002) and Socialization Theory, it is to 
be expected that not only these current or static characteristics will affect ethnic hostility but 
that parental education and parents’ class position during one’s childhood may cast a shadow of 
the past and affect current feelings of hostility. Previous empirical research has conﬁ rmed the 
relevance of the family of origin in relation to hostile attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Hello, 
2003; Jaspers, Lubbers, & de Vries, 2008), although the relative importance of social origin versus 
social destination remains unclear. 
Durkheim already hypothesised that the experience of social mobility by itself –
irrespective of the speciﬁ c origin and destination combination – could lead to personal instability, 
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alienation and a loss in social and personal control, in other words to a state of anomie (Durkheim, 
1987 [1897]). Several scholars suggest that this ‘negativity’ or frustration as a result of social 
mobility may ﬁ nd a release in hostility towards ethnic outgroups (scapegoating) (e.g Bettelheim 
& Janovitch, 1964). However, up to now no study has satisfactorily addressed the effect of social 
mobility on ethnic hostility. Recent contributions on the mobility-ethnic hostility relationship are 
simply lacking. In Chapter 2, Social Mobility and Ethnic Hostility, I investigate the impact of social 
mobility on three indicators of ethnic hostility: ethnic stereotypes, feelings of ethnic threat and 
opposition to ethnic intermarriage. The central research question of this chapter reads:
 
To what extent does intergenerational educational and class mobility affect ethnic hostility (i.e. 
stereotypes, feelings of ethnic threat and opposition to ethnic intermarriage)? 
Standard statistical methods are inadequate for modelling mobility effects. In chapter 2, I will 
therefore make use of diagonal mobility models. With diagonal mobility models it is possible to 
assess the relative importance of social origin versus social destination and to simultaneously and 
parsimoniously represent both mobility effects, which depend on speciﬁ c origin and destination 
combinations, and mobility effects that are independent of speciﬁ c origin and destination 
combinations. This chapter thus takes on what I have called a dynamic approach; I will not only 
investigate the impact of present characteristics of individuals but also the impact of fathers’ 
social position and of social mobility. 
Chapter 3, The Local Living Environment and Ethnic Hostility
It has been recognised previously that next to individual characteristics, so-called contextual 
characteristics also affect levels of ethnic hostility. However, so far only the impact of a very 
limited set of contextual characteristics on ethnic hostility has been explored. Moreover, until very 
recently this ‘context’ had mostly been operationalised as the nation-state or other relatively large 
geographical units such as regions or districts (e.g. Evans & Need, 2002; Poppe & Hagendoorn, 
2003; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006; 
Wagner, Christ, Pettigrew, Stellmacher, & Wolf, 2006), and the impact of smaller geographical 
units like municipalities and neighbourhoods received relatively little attention (for exceptions, 
see: Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2004; Lubbers et al., 2006). 
Empirical results from previous research regarding the impact of the size of the ethnic 
outgroup in the locale on ethnic hostility have been inconsistent (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2004; 
Lubbers et al., 2006; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006; Taylor, 
1998). This inconsistency could be due to the different geographical localities in the analyses, the 
use of different indicators of ethnic hostility and the limited contextual characteristics included in 
the explanatory models next to relative outgroup size. In Chapter 3, The Local Living Environment 
and Ethnic Hostility, it is my aim to address these lacunae and inconsistencies of previous research 
by investigating the impact of a wide array of characteristics of neighbourhoods and municipalities 
on different indicators of ethnic hostility. 
To identify theoretically relevant characteristics of the local living environment, I 
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will rely on Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory. According to Ethnic Competition 
Theory, perceptions of ethnic group competition induce feelings of group threat which in turn 
may ignite ethnic hostility (Coenders, 2001; Coser, 1956). I argue that characteristics of the 
local environment are likely to affect perceptions of ethnic competition and ethnic threat and 
hence ethnic hostility. Actual group competition may be over economic resources, power, cultural 
resources and collective identity (Blalock, 1967; Tajfel, 1982). The relative importance of the 
different types of competition is however unclear and deserves more scientiﬁ c attention (Taylor, 
1998). 
The above considerations have led to the following research question:
To what extent do characteristics of Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities related to economic, 
cultural or safety threats affect ethnic hostility (i.e. opposition to ethnic intermarriage, reluctance 
to grant residence permits to migrants and negative views on the multicultural society)?
 
Chapter 3 thus researches the relative importance of locality characteristics related to different 
types of ethnic competition (i.e. economic, cultural and physical) on indicators of ethnic hostility, 
thereby hoping to shed more light on the threat response. I will also investigate to what extent 
the impact of speciﬁ c locality characteristics depends on the particular locality, on the inclusion 
or exclusion of other contextual characteristics in the explanatory model, and on the indicator of 
ethnic hostility under consideration. As part of the multi-ethnic group perspective of this book, 
I will investigate in detail whether the relative size of a speciﬁ c ethnic group within the locality 
is predominantly correlated to opposition to marriages with this speciﬁ c ethnic-minority group. 
This enables more stringent tests of the derived hypotheses and makes it possible to assess the 
generalisability of our explanatory models.
Chapter 4, The Local Living Environment and Indicators of Social Cohesion
Ethnic tolerance, the opposite of ethnic hostility, is one of the many possible indicators of 
the level of social cohesion between ethnic groups. Social cohesion may be regarded as the 
interconnectedness of (or ties between) individuals that is both the result of, and cause for, 
the quality of public and civic life, feelings of commitment and trust, norms of reciprocity, and 
participation in networks and civic organisations (see Chan, To, & Chan, 2006 for a more thorough 
discussion of the concept of social cohesion). Whatever deteriorates trust in general presumably 
also increases hostility towards ethnic outgroups (Sniderman, Peri, De Figueiredo, & Piazza, 
2000b), and according to Putnam’s constrict proposition (Putnam, 2007), the proximity of ethnic 
outgroups in the locality not only deteriorates trust in members of ethnic outgroups but also 
deteriorates trust in members of the ingroup, consequently endangering both social cohesion 
between and within ethnic groups. 
Propositions regarding the level of social cohesion are commonly derived from the 
homophily principle; like seeks like (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001). People prefer to interact with similar others, with others who share the same ethnic 
heritage, have the same social status and thus share experiences and tastes. Explanations for 
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ethnic hostility are commonly grounded in Ethnic Competition Theory or Contact Theory. Chapter 4 
analyses to what extent these theoretical approaches lead to similar or contradictory propositions 
regarding the impact of the locality and to what extent explanations for ethnic hostility may be 
generalised to indicators of social cohesion that do not form part of ethnic hostility and vice 
versa. 
Although localities have repeatedly been put forward as important contexts for social 
cohesion (cf. Putnam, 2007; Sampson, Morenoff, & Gannon-Rowley, 2002; Volker, Flap, & 
Lindenberg, 2007), the argument for whom localities matter is less well developed. Building on my 
results of Chapter 3, I will argue in Chapter 4 that the impact of the community on indicators of 
social cohesion very likely depends on characteristics of its residents such as ethnic background, 
income and educational degree. 
The research question that I will address in Chapter 4 is:
To what extent, and for whom, do ethnic and economic heterogeneity, economic afﬂ uence, crime 
rates and residential mobility within Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities affect indicators of 
social cohesion (i.e. contact frequency with one’s neighbours, tolerance towards a neighbour from a 
different race, generalised social trust and volunteering)?
Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3 in three important ways. First I will assess the impact of different 
locality characteristics. This time theoretically relevant characteristics from the Homophily 
Principle are identiﬁ ed. Second, in Chapter 3, I will assess to what extent different indicators 
of ethnic hostility are affected differently by the locality. In Chapter 4, I will investigate to 
what degree explanatory models and the theoretical frameworks for ethnic hostility could also be 
applied to explain other indicators of social cohesion not related to ethnic hostility. Third, both 
Chapters 3 and 4 will take into account a multi-ethnic group perspective but in different and 
complementary ways. Whereas Chapter 3 analyses the impact of locality characteristics on ethnic 
hostility among natives directed towards different ethnic outgroups, Chapter 4 investigates the 
impact of the locality on ethnic hostility and other social cohesion indicators among both the 
native Dutch population and among different ethnic-minority groups. 
1.3.2 Part 2: Educational Attainment and Ethnic Hostility among Ethnic Minorities
Chapter 5, Trends in Ethnic Educational Inequality
Previous research has shown that the mean educational level of ethnic minorities has steadily 
increased, even faster than among the native Dutch (Gijsberts, 2004; Statistics Netherlands, 2005; 
Tesser, 1995). This does not necessarily mean that, in general, ethnic inequality of educational 
opportunities has been declining. A detailed description of trends in ethnic inequality of educational 
opportunities has been missing. Distributions of educational attainments have been linked to 
the effect of education on ethnic hostility and the effect of educational attainment on ethnic 
hostility among ethnic minorities is by no means clear. In Chapter 5, Trends in Ethnic Educational 
Inequality, I will commence on a detailed description of trends in educational differentials across 
the major ethnic groups in the Netherlands. After having investigated more in depth the reasons 
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for ethnicity-based educational inequality in Chapter 6, I will return in Chapter 7 to explaining 
ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities and the role played by educational attainment herein. 
Educational inequality may take on different guises. According to Raftery and Hout 
(1993), at times of educational expansion, educational inequality will only decrease at educational 
levels where enrolment of the elite stratum has been saturated. Otherwise, the dominant 
groups in society will proﬁ t more from educational expansion than the less privileged, whereby 
inequality is (maximally) maintained. The educational levels in the Dutch educational system 
are qualitatively differentiated into vocational and general tracks. It is thus possible that once 
saturation has been reached at a given educational level, inequalities of attaining that level may 
be replaced by inequalities in enrolment in the more selective track. In this way, inequality is 
effectively maintained (Lucas, 2001). In Chapter 5, acknowledging the possible different forms 
of ethnic educational inequality, I will investigate to what degree ethnic educational inequality 
is maintained, both maximally (across levels) and effectively (across general and professionally-
oriented tracks within the same level).
During one’s school career many transition decisions have to be made. The literature on 
class-based educational differentials has recognised since long that the inequality across classes 
in ﬁ nal educational attainment is the end product of the differences in educational opportunities 
during the complete school career (De Graaf & Wolbers, 2003; Mare, 1980). Trends among ethnic 
groups in transition decisions have hardly received any attention so far (for an exception, see: 
Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2003). I will therefore investigate (trends in) ethnic differences in transition 
decisions after primary school and after higher general secondary school, next to studying trends 
in ﬁ nal educational attainment in Chapter 5.
The four largest ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands have a less favourable social 
background that the native Dutch (Statistics Netherlands, 2008). Parental social background is 
a strong determinant of children’s educational achievement, both among the native Dutch and 
ethnic minority groups (Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993; Wolbers & Driessen, 1996). Up to now, however, 
it is unclear how much the differences in social background account for the differences in achieved 
educational level and educational transition decisions across ethnic groups. 
The above considerations have led to the following research question of Chapter 5: 
 
What are the birth cohort trends across ethnic groups in ﬁ nal educational attainment and in the 
transition decisions after primary school and higher general secondary school, and to what extent 
does parental social background explain these differences? 
The results of Chapter 5 have triggered new questions on differences between ethnic groups in 
their school career, which has resulted in the study presented in Chapter 6.
Chapter 6, Explanations for Ethnic Educational Inequality 
Differences observed at the ethnic-group level at branching points in the educational career are 
the result of differences in decisions made by individuals. In Chapter 6, Explanations for Ethnic 
Educational Inequality, I will investigate how and why ethnicity affects the decision for a speciﬁ c 
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track in higher education. My point of departure is the Breen-Goldthorpe model, a formal micro-
theoretical model developed to explain (trends in class-based) educational differentials (Breen & 
Goldthorpe, 1997; Goldthorpe, 2000). According to this model, students make rational decisions 
based on cost-beneﬁ t evaluations which are inﬂ uenced by subjective beliefs about the likelihood 
of success in different educational tracks, expected direct and indirect costs associated with each 
transition choice, and subjective beliefs about the utility of educational outcomes. The tenability 
of the Breen-Goldthorpe model within a multi-ethnic context is so far unclear. 
I will argue in Chapter 6 that male and female students, students from different social 
backgrounds and students with different ethnic origins may have different beliefs regarding 
their success probabilities, even after controlling for ability. Differences in success probabilities 
are thereby a likely candidate to account in part for existing ethnic educational differentials. 
Surprisingly, to what extent success probabilities explain the effect of ascribed characteristics 
such as ethnicity on schooling decisions have remained unclear, since success probabilities have 
seldom been included in explanatory models (for an exception, see: Stocké, 2007). The research 
question of Chapter 6 is therefore: 
To what extent do subjective estimates of success probabilities explain the effect of social origin, sex 
and ethnicity on students’ choices between different school tracks in Dutch higher education?
After having investigated the educational integration of ethnic minorities in Chapter 5 and the 
extent to which differences in subjective beliefs of future school success explain the observed 
ethnic educational inequality in Chapter 6, I will investigate the effect of educational attainment 
on indicators of ethnic hostility and cultural integration among minorities in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7, Educational Attainment and Ethnic Hostility
Educational attainment is an important, if not the most important, determinant of ethnic hostility 
among native ethnic groups (e.g. Hagendoorn & Nekuee, 1999). Surprisingly, the effect of 
education on ethnic hostility is by no means clear for ethnic-minority groups. Several authors even 
speak of an ‘integration paradox’ by which they refer to counterintuitive ﬁ ndings that especially 
well-educated ethnic minorities presumably feel rejected by the host country and perceive cultural 
differences and discrimination (Buijs et al., 2006; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009) These studies do not 
imply that education in general is positively related to ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities, 
but do raise questions regarding the assumed positive effect of education on cultural integration 
and inter-ethnic tolerance among ethnic minorities. 
Due to educational expansion in the Netherlands in recent decades, educational 
categories have become more distinct in terms of their cognitive skills. Probably as a consequence 
of this, the educational effect on ethnic tolerance increased among native Dutch in the 1975-1998 
time period (Jaspers, 2008). Following this line of argument, I will use the results of the ﬁ rst 
two chapters of Part 2, which study the educational integration of ethnic minorities, to derive 
hypotheses regarding the strength of the education effect on indicators of ethnic hostility and 
cultural integration among ethnic minorities. Chapter 7 also uses Ethnic Competition Theory and 
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Contact Theory to derive hypotheses regarding the mechanisms behind educational attainment 
and indicators of ethnic hostility and cultural integration. According to Ethnic Competition Theory 
and Contact Theory, members of society’s dominant ethnic group perceive less ethnic threat, and 
have more positive and fewer negative contact experiences. This in turn would partly explain why 
higher educated natives are less hostile to ethnic minorities. But if, and to what extent, these 
causal mechanisms also hold for ethnic minority groups has to be empirically investigated. 
I am unaware of any empirical study that makes use of highly representative datasets 
among different ethnic minority groups in which the mechanisms that provide insight into the 
link between educational attainment and indicators of ethnic hostility and cultural integration 
have been investigated. It is my aim to ﬁ ll this lacuna with Chapter 7. The ﬁ nal research question 
this book addresses is: 
To what extent and why is educational attainment linked to indicators of both ethnic hostility among 
and cultural integration of ethnic minorities (i.e. opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and 
identiﬁ cation with the country of origin)?  
In sum, in Part 2 of this book I recognise that although educational attainment might be an 
important determinant for ethnic hostility among native populations, one of the reasons to expect 
education to affect ethnic hostility differently across ethnic groups in the Netherlands is that 
educational levels are distributed differently across ethnic groups. Since the exact extent of these 
differences and the trends herein are unclear, I will ﬁ rst direct my attention to the educational 
integration of ethnic minorities. Next, I will explore to what extent and why educational attainment 
affects indicators of ethnic hostility and cultural integration among ethnic minorities. 
1.3.3 Questions, theories, perspectives, data and methods
The research questions of the empirical chapters, Chapter 2 to 7, have been summarised in Table 
1.1 together with the perspective applied, the theories from which the hypotheses are deduced, 
and the datasets and statistical methods that will be used to test these hypotheses. 
In the last chapter of this book, Chapter 8, I will assess to what extent I have been 
successful in answering the core question of this book; what might be the sociological reasons 
for the fact that some people, belonging to particular ethnic groups, situated in time and place, 
hold more (or less) ethnic hostility than others? I will reﬂ ect on the theoretical implications of my 
empirical ﬁ ndings, and will give my opinion on which direction future research should take. 
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1.4 NOTES
1. In this book I rely strongly on the Netherlands Kinship Panel Survey (NKPS) (Dykstra et 
al., 2004) and the Social Position and Use of Welfare Facilities by Immigrants (SPVA) 
surveys (Groeneveld & Weyers-Martens, 2003), which are made available by the Dutch 
National Research Foundation (NWO) through The Binding Force of Family Relations [De 
Bindende Kracht van Familierelaties] (BKF) program. The Netherlands Kinship Panel Study 
is funded by grant 480-10-009 from the Major Investments Fund of the Dutch National 
Research Foundation, and by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute 
(NIDI), Utrecht University, the University of Amsterdam and Tilburg University.
2. The label Ethnic Competition Theory is taken from Coenders (2001). The synthesis between 
Realistic Conﬂ ict Theory and Social Identity Theory is also referred to as Ethnic Group 
Conﬂ ict Theory (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2007).
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2. SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ETHNIC HOSTILITY†
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Empirical research has shown convincingly that educational achievement and social class are 
among the most important predictors of hostile attitudes towards ethnic outgroups, such as 
prejudices, ethnocentrism and opposition to ethnic intermarriage (Coenders, 2001; Kunovich, 
2004; Scheepers et al., 2002). The sociological literature consistently ﬁ nds that less educated 
persons hold less favourable attitudes towards ethnic outgroups than more educated persons 
and that manual workers and the self-employed hold less favourable attitudes towards ethnic 
outgroups than other social classes. 
Besides one’s current social position, one’s social origin – parental educational attainment 
and social class of the father during the formative years – also explains attitudes towards ethnic 
outgroups, although presumably to a lesser extent than current social position. If social mobility 
has an impact on ethnic hostility, newcomers into a speciﬁ c social position may differ in their 
level of hostile attitudes from members who hold the same social position but who have not 
experienced social mobility. The relative impact of social origin and destination positions on 
ethnic hostility remains unclear as the impact of social mobility may have been underestimated in 
previous studies because standard approaches are inadequate for modelling mobility effects.1 
Many theories in the Durkheimian tradition hypothesise that social mobility leads to 
instability, identity conﬂ ict, and subjective feelings of deprivation (Durkheim, 1987 [1897]). 
Social mobility – both upward and downward – is expected to cause alienation and abnormal 
strain. Without social and personal control, this may be manifested in dissatisfaction with life, 
antagonistic attitudes towards ethnic outgroups (Bettelheim & Janovitch, 1950), and, in extreme 
cases, in suicide (Durkheim, 1987 [1897]). Despite these longstanding theoretical predictions, we 
know of no empirical research that has shown that experiences of social mobility affect ethnic 
hostility through anomie or any other mechanism (Marshall & Firth, 1999). 
Conceptually, we view individuals’ attitudes towards outgroups as affected both by the 
social position of their parents and by their own social position in adulthood. In addition, the 
experience of social mobility itself may affect attitudes independent of the social origin and 
destination (Marshall & Firth, 1999). We stress that the two views are not in contrast with one 
another but rather complementary. Diagonal mobility models, which we apply in the present 
study, offer a parsimonious and elegant representation of origin, destination, and mobility effects 
and are well suited to model these potential mechanisms simultaneously (Hendrickx, De Graaf, 
Lammers, & Ultee, 1993; Sobel, 1981, 1985; Weakliem, 1992). 
† A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in the British Journal of 
Sociology (Tolsma, De Graaf, & Quillian, 2009). An earlier version of this paper has been 
presented at the American Sociological Association (ASA) 2008 Annual Meeting in Boston, 
USA and at the 8th European Sociological Association (ESA) Conference 2007, Glasgow, 
United Kingdom.
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In addition to the theoretical literature on causes of ethnic hostility, our research 
contributes to the theoretical literature on the consequences of social mobility. Several scholars 
have applied diagonal mobility models to assess the relationship between mobility on the one 
hand and voting behaviour, culture and material consumption behaviour, fertility, and lifestyles 
on the other hand (De Graaf, 1991; De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta, & Heath, 1995; Nieuwbeerta, De Graaf, 
& Ultee, 2000; Sobel, 1985; Stein, 2005; Weakliem, 1992). These studies showed that the level of 
acculturation depends on the speciﬁ c origin and destination positions. Until now, consequences 
of intergenerational mobility on ethnic hostility have been neglected in the body of research on 
social mobility. 
Both educational achievement and social class are important determinants of ethnic 
hostility. We, therefore, examine the effects of mobility in terms of both educational achievement 
and social class on attitudes towards outgroups. We employ three distinct measures of hostile 
attitudes towards outgroups: ethnic stereotypes, ethnic threat, and opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage. In sum, in this chapter we will address the following research question: To what 
extent does intergenerational educational and class mobility affect ethnic hostility (i.e. ethnic 
stereotypes, ethnic threat and opposition to ethnic intermarriage)?
For this purpose, we use two data sets from the Netherlands that are distinctive in 
their inclusion of measures of antagonistic attitudes, education, and class: Social and Cultural 
Developments in the Netherlands (SOCON) surveys, waves 1995, 2000, and 2005 and the Netherlands 
Kinship and Panel Study (NKPS) wave 2002.
2.2 EXPECTATIONS  
2.2.1 Class origin and destination status
Class of origin and class of destination are distinguished for individuals in that they occur at 
different points in the life course. Individuals experience their class of origin – their parent’s 
class – most strongly during childhood and adolescence when they reside with their parents. They 
experience their destination class as adults after the completion of formal schooling. Persons 
who climb or fall from the social ladder thus experience two different class positions. We expect 
that both origin and destination class status may have an impact on attitudes, but their relative 
importance depends to a large extent on the relative importance of early socialization into the 
attitudes typical of the origin class by parents and other members of the origin class versus later 
circumstances on the formation of attitudes towards ethnic outgroups in adulthood.
 Since socialization takes place primarily early in life (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991) and many 
attitudes tend to be rather stable during the life course (Glenn, 1980), a ‘socialization’ perspective 
would expect a larger role for origin position than destination position. As hostile attitudes 
towards ethnic outgroups are in part transmitted during childhood (Dalhouse & Frideres, 1996), 
‘Once prejudices appropriate to one’s class position are accepted, they may become traditions 
which are passed by childhood socialization from one generation to the next.’ (Hodge & Treinman, 
1966, p. 91). Re-socialization may also occur later in life, but most theory and research suggests 
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that socialization is a process that operates most strongly in childhood and adolescence, and thus 
class-based socialization inﬂ uences should largely reﬂ ect origin class position. Under the view 
that socialization experiences are of primary importance in the formation of negative attitudes 
towards ethnic outgroups, we expect the ‘Class Origin Hypothesis’ to hold: The impact of the 
destination class on indicators of ethnic hostility is weaker than the impact of the origin class on 
indicators of ethnic hostility. 
Another approach suggests that attitudes towards outgroups are more closely related to 
individuals’ perceptions of their material self-interest and related collective identities, especially 
their current class position. In line with this view, Ethnic Competition Theory states that members 
of ethnic groups compete with each other for scarce resources such as jobs, housing, and income 
(Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Coenders, 2001; Coser, 1956; Olzak, 1992; 
Scheepers et al., 2002; Tajfel, 1982). Especially in conditions in which new competitors come 
from ethnically distinct groups, many individuals perceive this competition as reﬂ ecting collective 
competition between ethnic groups. Since workers and the self-employed can rely on fewer 
resources and are more directly in competition with ethnic outgroups than other social categories, 
these categories perceive competition most strongly. Perceived ethnic threat evoked by perceptions 
of ethnic competition enhances in turn negative sentiments against ethnic outgroups (Coenders & 
Scheepers, 1998; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al., 2002). According to Ethnic Competition 
Theory, members of a social class thus share similar attitudes towards ethnic outgroups because 
of their shared competitive economic environment and because of their perceived mutual interest 
to protect their social class from ethnic outgroups. This theory suggests the ‘Class Destination 
Hypothesis’: The impact of the destination class on indicators of ethnic hostility is stronger than the 
impact of the origin class on indicators of ethnic hostility.
2.2.2 Educational origin and destination status
Past research has consistently found that level of education to be one of the strongest correlates 
of prejudice and attitudes towards outgroups, with higher education associated with less ethnic 
hostility. Many have theorised that this holds in part because schools are socializing agents 
and transmit the prevailing norms of society, which in most Western societies favour tolerance. 
Moreover, education develops cognitive competence, increases open mindedness, and reduces 
authoritarian attitudes, all of which tend to foster a more tolerant stance towards ethnic outgroups 
(Hello, Scheepers, & Sleegers, 2006). 
Studies have generally not examined the relative impact of parental level of education 
versus own educational achievement on attitudes towards ethnic outgroups. Applying the 
distinction we made earlier between socialization and instrumental theories of class position, 
socialization theory predicts that more educated parents are likely to transmit their tolerant 
attitudes to the child during both school and pre-school years. This suggests the ‘Educational 
Origin Hypothesis’: The impact of one’s own educational achievement on indicators of ethnic hostility 
is weaker than the impact of father’s educational achievement on indicators of ethnic hostility. 
While parental education is also likely to have an impact on attitudes, we expect a 
stronger impact of respondent’s own education, consistent with past research. There are two 
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reasons for this. First, education itself has a socializing inﬂ uence that increases acceptance of 
norms of tolerance, at least in societies in which tolerance is the dominant value orientation. 
Second, education is important because it has a strong impact on job and class position, and 
thus affects perceived ethnic competition experiences. In fact, Hello, Scheepers, and Sleegers 
(2006) ﬁ nd education affects social distance attitudes towards ethnic outgroups largely because 
of its effect on perceived ethnic competition, suggesting this second mechanism is predominant. 
Because of the combined effect of these mechanisms, we suggest that the more likely hypothesis 
with regard to education is the ‘Educational Destination Hypothesis’: The impact of one’s own 
educational achievement on indicators of ethnic hostility is stronger than the impact of father’s 
educational achievement on indicators of ethnic hostility. 
Table 2.1 Prevalence of ethnic threat, stereotypes and opposition to ethnic intermarriage in the Netherlands 
Ethnic Threat (N=2898)a Agree (%)
  Dutch people ﬁ red because of minorities 18
  Minorities are a threat to our own culture 30
Stereotypes (N=2520)a Agree (%)
  Never know whether Moroccans aggressive 24
  People from Surinam work slowly 25
  Gypsies are never to be trusted 16
  Turks are backward 7
  Extra careful with Jews in business dealings 14
Intermarriage (N=7420)b I would mind (%)
  Intermarriage with Turc OK? 39
  Intermarriage with Moroccan OK? 44
  Intermarriage with Surinamese OK?  32
Source: a: SOCON 1995, 2000, 2005 (pooled); b: NKPS 2002
2.2.3 Tolerance and the national culture
Individuals are inﬂ uenced by ‘the social pressure resulting from the shared values of the other 
members of the group’ (Blau, 1960, p. 191). We assume that this social pressure will not only 
originate from one’s ‘educational group’ or one’s ‘social class’ but also from the group formed 
by the people of a nation. The stronger the value climate of tolerance is in a country, the more 
individuals are thus stimulated to subscribe to these values. The Netherlands, like many other 
societies, ofﬁ cially condemn intolerance and discrimination. Although support for discrimination 
has been more widespread in times of high levels of immigration and during times of increasing 
unemployment, the Dutch majority did not support ethnic discrimination in the period from 1979 
to 2002 (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, & Verkuyten, 2008). Even after experiencing an ideological 
shift from multiculturalism towards assimilation (2001 to 2004), tolerance is the dominant 
attitude among older and younger generations in the Netherlands (Coenders et al., 2008). As can 
been seen from Table 2.1, the majority of the Dutch people do not agree that ethnic minorities 
form a threat, do not hold ethnic stereotypical attitudes, and do not oppose ethnic intermarriage. 
Intolerant attitudes are therefore difﬁ cult to express without facing social criticism; pressures of 
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social conformity favour more tolerant attitudes. We expect that general social pressures make it 
less difﬁ cult for individuals to adopt attitudes that are in congruence with the dominant norms 
of society. In the case of prejudice towards ethnic outgroups, these happen to be more tolerant. 
In summary, we expect the ‘Tolerance dominance hypothesis’ to hold: Someone who moves to 
a social destination category of which the immobile members are in general less hostile towards 
ethnic minorities than the immobile members of the origin category will be more likely to adopt the 
attitudes of the destination class than someone who is mobile into a social category of which the 
immobile members express more hostile attitudes than the social origin category. 
2.2.4 Losers of modernization
The importance of social mobility for attitudes towards ethnic outgroups is also found in the 
‘losers of modernization’ thesis (Scheuch & Klingemann, 1967). Downward mobility may determine 
that people lose connections with society and that problems accumulate among those who 
experience downward mobility (Bernhardt, 2001; Durkheim, 1987 [1897]). Downward mobility is 
likely to fuel feelings of subjective deprivation and economic competition. Since intergenerational 
progress is an important expectation in society, lack of mobility may lead to frustration. Feelings 
of subjective deprivation, perceptions of competition, and frustration may ﬁ nd a release in 
hostile attitudes towards ethnic outgroups whom become scapegoats (Bettelheim & Janovitch, 
1964). Consequently, the downward mobile may be especially likely to develop antipathy towards 
ethnic outgroups (Weller & Tabory, 1984). These theories suggest the ‘frustration hypothesis’: 
Intergenerational downward mobility induces hostile attitudes towards ethnic out-groups above and 
beyond social origin and destination effects on attitudes. 
 We test our hypotheses on two different datasets, for two types of mobility (educational 
and class) and on three different indicators of ethnic hostility. We assume that the same 
mechanisms apply and our results should therefore be consistent. 
2.3 DATA, MEASUREMENTS AND METHODS
2.3.1 Data description and measurement of dependent and independent variables
In this chapter we used the Dutch national Social and Cultural Developments in the Netherlands 
(SOCON) surveys, waves 1995, 2000, and 2005 and the Netherlands Kinship and Panel Study (NKPS) 
wave 2002.2 Within the SOCON a random stratiﬁ ed sampling method is followed: 81 municipalities 
were randomly selected according to their level of urbanization, followed by a random selection of 
residents aged 18-70. The response rate of these surveys is approximately 50 per cent. The NKPS 
is a random sample of individuals within private households in the Netherlands, with a minimum 
age of 18 and a maximum age of 79. To collect data from the main respondents, Computer Aided 
Personal Interviewing (CAPI), supplemented with self-completion questionnaires, was used. The 
overall response rate was 44.7 per cent. Response rates tend to be rather low in the Netherlands, 
and the response rates of the SOCON and the NKPS are not exceptionally low. The samples of the 
SOCON are to a large extent representative for the Dutch population. The distribution by sex, 
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urbanization, and matrimonial status in the NKPS sample signiﬁ cantly differs from that in the 
comparison population. Results based on a weighted sample do not lead to different conclusions 
as those presented below. For further information with regard to the sampling procedure, response 
rates and the construction of the weight variable we refer to the respective codebooks (Dykstra et 
al., 2004; Eisinga et al., 2002; Eisinga, De Graaf, Levels, Need, & Scheepers, 2008; Eisinga, Felling, 
Konig, Peters, & Scheepers, 1999). 
 For the present study we selected respondents with Dutch-born parents. With regard 
to the educational mobility analyses, we only included respondents older than 25 at which age 
most people ﬁ nished their educational career. For the class mobility analyses we excluded all 
students. The sample sizes used in this chapter depend on the type of intergenerational mobility 
(educational or class) and the dependent variable in question (see Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
 Based on the SOCON data sets, we constructed an ethnic stereotype scale and an ethnic 
threat scale as dependent variables.3 The ethnic stereotype scale score was based on the mean 
score of the following items: ‘With Moroccans you never know for certain whether they are going 
to be aggressive or not.’, ‘Most people from Surinam work quite slowly’, ‘Gypsies are never to be 
trusted.’, ‘Turks have so many children because they are slightly backward’, and ‘When you do 
business with Jews, you have to be extra careful.’ With answer categories: (4) agree entirely, (3) 
agree, (2) don’t agree/don’t disagree, (1) disagree, and (0) disagree entirely. The Cronbach’s alpha 
of the ethnic stereotype scale is 0.79. For the 1995, 2000, and 2005 waves this is 0.78, 0.83, 
and 0.76, respectively. If a respondent had one or two missing values on these ethnic stereotype 
items, we substituted these with the mean values based on the other stereotype items. Missing 
values were distributed more or less equally across these items (approximately 4 per cent). Results 
based on a sub-sample of respondents who had valid scores on all ﬁ ve items do not lead to 
substantially different results. The ethnic threat scale was a mean score of the items ‘The day will 
come that Dutch people will be ﬁ red to give jobs to ethnic minorities’ and ‘The coming of ethnic 
minorities to the Netherlands is a threat to our own culture’, both with answer categories: (4) 
agree entirely, (3) agree, (2) don’t agree/don’t disagree, (1) don’t agree, and (0) don’t agree at 
all. The inter-item Pearson correlation coefﬁ cient is 0.52. For the 1995, 2000, and 2005 waves 
this is 0.51, 0.62, and 0.48 respectively. Conﬁ rmatory factor analysis showed that the stereotype 
and ethnic threat dimension are empirically distinguishable. 
 Based on the NKPS data we constructed an opposition to ethnic intermarriage 
scale by adding the scores on three items on views related to ethnic intermarriage with 
speciﬁ c ethnic groups. The question is: ‘Would it bother you if one of your children decided 
to marry someone of [Turkish/Moroccan/Surinamese] descent?’, with answer categories (4) 
‘bother me a lot’, (3) ‘bother me a little’, (2) ‘neutral’, (1) ‘not bother me’, (0) ‘not bother 
me at all’. The Cronbach’s alpha of the opposition to ethnic intermarriage scale is 0.95.
 Social destination is measured either as respondent’s current social class or as 
respondent’s highest achieved educational degree. Social origin is either father’s social class 
when the respondent was 15 or father’s highest achieved educational degree. The social class 
of respondent’s current class position and father’s social class when the respondent was 15 were 
measured using a condensed version of the original eleven-category EGP classiﬁ cation scheme 
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created by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (Goldthorpe, 2000).4 In the Netherlands, the 
majority of the employed male population works in the service class, i.e. as high- and low-grade 
professionals and managers (classes I and II of the EGP class scheme) (Ganzeboom & Luijkx, 2004). 
Güveli, Need and De Graaf, (2007b) argue that in post-industrial societies, within this service 
class two sub-classes may be distinguished: the socio-cultural specialists (e.g. social workers, 
teachers, lawyers) and the technocrats (e.g. engineers, accountants, and ofﬁ ce managers). These 
subclasses are deﬁ ned according to two criteria: controllability of the work performance and the 
socio-cultural character of the work tasks. It is relatively harder for employers to monitor socio-
cultural specialists than technocrats in their work tasks. Furthermore, socio-cultural specialists 
have speciﬁ c skills and knowledge involving social services and social-cultural issues. Extensive 
validation tests strongly supports this class distinction for the Netherlands (Güveli, 2006; Güveli 
& De Graaf, 2007; Güveli, Need, & De Graaf, 2007a).The ﬁ nal class background categories we used 
were: (1) technocrats, (2) socio-cultural specialists, (3) routine non-manual occupations; (4) 
small employers, (5) manual supervisors and skilled manual occupations, and (6) semi-unskilled 
manual occupations and farm labourers. We measured the education of the respondent and father’s 
education in six categories: (1) university (WO), (2) college (HBO), (3) O and A levels (HAVO/
VWO), (4) secondary vocational (MBO), (5) lower secondary education (MAVO) and (6) elementary 
school and lower vocational school (LBO).5 
Although the impact of class and educational intergenerational social mobility on 
indicators of ethnic hostility is the main focus of this chapter, we also take into account other 
relevant variables which are likely to affect hostile attitudes and which possibly intervene with the 
impact of social origin and destination positions on these attitudes. Sex was coded as (0) male and 
(1) female. Church attendance was used as an indicator for religiosity and was measured in times 
per year. With regard to the class mobility analyses we controlled for respondent’s educational 
attainment since both father’s class position and respondent’s educational attainment are causally 
prior to respondent’s class destination. To take into account over time changes in ethnic hostility 
we included the variable birth cohort. Birth cohort was coded as survey year minus age at time of 
survey. Taking into account social position speciﬁ c birth cohort did not alter our ﬁ ndings. 
We are aware of other alternative explanations for negative attitudes, such as for example 
contact with ethnic minorities and neighbourhood contexts. However, only omitted variables that 
are related to both the speciﬁ c negative attitude and social mobility possibly bias our estimation 
of mobility effects. We expect to ﬁ nd mobility effects due to socialization mechanisms or due to a 
change of competition environment following mobility. Testing whether mobility effects could be 
explained by for example more or less contact with ethnic minorities or due to a change in residential 
environment following mobility, although interesting, is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Descriptive statistics as well as the six mobility tables on which we base our conclusions 
are summarised in Appendices 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. 
2.3.2 Diagonal mobility models and formalization of hypotheses
We use diagonal mobility models (Hendrickx et al., 1993; Sobel, 1981) to assess the relative impact 
of social origin and destination position on ethnic stereotypes, ethnic threat and opposition to 
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ethnic intermarriage. Diagonal mobility models offer a parsimonious and theoretically interpretable 
method to model interactions between social origins and destinations (see also note 1). To stress 
the theoretical importance of diagonal mobility models for the social sciences, Cox used these 
models as an example how social science can bridge empirical and substantive concerns. According 
to Cox: ‘These models aim to explain what is observed in terms of processes (mechanisms), usually 
via quantities that are not directly observed, and some theoretical notions as to how the system 
under study “works”’ (Cox, 1990, p. 169). Interested scholars can ﬁ nd a short tutorial on the 
application of diagonal mobility models in Appendix 2.4 of which an electronic version is available 
at www.jtolsma.nl.
Diagonal mobility models model the relative impact of the origin and destination position 
on the dependent variable. The central idea behind diagonal mobility models is that the immobile 
represent the ‘core’ of each social position and express attitudes ‘appropriate’ to the class position 
in question. In our case, these core attitudes will be expressed by respondents who have the 
same social class position as their father or the same educational degree as their father. In a 
table showing respondent’s social class by father’s social class when the respondent was 15, the 
immobile respondents will fall on the main top-left to bottom-right diagonal. Members of these 
core positions establish their attitudes towards ethnic minorities without mobility experiences.
 Formally, within diagonal mobility models, the attitudes of respondents in the ij cell 
of the mobility table are modelled as a function of the attitudes of the immobile respondents in 
social origin position i (cell ii) and of the immobile respondents of social destination position j 
(cell jj). The additive diagonal mobility baseline model without covariates for a dependent interval 
variable is given by: 
Yijk= pμii + (1-p)μjj + εijk (Model 0)
And the baseline model with covariates is given by:
Yijk= pμii + (1-p)μjj + Σbβbxijb + εijk (Model 1)
Where εijk is a stochastic term with expectation 0, and μii and μjj are the population means of the iith 
and jjth cells of the mobility table. The parameter p indicates the salience of origin status relative 
to destination status to the dependent variable in question. Parameter p can thus be interpreted 
as the relative weight, or importance, of the origin category and 1 – p the relative weight, or 
importance, of the destination category for the explanation of the dependent variable, Yijk. If p is 
smaller than 0.5 the destination has a stronger relative impact on the dependent variable than the 
origin position. During the estimation procedure, we restricted the salience parameter to the [0,1] 
interval in which it should theoretically lie. The covariates are expressed by different xijb variables 
and the corresponding covariate parameters by βb, which should be interpreted just as in ordinary 
least square regression analysis. The interpretation of the parameters will be illustrated further by 
several examples in the result section. 
In our origin hypotheses we stated that the inﬂ uence of the origin position is likely to 
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be more important than the inﬂ uence of the destination position. According to these hypotheses, 
the salience parameter p should be larger than 0.5. The destination hypotheses, which stated that 
the destination position will be more important than the social origin, implies that p is smaller 
than 0.5. 
The tolerance dominance hypothesis states that adaptation to the attitudes of the 
destination position will be stronger when these norms are more tolerant than the origin position. 
To order social classes and educational degrees on the level of ethnic hostility, we use the 
mean level of hostile attitudes as expressed by the immobile respondents. To test the tolerance 
dominance hypothesis we constructed a dummy variable xijt which takes the value 1 if someone 
moved to a position of which the immobile members express lower levels of hostile attitudes 
than the immobile class members of the origin position and 0 otherwise. Henceforth, we refer to 
these respondents as respectively the tolerant-destination and intolerant-destination mobile. The 
tolerance model is given by:
Yijk= (p + txijt)μii + (1-(p+txijt))μjj + Σbβbxijb + εijk (Model 2)
and we ﬁ nd conﬁ rmation for our hypothesis if t is negative. In this case the impact of the origin is 
smaller for the tolerant-destination mobile (i.e. p + t) than for the intolerant-destination mobile 
(i.e. p). 
 Finally, we expected that downward mobility may have an additional effect independent 
of the origin and destination categories due to the frustration that accompanies downward 
mobility. The full model is given by:
Yijk= (p + txijt)μii + (1-(p+txijt))μjj + fxijf + Σbβbxijb + εijk (Model 3)
Where the dummy variable xijf takes the value 1 for the downward mobile and 0 otherwise. An f 
larger than 0 is corroborative evidence for the frustration Hypotheses. 
In the result section below we discuss the parameter estimates of model 2 and 3. 
These models show the relative impact of origin and destination for the tolerant-destination and 
intolerant-destination mobile and whether there are additional mobility effects above origin and 
destination speciﬁ c acculturation mechanisms.  
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2.4 RESULTS
2.4.1 Intergenerational class mobility
Before we discuss class mobility effects we brieﬂ y describe the distribution of the investigated 
indicators of ethnic hostility across immobile respondents and the impact of the included 
covariates. Table 2.2 shows that in the Netherlands, social class has a non-linear relationship 
with ethnic hostile attitudes. The estimates of the diagonal cell parameters (μ11, μ22, μ33, μ44, μ55, 
μ66) refer to the mean values as expressed by the stable members of the speciﬁ c social position. 
Thus, the immobile socio-cultural specialists have the lowest level of stereotypical attitudes 
(1.55) and feelings of ethnic threat (1.75), and have the least opposition to an ethnically mixed 
marriage (6.22) (Table 2.2, models 2). Of the respondents who have not experienced mobility, 
the small employers hold the most stereotypic views regarding ethnic outgroups (1.95, Table 2.2, 
model 2) and opposition to ethnic heterogamy is most prevalent among the self-employed as well 
(7.91, Table 2.2, models 2). Feelings of ethnic threat are however most prevalent among manual 
labourers. This may reﬂ ect the level of objective economic competition members these groups face 
from ethnic minorities. While the order of social classes on the level of ethnic hostility is usually 
similar across stereotypes, ethnic threat, and intermarriage, the exact ordering of social classes on 
the level of ethnic hostility depends on the speciﬁ c indicator of ethnic hostility in question.
 Men and women do not differ in the level of stereotypical attitudes and feelings of 
ethnic threat but women express more opposition to ethnic intermarriage than men. Younger birth 
cohorts express lower levels of stereotypes, ethnic threat, and ethnic exclusionism. People who 
more frequently attend church express higher levels of ethnic hostile attitudes than those who 
attend less frequently. The higher one’s educational level the lower the level of hostile attitudes 
expressed (Table 2.2, models 2). 
 To test our hypotheses we now turn to the estimates of the mobility parameters. The 
relative inﬂ uence of the class of origin compared to the class of destination is p for the intolerant-
destination mobile and p + t for the tolerant-destination mobile. Downward mobility was expected 
to increase feelings of subjective deprivation, frustration, and perceptions of economic competition. 
Effects of downward mobility which work independently of the acculturation mechanism are 
expressed by the frustration parameter f. First we notice that with respect to stereotypes and ethnic 
threat there are no such downward mobility effects (Table 2.2, models 3) and it sufﬁ ces to look at 
the parameter estimates of models 2. With respect to opposition to ethnic intermarriage however, 
we do ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant effect of downward mobility independent of origin and destination effects 
(f=0.29, SE=0.13, Table 2.2, model 3). This provides corroborative evidence for the downward 
mobility hypothesis. That we only found conﬁ rmation for the frustration hypothesis with respect 
to opposition to ethnic intermarriage may be related to the fact that ethnically mixed marriage is 
the most intimate form of inter-ethnic contact and the one indicator of ethnic hostility to which 
there is by far the highest level of expressed hostility (Table 2.1). It may be more acceptable to 
express frustrations openly regarding ethnic marriage given the high level of opposition to it. 
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 For all distinguished negative attitudes, we ﬁ nd that the destination class provides a 
stronger reference point for those whose father was a member of a less tolerant social class (i.e. the 
tolerant-destination mobile) than for those whose father was a member of a more tolerant social 
class (i.e. the intolerant-destination mobile). The tolerance parameters t are -0.46 (SE=0.31), -
0.76 (SE=0.27), and -0.90 (SE=0.28), respectively for stereotypes, ethnic threat, and opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage (Table 2.2). This clearly supports the tolerance hypothesis in which we 
stated that acculturation to the attitudes of a new social position would be easier if the norms are 
more in line with the dominant (i.e. more tolerant) attitudes of society. 
 The relative impact of the origin and destination class thus depends on the tolerance 
direction of mobility. For the tolerant-destination mobile the impact of the origin is negligible 
since the p and t parameters add up to approximately zero: 0.46 – 0.46; 0.76 – 0.76; 1.00 – 0.90, 
respectively for stereotypes, ethnic threat, and opposition to ethnic intermarriage (Table 2.2). But 
strikingly, the class origin has a substantial inﬂ uence compared to the destination class for the 
mobile who moved to a less tolerant destination class. With respect to stereotypes the origin class is 
then equally important (p=0.46, Table 2.2, model 2) and the origin class even has a stronger impact 
among the intolerant-destination mobile with respect to ethnic threat (p=0.76, Table 2.2, model 2) 
and is the sole inﬂ uence with respect to ethnic intermarriage (p=1.00, Table 2.2, model 3).
 To illustrate the impact of mobility, consider a male born in 1960 who does not go 
to church and has only minimal schooling and whose father worked in a factory as an unskilled 
labourer (unskilled manual occupation). If this man starts his own small business (small employer) 
he would move up to a class where the core members are more opposed to ethnic intermarriage. 
We would predict that he would not acculturate to these attitudes since p = 1.00 and would 
predict his score on the intermarriage scale resembles the score of the core members of the origin 
category. If on the other hand, he were able to move up the social ladder even further, say to the 
class of socio-cultural specialists, his upward mobility would take him into a class where the core 
members are less opposed to ethnic intermarriage than the core members of his origin position. 
In the latter case we predict his score on the intermarriage scale closely resembles the score of 
core members of his new and more tolerant class (6.27).6
2.4.2 Intergenerational educational mobility
Immobile respondents within the highest educational position consistently express the lowest 
level of ethnic hostility: 1.15, 1.11, and 5.53 for respectively ethnic stereotypes, ethnic threat, 
and opposition to ethnic intermarriage, as shown in models 2 of Table 2.3. Immobile people with 
no or only elementary education express the highest levels of ethnic stereotypes (1.75), feel more 
threatened by ethnic minorities (2.03), and are in general more opposed to ethnically mixed 
marriages (7.07) (Table 2.3, models 2). Not surprisingly, the estimates of the covariates do not 
differ substantially from the estimates obtained from the class mobility models and are therefore 
not further discussed.
 The estimates of the downward mobility parameters are in the predicted direction but 
they never reach signiﬁ cance (Table 2.3, models 3). We have to reject the downwards mobility 
hypothesis. Within Table 2.3, models 2, the estimates of the tolerance parameter are in the 
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predicted direction (negative) but only reach signiﬁ cance with respect to ethnic intermarriage 
(t=-0.66, SE=0.24). 
From table 2.3 models 2, one’s own educational achievements are more important 
compared to father’s educational position for the explanation of stereotypical attitudes and 
feelings of ethnic threat. This holds for both intergenerational mobile respondents who obtained 
a higher degree – and in this case inherently a more tolerant position – than their father and 
for respondents who did not succeed in obtaining a degree as high as their father. This supports 
the educational destination hypotheses. The educational destination hypothesis is also supported 
among the tolerant-destination mobile with respect to opposition to ethnic intermarriage (p + t 
= 0.73 – 0.66 < 0.5, Table 2.3, model 3). Although the impact of the origin category on attitudes 
related to ethnic intermarriage is negligible for the mobile who reach a more tolerant educational 
position than their father, the impact of the origin category is even larger than the impact of 
the destination for the mobile who do not reach a more tolerant educational level (p=0.73, 
SE=0.18). 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Intergenerational mobility has a notable impact on ethnic hostility. People adapt to the attitudes 
of the destination category, but the extent of this attitudinal adjustment depends on the speciﬁ c 
origin and destination combination. We view social strata as having core or typical attitudes 
which are expressed by the members who have not experienced intergenerational social mobility. 
If someone is socially mobile and enters a new social position of which these core members are 
in general more tolerant towards ethnic minorities than the core members of the origin position, 
acculturation is easier and the impact of the origin is negligible. This holds for both types of 
intergenerational social mobility we investigated – intergenerational class and educational mobility 
– and for all three types of negative attitudes we consider: stereotypical attitudes, feelings of 
ethnic threat, and opposition to ethnic intermarriage. On the other hand, when the origin position 
is more tolerant than the destination position, the relative impact of the origin is substantial and 
sometimes exceeds the impact of the destination. 
 We interpreted origin effects as resulting from socialization processes taking place early 
in life. Destination effects could be both due to re-socialization later in life and due to shared 
experiences of ethnic threat (instrumental effects). With regard to educational mobility it is likely 
that the destination affects ethnic hostility due to both instrumental and socialization effects 
since schools are important socializing agents. This may explain why the destination is more 
inﬂ uential with respect to educational mobility than with respect to class mobility. 
In the Netherlands, mobility affects ethnic hostility by origin and destination dependent 
acculturation. Acculturation to tolerant attitudes is easier than acculturation to intolerant attitudes. 
This ﬁ nding supports what we have called the tolerance dominance hypotheses: acculturation to 
the level of ethnic hostility of the achieved social position will be stronger when these attitudes 
are more in congruence with the dominant culture of tolerance within society. 
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 Due to modernization processes and educational expansion upward mobility is more 
prevalent than downward mobility. Although upward mobility is often synonymous with mobility to 
a more tolerant stratum, this is not always the case. Hence, we cannot deduce from our data that as 
time goes there will necessarily be a reduction in ethnic hostility. Moreover, hostile attitudes may 
become more prevalent among all social classes because of shifts in macro-sociological conditions 
such as public events linked to ethnic conﬂ ict (e.g. hate crimes), large scale immigration ﬂ uxes, 
or economic recessions. 
We expected that downward social mobility would foster ethnic hostility due to feelings 
of frustration and increased perceptions of ethnic competition. This mobility effect should 
be visible on top of the acculturation effects following mobility. We only found corroborative 
evidence for the frustration hypothesis with respect to class mobility and opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage. We tentatively conclude that it is not the frustration of being downwards mobile but 
more likely frustration of not reaching a social position higher than one’s father that inﬂ uences 
ethnic hostility. The frustration of not achieving intergenerational progress may also be felt by the 
immobile, whose upward social mobility has been blocked. 
Our ﬁ ndings suggest that mobility effects may be generalised across different indicators 
of ethnic hostility and different forms of mobility. Even after taking into account respondent’s 
education we ﬁ nd signiﬁ cant class mobility effects. This stresses the importance of class mobility 
effects. However, ideally one would want to analyze the consequences of educational and class 
mobility simultaneously. Unfortunately, our data does not permit this, since this would involve 
a four-dimensional table with many sparsely ﬁ lled or empty cells. We hope that future research 
disentangles class mobility effects from educational mobility effects more clearly. 
Previous empirical research found a modest inﬂ uence of social origin on ethnic hostility. 
We note, however, that these studies mostly applied standard regression and that mobility effects 
are not adequately modelled with standard regression or similar approaches. Diagonal mobility 
models allow the relative importance of origins and destinations to be estimated. If they are not 
equally important this indicates a mobility effect. Past applications of diagonal mobility models 
identiﬁ ed various other effects of mobility (cf. De Graaf, 1991; De Graaf et al., 1995; Kelley & De 
Graaf, 1997; Monden, De Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2003; Sobel, De Graaf, Heath, & Zou, 2004). We are 
the ﬁ rst to make a distinction between on the one hand upward and downward mobility and on the 
other hand mobility in the direction of dominant attitudes. We ﬁ nd that mobility to more tolerant 
destinations is associated with increased tolerance, but mobility to a less tolerant destination has 
hardly any inﬂ uence on tolerance.
We hope that future research will further test our interpretation that acculturation is 
easier (or more likely) in the direction of ‘dominant’ attitudes. A necessary step in this analysis 
would be to theoretically deﬁ ne the ‘dominant’ attitudes in a society. At least three criteria are 
relevant: (1) the prevalence of the attitude in the society at large; (2) the extent to which state 
institutions actively promote the attitude in question; and (3) the extent to which expression 
of the opposite attitude is sanctioned by state institutions. Cross-societal comparative research 
provides a promising approach to better understand how variation in norms of tolerance conditions 
the effects of individual factors that predict ethnic hostility.
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2.6 NOTES
1.  Suppose that Yi is our dependent variable of interest and that xf is a measure of the social 
status of the father and xc is the social status of the child. Mobility may be conceptualised as 
the difference between these two statuses: xf - xc. Since:
  Yi= αfxf + αcxc + αm (xf - xc) + εi, 
is equivalent to:  
Yi= βfxf + βcxc + εi, 
where βf=αf + αm and βc=αc - αm, 
  these models can not test for the presence of a social mobility effect since they incorporate 
this effect in the main effects of social origin and destination. Thus in the conventional 
standard regression approach there is nothing in between the additive model and the 
model in which every origin and destination combination cell is considered as unique. The 
advantage of diagonal mobility models is that they offer parsimonious and structured models 
of interactions. More importantly, diagonal mobility models are theoretically interpretable; 
the parameters refer to well conceptualised mobility mechanisms. See also Sobel (1981; 
1985) and Sobel, Becker and Minick (1998). 
2.   The Netherlands Kinship Panel Study is funded by grant 480-10-009 from the Major 
Investments Fund of the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁ c Research (NWO), and by the 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), Utrecht University, the University 
of Amsterdam and Tilburg University.
3.  Our focus in this analysis is on openly expressed hostile attitudes towards ethnic minorities 
expressed on survey measures asking about opinions of ethnic outgroups. We recognise 
some research suggests the existence of implicit attitudes of which respondents may be 
incompletely aware, but we lack measures of these constructs in our data, and moreover we 
note that there remain many questions of interpretation of measures of implicit attitudes 
(Quillian, 2006). We believe that openly expressed attitudes remain highly important in 
affecting ethnic relations.
4.  People who became unemployed involuntarily and who want to work but remain unemployed 
for a long time are likely to feel frustrated. Note however that most unemployment in the 
Netherlands is frictional unemployment which may be voluntary. Unfortunately, within our 
data it is not possible to distinguish between frictionally unemployed and structurally 
unemployed. We therefore decided not to treat the unemployed as a separate social class 
position. 
5.   We ordered the educational levels from high to low as followed: (1) university, (2) college 
(HBO), (3) O and A levels (HAVO/VWO), (4) secondary vocational (MBO), (5) lower secondary 
education (MAVO) and (6) elementary school and lower vocational school (LBO). We ordered 
the social classes as followed: (1) technocrats and socio-cultural specialists, (2) routine 
non-manual occupations; (3) small employers, (4) manual supervisors and skilled manual 
occupations, and (5) semi-unskilled manual occupations and farm labourers. Note that 
the technocrats and socio-cultural specialist are assumed to be of equal status. Movement 
out of the service class may be the most signiﬁ cant (downward) mobility experience. In 
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subsequent analysis, a dummy variables referring to mobility out of the service class did not 
lead to different results than the dummy variable capturing more general downward mobility 
experiences.
6.  This is calculated as: (1 – 0.9) * 6.81 + (1 – ( 1 – 0.9) * 6.21=6.27. Note that if his father 
would have belonged to the socio-cultural specialists and the respondent himself would have 
ended up in the lowest class, we would predict a different score on the intermarriage scale, 
namely: 1 * 6.21 + ( 1 – 1) * 6.81 + 0.29 = 6.50.
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3. THE LOCAL LIVING ENVIRONMENT AND ETHNIC HOSTILITY†
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we set out to explain ethnic hostility and in particular as indicated by views of the 
ethnic majority group towards ethnic intermarriage. The Dutch society consists of approximately 
10 percent non-western immigrants (Statistics Netherlands). Of all marriages in 2005, 5 per cent 
were between a native Dutch and a non-western immigrant (Statistics Netherlands). Marriage 
between an ethnic immigrant and a native of the host country can be considered as the ﬁ nal 
step of the integration process for immigrants (Gordon, 1964; Hooghiemstra, 2003), and mixed 
marriages are an indicator of cohesion within society. Opposition to ethnic heterogamy among 
native Dutch would indicate a stagnating integration process and undermines cohesion. 
Opposition to ethnic intermarriage is one of the components of social distance (Bogardus, 
1928) and closely related to the phenomena of prejudice (Allport, 1979 [1954]; Pettigrew & 
Meertens, 1995) and as such it will be highly associated with other indicators of ethnic hostility. 
In this chapter we will investigate to what extent structural characteristics of neighbourhoods 
and municipalities affect opposition to ethnic intermarriage next to individual characteristics. 
Moreover, we will investigate the relative impact of different types of ethnic competition (i.e. 
economic, cultural, and physical) on opposition to ethnic intermarriage. 
Ethnic Competition Theory (ECT) is usually developed as a framework for predicting effects 
of individual-level as well as contextual-level structural characteristics on ethnic exclusionism. 
ECT poses that ethnic competition, either at the individual or group level, actual or perceived, 
enhances negative sentiments against ethnic outgroups by provoking threats to personal and 
group interests (Coenders, 2001; Coser, 1956). Ethnic group competition is the aggregation of 
individual competition experiences and may be over economic resources (Blalock, 1967), power 
(Blalock, 1967), cultural resources or collective identity (Tajfel, 1982). Persons in speciﬁ c social 
strata will resemble each other in hostile attitudes, not necessarily because all individual members 
have the same personal ethnic competition experiences but also because their perceived ethnic 
competition is a result of competition experiences of other members in their social strata. A sudden 
rise of immigrants at the national level leads to ethnic hostility, not necessarily because personal 
ethnic competition experiences are suddenly more prevalent but because these immigrants are 
perceived as a potential competitive threat for members of the ethnic ingroup (Blumer, 1958; 
Bobo & Zubrinsky, 1996). 
Studies focusing on structural sources for variations in ethnic hostility at the contextual 
level have mainly used size of the foreign population and economic conditions as indicators for 
ethnic-group competition. If prejudicial attitudes resulting from the presence of ethnic minorities 
are a threat response, the dynamics of this response should be made explicit (Taylor & Moghaddam, 
† A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in the European Sociological 
Review (2008). An earlier version of this paper has been presented during the European 
Sociological Association (ESA) summer school on ‘Immigration in Europe’, Milan, Italy, 
2006.
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1987). Assessment of the importance of types of ethnic competition remains to be made (Taylor, 
1998). In this chapter, we aim to investigate the relative impact of different types of ethnic 
competition (i.e. economic, cultural, and physical) on opposition to ethnic intermarriage.
As a result of ECT’s group level focal point, most studies focusing on the impact of 
contextual characteristics on ethnic hostility have used the country as a unit of measurement. 
However, there are several reasons to expect that structural characteristics of smaller geographical 
units than the country, such as municipalities and neighbourhoods, affect ethnic hostility, and 
hence opposition to ethnic intermarriage. The second aim of our  chapter is to investigate to what 
extent neighbourhood and municipality characteristics affect opposition to ethnic intermarriage 
next to individual characteristics. 
Results of recent studies on the link between the competitive environment and 
ethnic hostility have been inconsistent (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2004; Lubbers et al., 2006; Oliver 
& Mendelberg, 2000; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006; Taylor, 1998). Taylor (1998) has 
shown that resistance among whites towards blacks is higher when the proportion of blacks in 
neighbourhoods or schools is higher, but could not relate the percentage of Latinos to anti-Latino 
sentiments. Lubbers, Scheepers and Billiet (2000) showed that far right-wing voting in Belgium 
depends on the percentage of ethnic outgroups at the municipality level. But in a study on the 
German situation, Semyonov et al. (2006) could not support the theoretical expectation that the 
size of the ethnic outgroup in the locale increases exclusionary attitudes. Gijsberts and Dagevos 
(2004) showed that an inﬂ ux of ethnic minorities at the neighbourhood level increases negative 
stereotypes, but did not inﬂ uence attitudes related to the Dutch multicultural society. The effects 
of relative group sizes and other characteristics of the living environment on ethnic hostility may 
depend on the hostile attitude in question, the unit of measurement of the locale, and the speciﬁ c 
outgroup. 
If ethnic competition affects ethnic exclusionism, as ECT predicts, it should have an 
effect on views regarding ethnic heterogamy, since acceptance of a member of an ethnic outgroup 
as a close relative is the ultimate form of ethnic inclusion. However, for a sub-sample, we are 
able to compare our results regarding opposition to ethnic intermarriage with other indicators 
of ethnic hostility (i.e. reluctance to grant residence permits to migrants and negative views on 
the multicultural society). In this chapter we have three levels of measurement: the individual, 
the neighbourhood and the municipality. Moreover, to explore whether there are group-speciﬁ c 
exclusionistic reactions we will investigate opposition to ethnic heterogamy in relation to Turks, 
Moroccans and the Surinamese, the main ethnic groups in the Netherlands. We contribute to the 
body of literature by including, for the ﬁ rst time, a wide array of indicators for regional variance 
in ethnic competition in the explanatory model, next to relative group size measures and relevant 
individual-level characteristics. 
The above leads to the following research question: To what extent do characteristics of 
Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities related to economic, cultural or safety threats affect ethnic 
hostility (i.e. opposition to ethnic intermarriage, reluctance to grant residence permits to migrants 
and negative views on the multicultural society)?
We will test several hypotheses derived from ECT and Contact Theory with a national 
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representative data set, the Netherlands Kinship and Panel Study (NKPS) wave 2002, supplemented 
with unique aggregate demographic statistics on the city and neighbourhood level.
3.2 EXPECTATIONS
Opposition to ethnic intermarriage is a type of ethnic exclusionism, just like opposition to 
integrated housing, denial of civil rights to ethnic minorities (Scheepers et al., 2002) and 
opposition to asylum seeker centres (Lubbers et al., 2006). The explanations proposed by ECT for 
ethnic exclusionism should therefore also hold for views regarding ethnic heterogamy.
Ethnic group competition takes place in economic and cultural units. In the Netherlands, 
municipalities and sometimes even neighbourhoods have their own local authority and run local 
elections. There is considerable variance in employment levels across cities and neighbourhoods. 
Also, the real estate market varies widely between and within cities, and competition for primary 
education and public services takes place within cities or neighbourhoods (Oliver & Mendelberg, 
2000). Moreover, a regional group identity is developed due to, among other factors, local news 
media, soccer clubs, dialects and the social network; in general, between 10 and 20 per cent of the 
social network of a Dutch individual consists of people who live in the same neighbourhood (Flap, 
1999). We therefore expect the living environment of neighbourhoods and municipalities to affect 
opposition to ethnic heterogamy: Opposition to ethnic intermarriage varies at the municipality level 
and at the neighbourhood level (Regional variance hypothesis).
To assess whether the variance at the locale is in part genuinely due to structural 
characteristics, we will control for possible composition effects by including relevant individual-
level characteristics into our explanatory model. Based on previous research on attitudes towards 
ethnic outgroups, we expect older people, men, the lower educated, the lower strata together 
with the self-employed, and religious individuals, to express higher levels of opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage than young people, women, the higher educated, the higher social strata, and non-
religious individuals (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2005; Kunovich, 2004). 
We investigate opposition to ethnic intermarriage with speciﬁ c ethnic minority groups: 
Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans. These groups form 7 per cent of the current Dutch population 
(Statistics Netherlands). Turks and Moroccans are predominantly Muslim. The Surinamese are 
Christian, Hindu or Muslim. Opposition to ethnic heterogamy may therefore overlap with opposition 
to religious heterogamy. Consequently, we expect that religiosity will be a stronger predictor 
for opposition to ethnic intermarriage than for other indicators of ethnic hostility. Given the 
regional variation in religiosity and denominations within the Netherlands, the regional variance 
in opposition to ethnic intermarriage will be, in part, a consequence of the religious composition 
of the locale.
Previous research has pointed to the relevance of the family of origin in relation to hostile 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities (Hello, 2003; Jaspers et al., 2008). To control rigorously for 
possible composition effects, we include parental educational level, occupational position of the 
father during childhood and mother’s denomination in the explanatory model, and expect these 
effects to take the same direction as those of the respondent.
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The actual ethnic competition within geographic units such as neighbourhoods and 
municipalities will be more severe the larger the percentage of ethnic outgroups. The visibility of 
ethnic minorities in the locale is likely to inﬂ uence the perceptions of relative group sizes and 
hence perceived ethnic competition as well (Blalock, 1967; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000; Taylor, 
1998). Variation in actual ethnic competition and in perceived ethnic competition due to locale 
variation in relative group sizes, leads us to expect that: Regional variation in opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage is partially a consequence of the relative group size at the locale (Relative group size 
hypothesis). However, for Coenders (2001) and Olzak (1992, p. 35) the mechanism underlying 
perceived threat and ethnic hostility is not only the absolute size of minorities in the population, 
but ethnic tensions will increase by changing levels of outgroup sizes as well. Regional variation 
in opposition to ethnic intermarriage is partially a consequence of the changes in the relative group 
size at the locale (Change in relative group size hypothesis). 
There is strong regional variation in the concentration of ethnic minorities in the 
Netherlands, with different patterns for each of the three minority groups (Statistics Netherlands). 
We can relate the presence of Surinamese, Turks and Moroccans in a municipality to the resistance 
to intermarriage with a member of the speciﬁ c ethnic group. Hence we can test the propositions 
from ECT on the effect of relative outgroup sizes more rigorously, by investigating whether the 
relative group size of a speciﬁ c ethnic group predominantly affects hostile attitudes directed to 
this speciﬁ c ethnic minority group.
Ethnic hostility increases when the group economic situation worsens (Blalock, 1967; 
Quillian, 1995, 1996). The socio-economic status of the locale and changes herein are direct 
measures of the majority group’s actual economic environment. We therefore pose: Opposition to 
ethnic intermarriage is partially a consequence of (changes in) the socio-economic status of the 
locale (Economic environment hypothesis).
3.2.1 Cultural and physical competition
Due to the focus on relative group size and economic circumstances as the main contextual 
characteristics in empirical studies within the group-threat theory tradition, other forms of ethnic 
competition have been neglected in the literature (Taylor, 1998). To evaluate the underlying 
mechanism between actual competition at the contextual level and ethnic hostility, measures of 
economic and cultural competition are called for, next to measures of relative group size (Oliver 
& Mendelberg, 2000; Taylor, 1998).
Cultural competition takes place at the religious market (e.g. presence of places of 
worship) and within the educational system (e.g. presence of schools exclusively for Muslims 
(Taylor, 1998). The presence of mosques and Muslim schools in one’s living environment highlights 
the cultural distinctiveness between native Dutch and ethnic outgroups and as a consequence, 
concerns over cultural identity will increase among native Dutch (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & 
Prior, 2004). We use information on the geographical location of mosques and schools exclusively 
for Muslims as an indicator for (perceived) cultural competition at the contextual level and 
hypothesise that: The more mosques and Muslim schools present at the locale, the more opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage at the locale (Cultural environment hypothesis).
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 Members of most ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands are overrepresented in crime 
statistics. Almost 40 per cent of the population of suspects of criminal offences committed in 
2002 had an ethnic minority background, whereas the total of ethnic minorities (both EU and 
non-EU) forms only 20 per cent of the Dutch population (Blom et al., 2005). Moreover, crime is 
the most important theme in newspaper articles on Turks, Moroccans and the Surinamese in the 
Netherlands (Lubbers, Scheepers, & Wester, 1998). Publicity on criminal behaviour by ethnic-
minority members, often stirred up after Muslim terrorism and honour-related violence, is likely 
to attribute crime as characteristic of ethnic outgroups. This may fuel a physical, or safety threat 
(Sniderman et al., 2004; Taylor, 1998). We assume that feelings of fear and physical threat depend 
on the level of crime in municipalities and neighbourhoods. These feelings in turn may lead to 
lack of trust in others, and in particular to suspicion towards members of ethnic outgroups. We, 
therefore, deduce the following hypothesis: The higher the crime rates in a locale, the higher the 
opposition to ethnic intermarriage (Physical environment hypothesis).
 Opposition to ethnic intermarriage may also be heightened by a lack of social cohesion. 
Socially disintegrated individuals feel insecure and will search for new ways to derive a positive 
self-identity. To compensate for their loss in positive self-identity, such individuals have a stronger 
need for attachment to the ethnic ingroup and increase their ethnic ingroup favorable attitudes 
and negative views towards ethnic outgroups (Arendt, 1951; Lubbers, 2001). We assume that 
social cohesion will be lower within neighbourhoods and municipalities that are characterised by 
higher-moving mobility rates. Furthermore, a lack of social cohesion due to residential instability 
decreases informal social control within localities, hereby making the locality a preferred target 
area for criminals (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). As a consequence, residents may feel 
unsafe within these localities. In sum, residential instability is expected to cause residents to 
feel unsecure and unsafe and hence to develop ethnic hostility: Residents in neighbourhoods 
and municipalities characterised by high rates of mobility will express higher levels of opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage than residents in neighbourhoods and municipalities with lower rates of 
mobility (Cohesive environment hypothesis).
 Larger Dutch cities have had a longer history with relatively high percentages of non-
Western ethnic minorities. Due to the longer visibility of ethnic minorities within large cities and 
to the accumulation of problems associated with large cities such as organised crime, housing 
shortages and ethnic minorities without legal residence permits, we expect that: Respondents in 
larger cities express higher levels of opposition to ethnic intermarriage than respondents in smaller 
cities (Negative large city hypothesis).1
3.2.2 Contact Theory
In line with ECT, we stated that the ethnic minority percentage in neighbourhoods and municipalities 
is likely to be positively related to actual and perceived ethnic competition and hence to opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage. However, Contact Theory offers an alternative hypothesis to ECT. Intergroup 
contact reduces prejudice, even if Allport’s optimal contact conditions (Allport, 1979 [1954]) 
are not met (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Although the causal mechanism is not undisputed, the 
literature seems to suggest that the causality runs mainly from contact to prejudice reduction 
3. The Local Living Environment and Ethnic Hostility | Expectations
54
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Wagner et al. (2006) show that, at least in the case of Germany, 
the percentage foreigners in the locale is negatively related to prejudice even after controlling 
for relevant individual level characteristics. They further established that the opportunity for 
contact and actual contact with foreigners in the neighbourhood increases with larger outgroup 
proportions in the living environment (Wagner et al., 2006).2 Given these ﬁ ndings and in line with 
Contact Theory, we formulate a Contact Hypothesis: The higher the percentage of ethnic minorities 
in the neighbourhood and municipality, the lower the opposition to ethnic intermarriage. In line 
with this, we formulate a Positive large city hypothesis: Respondents in larger cities express lower 
levels of opposition to ethnic intermarriages than respondents in smaller cities.
However, higher levels of contact are in part a consequence of tolerant attitudes as well 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). People with more tolerant attitudes may embrace residential proximity 
to immigrants and choose to live in neighbourhoods and municipalities with higher percentages of 
ethnic minorities (Wagner et al., 2006). Likewise, one could also expect selective out-migration of 
people with intolerant attitudes from locales with high percentages of ethnic minorities i.e. ‘white 
ﬂ ight’ (Massey, Gross, & Shibuya, 1994). We assume that respondents with low educational levels 
are more often relegated to neighbourhoods and municipalities with higher percentages of ethnic 
minorities due to economic constraints than respondents with high educational levels. Selective 
migration therefore implies a negative interaction between educational attainment and relative 
group size. If the effect of relative group size on opposition to ethnic intermarriage is positive for 
the lower educated (or for all educational levels) we would ﬁ nd support for the threat mechanism. 
If on the other hand the effect of relative group size on ethnic heterogamy is negative for all 
educational levels, this would be a corroboration of the contact theory.
In this chapter, we thus pose that two mechanisms may operate at the neighbourhood 
and the municipality level simultaneously: the threat mechanism and the contact mechanism. 
Furthermore, we pose that due to selective migration outgroup sizes may be positively related to 
opposition to ethnic intermarriage for the lower educated and negatively related to opposition to 
ethnic intermarriage for the higher educated. 
3.3 DATA, MEASUREMENTS AND METHODS
3.3.1 Micro-level measurements
For information on individual-level characteristics, we used data from the main sample of the 
Netherlands Kinship and Panel Study (NKPS) wave 2002 (Dykstra et al.).3 This is a random sample 
of individuals within private households in the Netherlands, with a minimum age of 18 and 
a maximum age of 79. To collect data from the main respondents, Computer Aided Personal 
Interviewing (CAPI), supplemented with self-completion questionnaires, was used. The overall 
response rate was 44.7 per cent. Response rates tend to be rather low in the Netherlands, and 
this study is no exception. For the present study we selected respondents with both Dutch-born 
parents and who returned the self-completion questionnaire (N=6538). A sub-sample of these 
respondents (N=903) provided information on more indicators of ethnic hostility.
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 The opposition to ethnic intermarriage scale was constructed by adding the scores on 
three items on views related to ethnic intermarriage with speciﬁ c ethnic groups (‘Would it bother 
you if one of your children decided to marry someone of [Turkish/Moroccan/Surinamese] descent?’, 
with answer categories (4) ‘bother me a lot’, (3) ‘bother me a little’, (2) ‘neutral’, (1) ‘not bother 
me’, (0) ‘not bother me at all’). The three items constituted a Mokken scale (Mokken, 1971): the 
Loevinger’s H for the entire scale was 0.92 and the lowest Loevinger’s H per item pair was 0.89. 
Respondents are most opposed to an ethnic intermarriage with Moroccans, followed by an ethnic 
intermarriage with Turks. This ﬁ nding is in line with previous research on the ethnic hierarchy in 
the Netherlands (Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003). The constituted ‘ethnic intermarriage scale’ runs 
from 0-12, and higher scores indicate more opposition to ethnic heterogamy. It closely follows 
a normal distribution. Approximately 40 per cent of our respondents are bothered if one of their 
children decides to marry someone from either Turkish, Moroccan or Surinamese descent.
To assess the construct validity of the ethnic marriage scale, we tested the relationship 
to other prejudice-related concepts among the indicated sub-sample of respondents. Within 
this sub-sample, the three items on ethnic intermarriage referring to a speciﬁ c ethnic group 
also formed a Mokken scale with other items measuring social distance (Bogardus, 1928). As 
expected, exclusionistic attitudes were most prevalent when it came to ethnic heterogamy. 
Furthermore, the ethnic intermarriage scale correlated signiﬁ cantly with more restrictive views 
on Dutch immigration policies (e.g. ‘To what extent do you believe the Dutch government should 
be lenient in issuing residence permits to people from other countries who wish to live and 
work in the Netherlands for the following reason: someone whose life is at risk in his country of 
origin because of the political situation’, Pearson correlation r=0.23), with negative views on the 
multicultural society (e.g. ‘There are too many migrants in the Netherlands’, Pearson correlation 
r=0.50) and with individually-experienced ethnic threat (‘Do you feel at ease in the company of 
migrants?’, Pearson correlation r=0.44). In sum, our dependent variable forms part of an ethnic 
social-distance scale and is related to views on immigration policies, the multicultural society in 
general, and individually-perceived ethnic threat. The propositions of group-threat theories such 
as ECT that relate to prejudice and exclusionism should therefore hold in relation to opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage. 
Sex was coded as (1) male and (0) female. Age was measured in years. Education was 
measured in years: no complete primary=4; primary education=6; lower vocational education 
(LBO)=8; lower general education (MAVO)=10; medium vocational education (MBO)=10.5; 
medium general education (HAVO)=11; higher general education (VWO)=12; higher vocational 
education (HBO)=15; and university=16. For parental education, we used the highest education 
of either parent and it was also measured in years. We replaced missing values with mean values. 
The employment categories were measured using a condensed version of the original eleven-
category EGP classiﬁ cation scheme created by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979). We 
used current occupational status to derive the social class of the respondent, and added the 
categories: pensioner, student, disabled, in care of household, and unemployed. For father’s social 
class we used the occupation of the father at the time the respondent was aged 15, and this 
was measured by the EGP scheme too. The denomination of the respondent was measured in 
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seven categories: no-religion, Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed and Calvinists (synodal), other 
Calvinist denominations, other Christian denominations, other denominations, and missing. 
Church attendance was measured in times per year. Missing values on church attendance were set 
to the mean value. Mother’s denomination was measured likewise. We chose mother’s denomination 
instead of the father’s since mothers have the strongest inﬂ uence on religious socialisation (Bao, 
Whitbeck, Hoyt, & Conger, 1999). 
3.3.2 Macro-level measurements
The NKPS survey data on individual-level characteristics were enriched with data on structural 
characteristics of neighbourhoods (NB, four-digit zip codes) and municipalities (MP). Information 
on socio-economic disadvantage of the locale and relative group sizes was taken from Dutch 
municipalities’ administration data published by Statistics Netherlands. Percentage of ethnic 
minorities at the neighbourhood and municipality levels was calculated as non-Western minorities. 
Within the Dutch administration data, ethnic minorities are people with at least one parent born 
in the respective origin country. Non-Western minorities predominantly include immigrants from 
Turkey, Morocco and Suriname. We also constructed the variable change in percentage of ethnic 
minorities as a change score of the percentage of non-Western ethnic minorities at the locale 
between 2001 and 1999.4 At the municipality level, we had additional information on percentages 
of the speciﬁ c Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese ethnic groups (Statistics Netherlands).
For 2001, a summary measure of socio-economically disadvantaged neighbourhood (SES 
dis. NB) was computed based on the results of a principal component analysis (PCA) on 2945 
neighbourhoods. The PCA included the scores of mean income of income recipients, percentage 
of income recipients with a low income, and percentage inhabitants living on public beneﬁ ts. 
We labelled the ﬁ rst component as socio-economically disadvantaged neighbourhood. A similar 
procedure was followed for the raw changes in these three indicators. The extracted component of 
a PCA including these three change scores was labelled change in socio-economically disadvantaged 
neighbourhood (ΔSES dis. NB). Likewise, we constructed the measurements socio-economically 
disadvantaged municipality (SES dis. MP) and change in socio-economically disadvantaged 
municipality (ΔSES dis. MP).5
Locations of 39 Muslim schools in 2002 were provided by the Board of Islamic Education, ISBO 
(www.deisbo.nl). The best information we could ﬁ nd on the location of 454 Mosques NB/MP 
was a data ﬁ le derived from Nico Landman, which has been updated with internet resources. We 
have to acknowledge that large differences exist in the visibility of these Mosques, for which 
we cannot control. We counted the presence of all types of mosques and Muslim schools within 
neighbourhoods and municipalities. 
We used two indicators for crime rates at the locale. The Dutch Police Population Monitor 
(PPM, Politiemonitor Bevolking) includes standardised questions on victimisation experiences. We 
aggregated the PPM data of the 1999, 2001 and 2003 waves (approximately 150,000 respondents). 
Victims of burglary NB/MP is a count of burglary victims within the spatial units of neighbourhoods 
and municipalities divided by the total PMM respondents who lived within these localities. Figures 
on crime statistics NB/MP have been obtained from the Dutch police registration systems (HKS, 
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HerkenningsdienstSysteem).6 We aggregated data on crime statistics for the available years 
2000 to 2004 (2,688,262 recorded offences with known location). For every neighbourhood and 
municipality we counted the total offences, with the exception of petty theft and trafﬁ c offences, 
since we do not consider these latter severe enough to cause physical threat or to be locale-
speciﬁ c. For our crime statistics variables, we divided these ﬁ gures by the total inhabitants of the 
locale, as reported by Statistics Netherlands. 
The only available indicator for social cohesion at the neighbourhood level was 
relative inward-moving mobility – the number of people entering a neighbourhood from 
another neighbourhood per 1000 inhabitants of the destination neighbourhood. For reasons of 
comparability, we used a similar measure at the municipality level (Statistics Netherlands).7 The 
variable city size measures the total inhabitants of each municipality in 2001. 
For 186 respondents we were unable to match any municipality characteristic. These 
respondents were deleted from the sample. Missing values at either the neighbourhood or 
municipality level regarding (changes in) economic status, percentage of ethnic minorities or 
mobility were replaced with grand mean values.8
We ended up with a workable dataset of 6095 respondents from 2096 neighbourhoods 
and 437 municipalities, thus covering 55 per cent of Dutch neighbourhoods and 86 per cent of 
Dutch municipalities. We centred non-categorical variables on their grand mean values, except 
for number of mosques and Muslim schools at the locale and the variables measuring (changes 
in) the economic disadvantage at the locale, which were already standardised variables at the 
corresponding contextual levels. Descriptive statistics are summarised in Appendix 3.1. 
3.4 RESULTS 
The bivariate relationships between individual-level characteristics and opposition to ethnic 
heterogamy run mostly in the predicted direction (Appendix 3.1). The longer a person has been 
in the educational system and the higher the social class, the less opposition one ﬁ nds to ethnic 
heterogamy. Pensioners and housewives are most opposed to ethnic intermarriage compared to 
other groups. People who belong to a speciﬁ c denomination and attend church are more opposed 
to ethnic heterogamy than non-churchgoers and those not belonging to a speciﬁ c denomination. 
Older people are more opposed to ethnic intermarriage than younger people, as are men compared 
to women. Parental characteristics are correlated to opposition to ethnic intermarriage in the 
same way as respondent characteristics, albeit less strongly. 
  Concerning the bivariate relations with the macro-level characteristics, we ﬁ nd that 
the larger the relative size of the ethnic outgroup in the locale the lower the opposition to 
ethnic intermarriage. This is in line with the contact hypothesis. Respondents who live in socio-
economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods and municipalities are on average not more (or less) 
opposed to ethnic heterogamy. However, respondents living in neighbourhoods and municipalities 
which have experienced a deteriorating economic status are, as predicted, more opposed to ethnic 
heterogamy. Surprisingly, all other indicators for ethnic competition run in the opposite direction 
than predicted. For example, the higher the crime rates in the neighbourhood or municipality, 
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the lower the opposition to ethnic intermarriage. The bivariate correlations between contextual 
characteristics and opposition to ethnic heterogamy could be confounded by the composition 
of the locale and the interrelation between contextual characteristics. We therefore turn to the 
multivariate analyses next. 
3.4.1 Opposition to ethnic intermarriage
We started with an empty hierarchical random intercept model to assess the variance components 
at the individual, neighbourhood and municipality levels. Of the total variance, a signiﬁ cant part, 
3.5 per cent, is due to the variation between municipalities, but we do not ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant 
variance component at the neighbourhood level (Table 3.1, model 0). We thus ﬁ nd only weak 
support for the regional variance hypothesis. This does not necessarily mean that contextual 
characteristics of the neighbourhood do not affect opposition to ethnic intermarriage, as we 
deduced from ECT. We will therefore continue our analysis as a three-level hierarchical model.9
 To investigate to what extent parental characteristics are mediated by the characteristics 
of the respondents themselves, we continued our analysis by including parental characteristics in 
model 1 and respondents’ characteristics in model 2 and 3. In agreement with our expectation, 
parental education, father’s social class and mother’s denomination affect opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage (Table 3.1, model 1). Respondents with higher educated parents are less opposed to 
ethnic intermarriages, respondents who grew up with a self-employed father and respondents with 
a Catholic or Calvinist mother are more opposed to ethnic intermarriage. Even after controlling for 
respondent’s own educational achievement, employment status, age and sex, parental education 
and father’s employment status still contribute signiﬁ cantly to the explanatory power of the 
model (Table 3.1, model 2). After controlling for respondent’s religiosity in model 3, mother’s 
denomination is no longer signiﬁ cant and is therefore excluded from subsequent models.
Older respondents are more opposed to ethnic intermarriage than younger respondents 
(model 3). Men and women do not express signiﬁ cantly different attitudes regarding ethnic 
intermarriage in our multivariate model. Higher educated individuals are less opposed to ethnic 
intermarriage; one year of education leads to a reduction of 0.13 in the opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage scale, which ranges from 0-12. Of all employment statuses, the unemployed and 
students are the least opposed to ethnic heterogamy. That the unemployed express high levels of 
tolerance is a consistent ﬁ nding in the Dutch context (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998). The higher 
one’s social class, the less opposed one is to ethnic heterogamy. Catholics and Calvinists are more 
opposed to ethnic intermarriage than individuals of other denominations and those who do not 
belong to any denomination at all. Church attendance also contributes to explaining opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage – frequent churchgoers are more opposed. 
The individual-level characteristics included in model 3 reduce the estimated variance 
components at the municipality level by 64 per cent compared to the null model. This indicates that 
the variance at the locale is largely due to compositional effects. The respondent’s denomination 
is responsible for almost half of the proportional reduction of the estimated variance component 
at the municipality level.
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Next, we turn to the higher-order characteristics. In Table 3.2 we summarised the effects of 
municipality and neighbourhood characteristics. First, we added the classical structural indicators 
of ethnic threat and ethnic competition to the model: (changes in) relative group size and 
(changes in) economic situation. We did this separately for the neighbourhood level (model 4) 
and for the municipality level (model 5). 
Although the main effects of percentage of ethnic outgroups and changes herein at the 
neighbourhood level are not related to opposition to ethnic intermarriage (Table 3.2, model 4), 
the cross-level interaction between educational level and outgroup size at the neighbourhood level 
is negative and signiﬁ cant (Appendix 3.2). For people who are lower educated than average, the 
percentage of ethnic minorities within their neighbourhood is positively related to opposition to 
ethnic intermarriage but for people who are higher educated than average, the relative outgroup 
size within the neighbourhood is negatively related to opposition to ethnic intermarriage. The 
proportion of ethnic outgroups in the municipality is negatively related to opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage (Table 3.2, model 5). The economic situation of the municipality explains partially 
the relationship between ethnic outgroup size and opposition to ethnic intermarriage; without 
the indicators for the economic situation of the municipality, the negative effect of percentage of 
outgroup size at the municipality is twice as large. The cross-level interaction between educational 
level and outgroup size at the municipality level is not signiﬁ cant and does not inﬂ uence the main 
negative effect of outgroup size at the municipality level (Appendix 3.2). The effect of a change in 
the minority size at the municipality level is positive but not signiﬁ cant (b=0.07; se=0.07; Table 
3.2, model 5).
Individuals in neighbourhoods with deteriorating economic conditions are more opposed 
to ethnic intermarriage (Table 3.2, model 4). At the municipality level we also observe that an 
economically deteriorating situation is related to a stronger opposition to ethnic heterogamy 
(Table 3.2, model 5). Surprisingly, at the municipality level the current economic situation is 
negatively related to opposition to the ethnic intermarriage scale – the parameter estimate is 
-0.07. However, since the effect of a change in this situation is larger (0.12), we ﬁ nd partial 
support for the economic environment hypothesis; variation in ethnic hostility is partly the result 
of changes in the economic competition within the locale.
In models 6 and 7 we test if our other indicators of competition affect hostile views 
towards ethnic minorities.10 Crime statistics and the presence of mosques and Muslim schools do 
not inﬂ uence people’s opinion on ethnic heterogamy, neither at the neighbourhood level (Table 
3.2, model 6) nor the municipality level (Table 3.2, model 7). We therefore have to refute the 
cultural and physical environment hypotheses.
Relative inward-moving mobility at the neighbourhood and municipality levels affect 
opposition to ethnic heterogamy, albeit in the opposite direction than predicted. We consequently 
have to refute the cohesive environment hypothesis. The larger the relative inward-moving mobility, 
the less opposed respondents are towards an ethnically-mixed marriage. Once we control for economic 
competition at the municipality level, municipality size does not affect respondents’ views regarding 
ethnic intermarriage signiﬁ cantly. There are no other major problems to accumulate in big cities that 
affect opposition to ethnic intermarriage. We therefore refute both large-city hypotheses. 
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In model 8 we focus on the characteristics that turned out to be signiﬁ cant.11 The effects 
of change in socio-economic disadvantage at the neighbourhood level reaches the boundary of 
signiﬁ cance in model 8 (b=.07; se=0.05). Relative inward-moving mobility at the neighbourhood 
level explains the effect of relative inward-moving mobility at the municipality level. Based on 
the contact theory perspective we expected that larger proportions of ethnic minorities would 
be related to less opposition to ethnic intermarriage. The effect of relative outgroup size at 
the municipality level is negative and, given a one-sided signiﬁ cance test, signiﬁ cant (b=-.12; 
se=0.09; p=0.09) Given a one-sided signiﬁ cance test - we deduced a directional hypothesis from 
ECT - the effect of an increase in the percentage of ethnic minorities is signiﬁ cant as well (b=.07; 
se=0.05; p=0.10).
3.4.2 Outgroup specifi c opposition to intermarriage
To investigate whether the explanatory model is ethnic outgroup-speciﬁ c, we relate the presence 
of Moroccans, Surinamese and Turks in the municipality to the resistance to intermarriage with a 
member of one of these speciﬁ c groups (Appendix 3.3). In general, our results replicate previous 
results; the overall relative outgroup size at the municipality level is negatively related to opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage with one of the ethnic groups mentioned above, and the change in the 
overall relative outgroup size is positively related to opposition to ethnic intermarriage (although 
these parameters only reach signiﬁ cance for opposition to intermarriage with Surinamese). The 
percentages of Moroccans, Turks and Surinamese in the municipality do not affect opposition to 
speciﬁ c ethnic intermarriages signiﬁ cantly.
3.4.3 Ethnic hostility indicator specifi c relations 
We repeated our analyses on the sub-sample for which we had a broader set of indicators of ethnic 
hostility. This sub-sample includes 771 respondents with valid answers, all living in one of the 
14 medium-to-large Dutch cities with a longer history of non-EU ethnic-immigrant residents.12 
First we compare the results on ethnic intermarriage for this sub-sample (Table 3.3, model 1) 
with our previous results for the complete sample (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). The individual-level 
characteristics have similar effects on the opposition to ethnic intermarriage scale within the two 
different samples. The only exception is religiosity. For respondents living in one of these 14 Dutch 
cities, denomination has a stronger effect on opposition to ethnic intermarriage than for Dutch 
individuals in general. Remarkably however, the effect of church attendance is now reversed; 
more frequent churchgoers in medium-to-large cities are less opposed to ethnic intermarriage. 
Persons living in these municipalities have lower church attendance rates than the average Dutch 
individual.
Regarding the neighbourhood and municipalities characteristics, we once again 
observe that, in agreement with the contact hypothesis, the higher the percentage of ethnic 
minorities in the municipality, the lower the opposition to ethnic intermarriage. An increase 
in the percentage of ethnic outgroups at the municipality level increases opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage signiﬁ cantly.13 Once again, the higher the inward-moving mobility, the less 
opposition respondents express to ethnic intermarriage. Other structural characteristics did not 
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signiﬁ cantly affect opposition to ethnic intermarriage once individual level-characteristics and 
mobility were controlled for. 
 The next question is whether the explanatory model for opposition to ethnic intermarriage 
on this sub-sample is similar to explanatory models for other indicators of ethnic hostility on 
this sub-sample. We compare the explanatory model for opposition to ethnic intermarriage with 
the explanatory models on whether there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands, and on 
the extent to which the Dutch government should be lenient in issuing residence permits to 
persons whose life is at risk in their country of origin. In order to compare the effect sizes of 
the independent variables, we standardised the respective dependent variables. The education 
effect is consistent across the three models. Church attendance reduces opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage, and more frequent churchgoers agree less often on there being too many migrants 
in the Netherlands. Catholics and Protestants are more opposed to ethnic heterogamy than the 
non-religious, but do not have different views on granting a residence permit to someone whose 
life is at risk and do not agree more or less often in there being too many migrants in the 
Netherlands. This is another indication that opposition to ethnic intermarriage overlaps with 
opposition to religious heterogamy. 
None of the contextual characteristics inﬂ uence views on granting a residence permit to 
someone whose life is at risk. In the models regarding opposition to ethnic intermarriage and the 
view on whether there are too many immigrants in the Netherlands, an increase of ethnic minorities 
at the municipality level leads to more hostile views. In these two models, higher mobility rates 
lead to less hostile views. The non-signiﬁ cance of the economic situation of the municipality is 
likely due to the smaller sample size. Notwithstanding some noteworthy differences, the model 
pertaining to attitudes towards the number of immigrants in the Netherlands and the model 
regarding ethnic intermarriage are almost identical (Table 3.3).
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS
We observed a weak variation across municipalities in mean levels of opposition to ethnic 
heterogamy. Most of this variance was explained by compositional differences, for which we found 
that the individual-level characteristics are in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. The strongest 
municipality variance reduction was caused by the religious composition of the municipality 
though. Religiosity turned out to be a strong predictor for opposition to ethnic heterogamy. 
Moreover, parental education and father’s social class contributed to the explanatory power of the 
model even after controlling for respondents’ characteristics. 
We did not observe a signiﬁ cant variation across neighbourhoods in opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage when we took into acount that neighbourhoods are nested within municipalities. 
However, we showed that contextual characteristics of both municipalities and neighbourhoods 
affect attitudes towards ethnic heterogamy, where the municipality level plays a larger role. Within 
the Netherlands, individuals do not hold more, but less negative views on ethnic outgroups when 
the percentage of such groups in municipalities is higher. This ﬁ nding holds for both the lower and 
higher educated; therefore in support of contact theory. Interestingly, at the neighbourhood level, 
for respondents with low educational levels – whom we assume to be relegated to neighbourhoods 
with higher percentages of ethnic minorities due to economic constraints –, the percentage of 
ethnic minorities is related to more opposition to ethnic intermarriage. This ﬁ nding clearly supports 
the threat mechanism. On the other hand, for higher educated individuals, larger outgroups within 
the neighbourhood are related to less opposition to ethnic intermarriage. This is likely the result 
of white ﬂ ight and selective in-migration of individuals who have the luxury to choose their 
neighbourhood. 
A relative increase in the size of the ethnic outgroup at the municipality level increases 
opposition to ethnic heterogamy, especially in municipalities with relatively large outgroups. 
In these cities, the possibility of contact with ethnic minorities will hardly increase with larger 
outgroups. Consequently, the threat mechanism induced by an increase in outgroup size may be 
easier to observe.
Economic characteristics of the municipality account partially for the negative relation 
between group sizes and opposition to ethnic intermarriage. Studies that interpret the negative 
correlation between proximity of outgroups and prejudice as supportive for the contact hypothesis 
suffer a severe weakness if they do not control for the economic condition of the geographical 
unit.
A deteriorating socio-economic status at the neighbourhood and municipality levels 
increases opposition to ethnic intermarriage. We therefore ﬁ nd conﬁ rmation for our economic 
environment hypothesis. Moreover, the mechanism by which group competition leads to 
exclusionist attitudes and in turn to opposition to ethnic intermarriage is only conﬁ rmed for 
economic competition; cultural competition and physical competition at the neighbourhood and 
municipality levels do not induce ethnic hostility. If ethnic competition causes ethnic hostility, 
our ﬁ ndings show that economic competition is the most important, if not the sole, type of 
competition within the locale that causes an increase in opposition to ethnic heterogamy within 
the Netherlands. The perception of cultural and physical competition may be inﬂ uenced by the 
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mass media, as a consequence the regional variation in perceived cultural and physical threat may 
be low within a nation. Future research should assess whether cultural or physical competition 
plays a larger role at the national level. 
 The higher the relative inward-moving mobility within neighbourhoods, the less hostile 
attitudes respondents express. This was contrary to our expectations. Mobility explains in part the 
effect of economic competition at the contextual level. If people have a choice, they will not move 
into a disadvantaged neighbourhood. A high inward-mobility rate is therefore a likely indicator 
for a popular locale and favourable competitive environment. City size is no longer negatively 
correlated to opposition to ethnic intermarriage once the economic situation of the municipality 
is controlled for. 
In this  chapter we showed that within the Netherlands, the competitive environment of 
neighbourhoods and municipalities play a modest role in the explanatory model of ethnic hostility 
compared to individual-level characteristics. We found conﬁ rmation for both the contact mechanism 
and the threat mechanism. Of the different forms of competition only the economic competitive 
environment of the locale inﬂ uences opposition to ethnic intermarriage. The explanatory model 
for opposition to ethnic intermarriage is not outgroup speciﬁ c. 
3.6 NOTES
1.  Gijsberts et al. (2004) posed the same hypothesis but were unable to test it due to their 
smaller sample size of individuals and municipalities.
2.  It is not self-evident that the negative relationship between percentage of foreigners and 
prejudice would have remained signiﬁ cant once other relevant contextual characteristics were 
controlled for. And although we fully acknowledge the rigor of the study, surprisingly, the 
item measuring the frequency of contact in the neighbourhood is not included in the ﬁ nal 
multi-variate model explaining prejudice. 
3.   The Netherlands Kinship Panel Study is funded by grant 480-10-009 from the Major 
Investments Fund of the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁ c Research (NWO), and by the 
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), Utrecht University, the University 
of Amsterdam and Tilburg University.
4.   Change scores in percentage of ethnic minorities between the years 2001 and 1997, and 2001 
and 1995 do not lead to different results.
5.  A positive score indicates that the socio-economic situation within this speciﬁ c locale 
improved less than average. 
6.  We would like to kindly thank L. Prins and his colleagues of the Dutch police force (Korps 
Landelijke Politiediensten, Dienst Nationale Recherche Informatie, Onderzoek en Analyse) for 
making these data available for us.
7.  At the municipality level we also constructed the variables relative outward-moving mobility 
and relative mobility. These variables do not lead to different results.
8.  Control dummies for mean value substitution do not reach signiﬁ cance during the analysis 
and do not inﬂ uence the estimates of the other variables included in the model.
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9.  The models presented in this chapter are estimated in MLwiN version 2.00. If one wishes to 
estimate the within and between neighbourhood variance, one needs at least 2 respondents 
per neighbourhood (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Our data contains 1378 neighbourhoods with 
2 or more respondents; therefore the observed absence of variance at the neighbourhood 
level in the three-level model is not caused by the relatively small samples within each 
neighbourhood. In a two-level empty hierarchical random intercept model which only 
includes the neighbourhood level and the individual level, the variance component at the 
neighbourhood level is signiﬁ cant. 
10.  There was no problem with multicollinearity in estimating the models. We analysed this by the 
“expert” macro for MLwiN 2.0 developed by Stijn Ruiter (http://stijnruiter.ruhosting.nl/).
11.  We also included the variable change in percentage of ethnic minorities at the municipality 
level since in model 5 the z-value of the estimated parameter was larger than 1. In a next 
step we added the cross-level interaction between outgroup size at the neighbourhood level 
and respondent’s educational level (p=-0.02, se=0.01).  
12. These cities are: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, Hoogezand-Sappermeer, Almere, 
Enschede, Tiel, Alphen aan den Rijn, Delft, Dordrecht, Bergen op Zoom and Eindhoven. The 
sub-sample contains 275 neighbourhoods.
13.  An increase in relative outgroup sizes at the municipality level forms a stronger ethnic threat 
when the outgroup is already relatively large. We also conﬁ rmed this for our full sample 
(N=6095). An increase in the outgroup size once the relative outgroup size is already above 
the Dutch average increases opposition to ethnic intermarriage.
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4. THE LOCAL LIVING ENVIRONMENT 
AND INDICATORS OF SOCIAL COHESION†
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Social cohesion is the social harmony that enhances the quality of public and civic life by feelings 
of commitment and trust and participation in networks and civic organisations. It develops from 
an interplay between personal characteristics and the community one lives in (Wilson, 1987). 
Social cohesion is a characteristic of a group, yet ﬁ nds it origins in pro-social attitudes and 
behaviour of individuals. The ties that individuals have with other individuals, illustrated by 
associative life and feelings of trust and tolerance to others, are indicators at the individual 
level of the cohesiveness of a group or community. Although ethnic and economic heterogeneity, 
poverty, crime and residential mobility of the local environment are all claimed to be related to 
lower levels of social cohesion (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Letki, 2008; Putnam, 2007), 
it is unclear which of these characteristics matters most and whether the impact of contextual 
characteristics is consistent for different aspects of social cohesion. A possible reason for this 
remaining controversy might be that scholars focused on different geographical regions and 
have neglected the fact that it is likely that the impact of the community on social cohesion 
depends on the characteristics of its residents. In this chapter, we assess to what extent, and for 
whom, characteristics of Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities affect four different aspects 
associated to social cohesion: contact frequency with one’s neighbours, tolerance to a neighbour 
from a different race, generalised social trust, and volunteering.1
Much attention has been paid to the negative impact of (ethnic and economic) 
heterogeneity on social cohesion. Supposedly, individuals are less likely to connect to each other 
socially in heterogeneous communities than in homogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 
2002). This is explained by the homophily principle: people prefer to interact with others who share 
the same ethnic heritage, have the same social status and hence share experiences and tastes. 
Whereas some stress the importance of economic heterogeneity within communities (Uslaner & 
Brown, 2005), others argue that particularly ethnic heterogeneity within local communities erodes 
social cohesion (Putnam, 2007; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Evidence for the negative 
effect of locality heterogeneity on social cohesion has been largely conﬁ ned to the United States 
and is scarce in Europe. Hence, our ﬁ rst research question reads: to what extent is social cohesion 
affected by ethnic and economic heterogeneity within neighbourhoods and municipalities in the 
Netherlands?
Despite the strong, recent emphasis on ethnic heterogeneity, the general tenability 
of the heterogeneity hypothesis is by no means clear. Letki (2008) shows convincingly that in 
British neighbourhoods it is foremost economic deprivation and not ethnic heterogeneity that 
† A slightly different version of this chapter is forthcoming in Acta Politica  (Tolsma, Van 
der Meer, & Gesthuizen, forthcoming). An earlier version of this paper has been presented at 
the Dutch Ministry of Finance at the invitation of Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos (June 
2008).
4. The Local Living Environment and Indicators of Social Cohesion | Introduction
74
erodes social cohesion. Economically deprived localities, criminal localities, and localities with 
high residential mobility rates offer their inhabitants less opportunities for social interaction. 
Within these localities, circumstances make that contacts between people are not generally 
positive, making inhabitants more careful, fearful and less familiar with each other (Sampson et 
al., 2002; Small & Newman, 2001). This leads to our second research question: to what extent 
is social cohesion affected by economic deprivation, crime rates, and residential mobility within 
neighbourhoods and municipalities in the Netherlands? Ethnic and economic heterogeneity often 
go hand in hand with crime rates, and residential mobility. To assess the unique impact of different 
locality characteristics it is necessary to take them into account simultaneously. 
From a theoretical perspective, locality characteristics are likely to have a different 
impact across social groups. In line with the homophily principle, living in close proximity 
to ethnic minorities might not be such a big deal for ethnic minorities themselves, while for 
natives, higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity might be much more threatening. Moreover, as we 
will argue below, for individuals with low income and educational levels, living in an ethnically 
heterogeneous, economically deprived, or otherwise disordered locality is often not based on 
free choice (i.e. preferences), but on economic necessity. The impact of neighbourhood and 
municipality characteristics might thus be stronger for the poor and lower educated than for the 
rich and higher educated. To our knowledge the differential effect of contextual characteristics 
across social groups has been neglected so far. Our ﬁ nal research question is: to what extent does 
the relationship between locality characteristics and social cohesion vary across individuals with 
different income and educational levels and across ethnic groups? 
 Empirically, we focus on the Netherlands, which has traditionally been a high trust, 
highly engaged country (Pharr & Putnam, 2000). Such an analysis is the more interesting, as 
the Netherlands differs profoundly from the United States in terms of heterogeneity: economic 
inequality is lower, and the Netherlands have witnessed a very different, much more recent migration 
history. In the Netherlands, data have been recorded in great detail both at the individual level 
(through survey data) and at the contextual levels (through statistics from the Dutch Statistical 
Ofﬁ ce and ofﬁ cial police data). 
Yet, a systematic test of the impact of theoretically interesting – and tightly collected – 
locality characteristics on different aspects of social cohesion has been scarce in Europe (but see: 
Letki, 2008). Our focus on the Dutch case thus enables us to replicate previous, mainly American 
studies. However, the study presented in this chapter is more than a replication. First, previous 
studies on the impact of the local community on social cohesion predominantly focused on one 
aspect of social cohesion, most often on (general or particular) social trust (e.g. Alesina & La 
Ferrara, 2000; Putnam, 2007). In this chapter we employ four indicators of social cohesion: contact 
frequency with one’s neighbours, tolerance to neighbours from a different race, generalised social 
trust, and volunteering. Second, the explanatory model of this chapter is broader in scope than 
previous research as well, as we take into account the following locality characteristics: (ethnic 
and economic) diversity, mean income levels, crime rates and residential mobility simultaneously. 
For example, this allows us to disentangle effects due to economic heterogeneity and poverty. 
Third, whereas most previous studies looked at the impact of a single relatively large geographical 
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unit such as states or countries, we investigate the impact of two smaller geographical units 
simultaneously: neighbourhoods and municipalities. Below, we use the label ‘localities’ to refer to 
both neighbourhoods and municipalities. Finally, we build on previous research by placing more 
emphasis – theoretically and empirically – on the possibility that the impact of the locality may 
vary across the residents they inhabit. We will investigate to what extent the living environment 
inﬂ uences our indicators of social cohesion differently for individuals from different ethnic 
backgrounds, with different income levels, and with different levels of education. 
Context effects are likely to be most pronounced at the neighbourhood level, being 
the most direct geographical environment in which we assume that people spend most of their 
social time. However, community life does not exclusively take place in neighbourhoods. Soccer 
clubs, churches, etc. may be situated outside one’s direct neighbourhood. Similarly, friends may 
very well live in different neighbourhoods but within the same city. Living in a homogenous and 
prosperous neighbourhood may not be enough to shield oneself from the inﬂ uence of an otherwise 
heterogeneous and deprived municipality. We therefore expect similar contextual effects at the 
municipality level as at the neighbourhood level. Note that the only way to test whether observed 
municipality effects are in reality due to experiences within neighbourhoods is to employ a three-
level design (i.e. individual, neighbourhood, and municipality), which is exactly what we will do.
At the individual level, participating in voluntary organisations and having dense social 
networks is beneﬁ cial for many reasons; among others it (supposedly) stimulates physical and 
mental health, and boosts one’s economic career (Ruiter & De Graaf, 2008; Wilson, 2000). At the 
aggregate level, social cohesion (e.g. associative life and trust) is desirable since it (supposedly) 
improves inter-ethnic relations, enhances the quality of public and civic life, promotes economic 
growth, and makes democracy work (Halpern, 2005; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993). It is 
therefore not surprising that governments put much effort in developing policy measures that aim 
to improve locality characteristics and thereby enhancing social cohesion. For this, it is important 
to empirically assess which locality characteristics affect which aspects of social cohesion, and 
for whom.  
4.2 EXPECTATIONS
4.2.1 Heterogeneity and confl ict
The homophily principle (Blau, 1977; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954) has found impressive support 
in a wide array of sociological and psychological studies (McPherson et al., 2001). People like 
others that resemble themselves and have the tendency to associate with these similar others, 
while they have a ‘natural aversion to heterogeneity’ (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). Similarity and 
familiarity facilitate interpersonal relations (Kalmijn, 1998). Vice versa, when people living in the 
same community have less in common with each other, they are less likely to identify with each 
other (Lehning, 1998), and are therefore less likely to connect to each other socially (Alesina 
& La Ferrara, 2002). Lehning (1998, p. 238) claimed that ‘the greater the number and diversity of 
persons in a group, the more that universalistic norms require altruism, and yet – at the same time 
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– the weaker the force of altruism.’ According to Putnam (2007), heterogeneity of the environment 
does not only affect the relations between individuals of different social groups negatively, but 
may even deteriorate cohesion between members of the same social group. 
 The recent scientiﬁ c debate especially emphasises the detrimental effect of ethnic 
heterogeneity on social cohesion. In ethnically diverse communities, inhabitants share less cultural 
characteristics. Cultural differences complicate the inter-ethnic dialogue, and language differences 
literally may cause people not to understand each other. This may lead to lower levels of trust 
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Stolle et al., 2008) and participation (Letki, 2008; Putnam, 2007).
The literature on ethnic exclusionism takes a different spin on why ethnic heterogeneity 
would affect social cohesion. According to Ethnic Competition Theory (ECT) (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 
1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Coenders, 2001; Quillian, 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al., 2002) 
larger ethnic outgroup size produces feelings of ethnic threat, be it economically or culturally, and 
thereby stimulates negative outgroup attitudes. In contrast, Contact Theory (Allport, 1979 [1954]; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) poses that the size of ethnic outgroups in a community stimulates 
contact whereby prejudicial attitudes are reduced. Both contact theory and ECT make an explicit 
distinction between attitudes towards the (ethnic) ingroup and outgroup, which are supposedly 
communicating vases (Sumner, 1959 [1906]). However, a positive ingroup bias is not necessarily 
accompanied with outgroup hate (Allport, 1979 [1954]; Brown, 2000). Sniderman and colleagues 
(2000b) posed that whatever deteriorates trust in general also increases hostility towards ethnic 
outgroups. And according to Putnam’s constrict proposition, the proximity of ethnic outgroups 
would deteriorate trust in both the ethnic outgroup and ingroup (Putnam, 2007). 
 Several cross-regional studies in the U.S. provide evidence for the claim that within 
ethnic heterogeneous communities, people are less likely to trust each other or perform joint 
activities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Although in European countries the relative 
group size of non-EU citizens is related to higher levels of ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 
2002; Semyonov et al., 2006), support for the ethnic heterogeneity approach on other aspects of 
social cohesion in Europe is scarce (Letki, 2008). European countries with a higher level of ethnic 
heterogeneity, or a higher share of immigrants, do not show less social cohesion (Gesthuizen, Van 
der Meer, & Scheepers, 2008; Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2009). 
In a study of British neighbourhoods, Letki (2008) ﬁ nds a negative effect of ethnic 
heterogeneity for neighbourhood attitudes, but no effect for structural aspects of social cohesion 
(sociability, associational involvement and informal help provision). In the Netherlands, at the 
municipality level, the proximity of ethnic minorities is negatively related to ethnic exclusionism, 
however, at the neighbourhood level the ﬁ ndings are mixed (see previous chapter). Ethnic 
heterogeneity may thus not have the same effects on different aspects of social cohesion and the 
impact of ethnic heterogeneity may depend on the geographical locality considered. Nevertheless, 
building on the general conclusions for the U.S., we formulate the following hypothesis: The larger 
the ethnic heterogeneity in localities, the less social cohesion (Hypothesis 1).
Dissimilarity in economic resources may also cause people to have problems cooperating, 
trusting, and predicting each others’ behaviour. The lifestyles of the rich and the poor differ 
profoundly; there are marked differences in for example economic and cultural consumption and 
77
sporting activities. The rich and the poor have been socialised in different social classes and 
other contexts. Differences in economic resources thus result in less shared experiences and less 
shared norms. The larger the economic heterogeneity, the more cultural dissimilarity, the larger 
the barriers across social groups, and the less citizens will be able to identify with each other. The 
end result will be less social cohesion. 
 The claim that economic heterogeneity reduces social cohesion has found support in 
several cross-national studies (Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Uslaner & 
Brown, 2005; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005), as well as in cross-regional studies in the United States 
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Putnam, 2007). Yet, the relationship between economic heterogeneity 
and social cohesion has been less regularly examined at the local level in European countries. We 
formulate the following hypothesis: The larger the economic heterogeneity in localities, the less 
social cohesion (Hypothesis 2).
4.2.2 Deprived communities
Next to the degree of heterogeneity, communities differ in the extent to which they offer their 
inhabitants the resources to meet and mingle. These resources encompass well-equipped alters, 
infrastructure, a safe and trustworthy environment, and residential stability. Without such 
resources it will be more difﬁ cult for social cohesion to arise (Volker et al., 2007). Moreover, such 
communities generate feelings of threat and alienation, which hampers social interactions (Letki, 
2008). Social cohesion is least, there where its positive effects are needed the most, namely in 
disadvantaged communities (Letki, 2008; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 2002; Small & 
Newman, 2001; Wilson, 1987). A lack of social cohesion may have negative consequences for the 
quality of the community, which in turn could result in dropping social cohesion rates. Localities 
may thus get trapped in a vicious circle. Vice versa, advantaged communities may ‘accumulate’ 
capital and beneﬁ t from a virtuous circle, due to a high level of individual level and collective 
resources. We distinguish three locality characteristics that may obstruct social cohesion: poverty, 
criminality, and residential mobility. 
In economically deprived neighbourhoods people experience less instrumental help, 
have less positive role models (Wilson, 1987), and develop lower levels of self-efﬁ cacy (Boardman 
& Robert, 2000). Residents consequently experience less bonding (Brisson & Usher, 2005), have 
less trust (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005; Ross, Mirowsky, & Pribesh, 2001), and associate less 
(Browning, Feinberg, & Dietz, 2004; Halpern, 2005; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2007). Crime, too, 
may be a hindrance for social cohesion (Rosenfeld, Messner, & Baumer, 2001), since people are 
less likely to trust others when they themselves or acquaintances have been the victim of crime. 
According to Oliver and Mendelberg (2000, p. 576), exposure to crime ‘leads to […] feelings 
of anxiety and fear, alienation from neighbours, lack of trust in others, and suspicion towards 
outgroups in general’. Finally, higher residential mobility rates are also likely to diminish social 
cohesion (Sampson & Groves, 1989). The time people spend in their community stimulates their 
possibilities to initiate social interaction and subsequently enhance the quality of social relations 
(Volker et al., 2007). Residential mobility destabilises social networks, both for those who leave 
the locality and for those who stay behind. Moreover, anticipating on others’ residential mobility 
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may be a negative incentive for investing in social relationships. It is therefore more difﬁ cult to 
build up and maintain social ties when the composition of a community is unstable. All these 
symptoms of a ‘bad’ locality were signiﬁ cant determinants of social cohesion in Putnam’s recent 
study (Putnam, 2007), but have not been tested simultaneously in the Netherlands. We expect 
that: The more (a) poverty, (b) criminality, and (c) residential mobility in localities, the less social 
cohesion (Hypothesis 3).
4.2.3 Who is affected?
Up to this point we have focused on the question which contextual characteristics matter. At least 
as interesting is the question for whom these contextual characteristics matter. Yet, although 
localities have repeatedly been put forward as important contexts for social cohesion (Putnam, 
2007; Sampson et al., 2002; Volker et al., 2007), the argument for whom is less well developed. 
Nevertheless, differential effects of contextual characteristics are to be expected – primarily 
between the rich and the poor as well as between the relatively higher and lower educated. 
Compared to individuals with higher incomes, individuals with low incomes will be 
relegated to localities less by choice than by economic necessity. For rich citizens that do not 
like their local environment (due to heterogeneity or bad neighbourhood quality), leaving the 
locality is more often a viable option (Massey et al., 1994). Those who are content with their local 
environment stay. This selective migration may obscure the contextual effects for the rich, but 
not (or at least less so) for the poor – who are more likely to lack the option to move. Moreover, 
especially the relatively higher educated express less ethnic hostility, higher feelings of trust and 
adhere more to a cosmopolitan worldview. Given these known relationships between educational 
level and social cohesion, we expect that the homophily principle might be less applicable to 
them. Instead, the higher educated may prefer to live in a diverse locality, at least more so than 
individuals with lower educational degrees. 
The literature on ethnocentrism suggests that locality characteristics referring to the 
local (economic, cultural or physical) competitive environment  may have a stronger impact on 
ethnic hostility for the poor and lower educated members of the dominant ethnic group than 
for the rich and higher educated members of the dominant ethnic group, since especially poor 
and lower educated native residents are in direct competition with ethnic minorities in ethnic 
heterogeneous and deprived localities (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et 
al., 2002, see also chapter 3).
Empirically, it has been shown that the poor are more likely to be inﬂ uenced in pro-
social behaviour than the rich (Van der Meer, Scheepers, & Te Grotenhuis, 2008). And as shown in 
chapter 3, the impact of the proportion of ethnic outgroups within one’s neighbourhood increases 
ethnic exclusionism among the lower educated, but decreases ethnic exclusionism among the 
higher educated. Given these theoretical considerations and empirical ﬁ ndings we formulate the 
hypothesis: Locality characteristics have a stronger detrimental effect on social cohesion for the poor 
and lower educated than for the rich and higher educated (Hypothesis 4).2
Within a municipality people will choose the neighbourhood most to their liking within 
the limits of their economic resources. People are more conﬁ ned to live in a speciﬁ c municipality 
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than to live in a speciﬁ c neighbourhood, due to working or family obligations for example. 
Differential effects of locality characteristics across the rich and the poor and the higher and 
lower educated should thus be most apparent on the neighbourhood level. 
Ethnic heterogeneity may not be perceived in the same way by different ethnic groups. 
For native Dutch, increasing heterogeneity in localities is generally synonymous to increasing ethnic 
outgroup sizes. However, this is generally not the case for ethnic minority groups; for them, a larger 
ingroup size increases ethnic heterogeneity. We expect that: Ethnic heterogeneity has a stronger 
negative effect on social cohesion for the native Dutch, than for non-natives (Hypothesis 5).
4.3 DATA, MEASUREMENTS AND METHODS
Our hypotheses call for a multi-level design since we distinguish between three levels of analysis: 
individuals, neighbourhoods, and municipalities. This distinction is well captured by the survey 
data of ‘Culturele Veranderingen 2004’ (Cultural Changes 2004, CV04) of the Netherlands Institute 
for Social Research (www.scp.nl). The CV04 is a random sample of individuals within private 
households in the Netherlands, with a minimum age of 16. Within the CV04 a random stratiﬁ ed 
sampling method is followed: 430 neighbourhoods were randomly selected according to their level 
of urbanization, followed by a random selection of residents aged 16 and older. To collect data 
from the respondents, Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI), supplemented with self-
completion questionnaires, was used. This data set has several additional advantages. Firstly, it 
contains a large amount of measures associated with social cohesion. Secondly, besides the natonal 
representative sample (response rate 59 per cent), it is supplemented with an additional sample 
of respondents living in 100 underprivileged neighbourhoods (response rate 40 per cent), thereby 
increasing variance in locality characteristics. Furthermore, this sampling procedure resulted in a 
large percentage of respondents of non-Dutch origin in our dataset (25 per cent). 
We distinguish between the neighbourhood and the municipality as relevant geographical 
contexts for social cohesion. In the Netherlands, complete zip codes have four digits and two 
letters. Parts of streets have distinct zip codes. From here on, we use the word neighbourhood 
as synonym for the four-digit part of the zip code. On average, approximately 4000 persons 
share the same four digits of their zip code. Neighbourhoods are nested in larger geographical 
units, municipalities. We test our hypotheses on a dataset of 2949 individuals living in 503 
neighbourhoods and 245 different municipalities. 
4.3.1 Measures of indicators of social cohesion
The four indicators of social cohesion are measured at the individual level. Although we 
acknowledge that social cohesion is a characteristic of a group, these four indicators all refer 
to the way individuals are tied to fellow citizens. The frequency of contact with one’s neighbours 
was measured by an ordinal scale. We recoded it into the number of days per year. Tolerance to 
neighbours from a different race was measured by the survey question whether it would bother 
the respondents if they would get neighbours from a different race. Answer categories were: 
1: I would oppose; 2: It would be less comfortable; 3: Depends; 4: No objection at all. Higher 
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scores thus represent less opposition and hence more tolerance to a neighbour from a different 
race. Notably, ethnic minorities received the same questions as the native Dutch. Voluntary work 
is operationalised as doing voluntary work for at least one of eleven types of associations.3 
General social trust is measured through the standard dichotomous question: Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? Although all indicators of social cohesion, they are not strongly correlated; the strongest 
correlation was observed between tolerance to neighbours from a different race and general social 
trust (Pearson correlation 0.13, p=0.00). This underlines the importance of analyzing indicators 
of social cohesion separately. 
4.3.2 Individual level determinants: background characteristics
While testing the effects of citizens’ direct environment on social cohesion, we need to take 
other explanations into account. Previous studies showed, for instance, that citizens with more 
resources (income, education) are more likely to be happy with their direct environment, trust 
others, and participate socially. In sum, we control for the following factors at the individual level: 
age, sex, marital status, household composition, level of education, level of income, work status, 
health status, denomination, church attendance, and ethnic origin. To deal with missing values 
on these determinants, we assigned the respective average scores to interval level variables and 
included an extra category ‘missing’ to nominal level variables. 
4.3.3 Context characteristics
Our measure of ethnic heterogeneity is based on the Herﬁ ndahl Index (i.e. 1 – Herﬁ ndahl Index). We 
hereby use the same measure for ethnic heterogeneity as other recent studies on the relationship 
between contextual characteristics and social cohesion (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Anderson 
& Paskeviciute, 2006; Gesthuizen et al., 2008; Hooghe et al., 2009). The ethnic heterogeneity 
measure estimates the chance that two randomly chosen individuals in the population have a 
different ethnic background. We distinguish three main ethnic background categories: native 
Dutch, non-western immigrants, and western immigrants, which constituted 81 per cent, 10 
per cent, and 9 per cent of the Dutch society in 2004, respectively.4 In the Netherlands, the 
most important non-western immigrant groups are Turks (21 per cent), Moroccans (19 per cent), 
Surinamese (20 per cent), and Antilleans (7 per cent). The most important western-immigrants are 
Germans.  
 We used the Gini-coefﬁ cient as our indicator for economic heterogeneity within 
neighbourhoods and municipalities. The value 0 corresponds to perfect equality (homogeneity) 
and 1 with perfect inequality (heterogeneity). To construct the Gini-coefﬁ cient, we used the 
mean nominal income of the complete zip code (i.e. parts of streets; on average 40 persons), as 
collected by Statistics Netherlands. On average the Gini-coefﬁ cient for neighbourhoods is based 
on 109 complete zip codes, the Gini-coefﬁ cient for municipalities on 907 complete zipcodes.5 
 To capture the economic status of the neighbourhood and municipality we used the 
mean income, as collected by Statistics Netherlands. 
We used the Dutch Police Population Monitor waves 1999, 2001, and 2003 to obtain the 
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number of burglary victims per 1000 residents in the locale. The number of recorded offences in 
the time period 2000-2004 per 1000 residents has been derived from ofﬁ cial crime statistics. The 
number of criminal suspects living in each locality (per 1000 residents) has been derived from 
ofﬁ cial crime statistics as well. We calculated the standardised sum score of these three distinct 
crime measures to construct a single indicator of crime.6
Finally, the residential mobility of a locale is a sum score of all people who moved 
within a locale plus half the sum of movers out of, and into a locale in 2004, divided by the total 
inhabitants of the locale. 
Note that due to our unique data, all neighbourhood characteristics are measured at 
the correct level, the four digit zip code. We thus did not use characteristics of larger localities as 
proxies for neighbourhood characteristics. Descriptive statistics for both individual level variables 
and contextual level variables may be found in Appendix 4.1. In order to facilitate interpretation 
of the cross-level effects, we centered the involved variables (accept for ethnicity) around their 
respective grand (sample) mean values. Correlations between the context variables are summarised 
in Appendix 4.2.
4.3.4 Modelling strategy
We employ multi-level analyses to take into account the nesting structure of our data (Snijders 
and Bosker, 1999). For the metric dependent variables, we estimate hierarchical linear random 
intercept regression models (with lme4 in R, ﬁ nal results were veriﬁ ed with xtmixed in STATA 10); 
for the dichotomous dependent variables, multi-level logistic regression models (with  lme4 in R, 
ﬁ nal results were veriﬁ ed with xtmelogit in STATA 10). The estimated variance components are 
summarised in Appendix 4.3.7 
 It is impossible to estimate all contextual characteristics and proposed cross-level 
interactions simultaneously. With so many related contextual variables and cross-level interaction 
variables, we would experience problems of collinearity. It is also undesirable to include all 
contextual characteristics simultaneously, since the inclusion of irrelevant contextual variables will 
cause standard errors to be needlessly large. We deal with this problem in two ways. First, we will 
investigate the bivariate relationships between locality characteristics and social cohesion. Second, 
to come to our ﬁ nal multivariate explanatory models we will follow a stepwise procedure. We start 
with a base model that included all individual level characteristics but no locality characteristics. 
As a criterion for entry and removal of contextual characteristics we use the signiﬁ cance of the 
parameter estimates, respectively p<0.10 and p>0.10, two-tailed. The order of introduction is 
determined by the improvement of the model ﬁ t as indicated by the likelihood value.8 
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4.4 RESULTS
4.4.1 Bivariate relationships between locality characteristics and indicators of social cohesion
The bivariate relationships between on the one hand neighbourhood and municipality characteristics 
and on the other hand our indicators of social cohesion are summarised in Table 1. The values in Table 
1 refer to the parameter estimates of hierarchical random intercept regression models in which only the 
contextual characteristic of interest is included. At the neighbourhood level, ethnic heterogeneity is 
negatively and signiﬁ cantly related to contact frequency with one’s neighbours (b=-13.31), generalised 
trust (b=-0.54), and volunteering (b=-2.04). In economically advantaged neighbourhoods, residents 
have more frequently contact with their neighbours (b=3.72), higher levels of generalised trust 
(b=0.68), and participate more in voluntary work (b=0.58). Crime and residential mobility in one’s 
neighbourhood are negatively related to contact frequency with one’s neighbours and voluntary work 
(Table 1). So far the bivariate relationships between neighbourhood characteristics and social cohesion 
are in agreement with our predictions. 
On the other hand, economic inequality within the neighbourhood as operationalised by 
the Gini coefﬁ cient is not negatively related to any of our distinguished aspects of social cohesion. 
Moreover, ethnic heterogeneity, crime, and residential mobility are positively related to tolerance 
to neighbours from a different race. Although somewhat surprisingly from the constrict proposition 
(Putnam 2007), these latter ﬁ ndings are in line with the bivariate relationships as reported in Chapter 
3 and with respect to ethnic diversity, they support the contact theory. 
When we look at the relationships between characteristics at the municipality level and 
our indicators of social cohesion, we mainly ﬁ nd similar results. However, there are also some striking 
differences. Whereas economic heterogeneity at the neighbourhood level is not negatively related to 
any of our indicators of social cohesion, at the municipality level it is related to less contact with 
neighbours and lower levels of volunteering, in line with our predictions. And although mean income 
at the neighbourhood level is fairly consistently related to more social cohesion, mean municipality 
income is not related to any of our indicators of social cohesion. 
4.4.2 The unique impact of locality characteristics on indicators of social cohesion
The results discussed so far referred to bivariate relationships between contextual characteristics and 
our indicators of social cohesion. The observed relationships may however be due to composition 
effects. In this case, individuals living in these localities are more (or less) likely to have pro-social 
attitudes or display social behaviour due to their own characteristics instead of characteristics of 
their local environment. Moreover, since locality characteristics are correlated we need to include 
(relevant) contextual characteristics simultaneously into our explanatory models. Finally, since we 
assumed that contextual characteristics may have a different impact across ethnic, income or education 
groups, we need to take into account possible cross-level interactions. Our multi-variate hierarchical 
random intercept regression models with cross-level interactions with which we test our hypotheses 
are summarised in Table 2. The presented main effects of locality characteristics indicate the general 
(or mean) effect within the population on social cohesion. The cross-level interactions show to what 
extent the impact of locality characteristics is conditional on individual-level characteristics.
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Before we turn to the impact of locality characteristics, we brieﬂ y discuss the effects at the 
individual level for which we hypothesised that contextual characteristics may have different 
effects (i.e. which have been used in cross-level interactions), namely income, education and 
ethnicity. Compared to native Dutch, Antilleans and Turks have more and Indonesians have less 
contact with their neighbours. In general, ethnic minority groups express more tolerance to 
neighbours from a different race (although only the parameter estimates for Surinamese and 
Indonesians reach signiﬁ cance). Ethnic minority groups have lower levels of generalised trust 
than native Dutch but do not participate more or less in voluntary associations. The higher one’s 
income, the lower the contact frequency with neighbours, the more tolerance to a neighbour from 
a different race, and the higher one’s feelings of generalised trust. People with higher levels of 
education have less contact with their neighbours, express more tolerance to neighbours from 
a different race, have higher levels of trust and participate more in voluntary work. These main 
effects of ethnicity, income and education on our dimensions of social cohesion are ﬁ rmly in line 
with previous research (Gesthuizen et al., 2008, see chapter 3). The parameter estimates of our 
other control variables at the individual level (age, sex, employment status, health, religiosity, and 
household composition) did not lead to surprising results. 
In general, after controlling for individual level characteristics and by taking into 
account contextual characteristics simultaneously, we ﬁ nd far less support for our hypotheses 
stating that (ethnic or economic) heterogeneity, poverty, crime, or residential mobility negatively 
affect social cohesion. Compared to Table 1, much fewer (main) effects of locality characteristics 
reached signiﬁ cance. 
Perhaps most strikingly, ethnic heterogeneity at the neighbourhood level is no 
longer negatively related to any of our indicators of social cohesion. Ethnic heterogeneity at 
the neighbourhood level is even signiﬁ cantly positively related to contact with neighbours for 
residents with income levels above average (as indicated by the signiﬁ cant cross-level interaction, 
b=8.79, se=3.77) and to tolerance to neighbours from a different race (the main effect is 0.52 
(se=0.15)), especially for residents with income levels below average (the cross-level interaction 
is -0.26 (se=0.09)). Ethnic heterogeneity at the municipality level is also positively and not 
negatively related to generalised trust for residents with educational levels above average (b=0.24, 
se=0.09). The only effects of ethnic heterogeneity in line with our predictions are that ethnic 
heterogeneity within municipalities is negatively related to voluntary work (b=-1.09, se=0.39) and 
negatively related to contact with neighbours for the higher educated (as indicated by the cross-
level interaction b=-4.67, se=1.94). All in all, we thus ﬁ nd little support for hypothesis 1.
Economic heterogeneity within neighbourhoods or municipalities does not consistently 
negatively affect social cohesion either, contrary to our second hypothesis. Economic heterogeneity 
of the neighbourhood only reduces contact with neighbours for the higher educated (as indicated 
by the signiﬁ cant cross-level interaction, b=-9.53, se=5.59) and reduces generalised feelings of 
trust for residents with income levels above average (as indicated by the signiﬁ cant cross-level 
interaction, b=-2.65, se=1.12). 
Instead of economic heterogeneity it is economic afﬂ uence that inﬂ uences social 
cohesion; the most consistent ﬁ nding is that the economic afﬂ uence of neighbourhoods is 
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positively related to social cohesion. If the mean income level of a neighbourhood increases with 
1000 euros, residents see their neighbours 7 times more a year (b=7.21, se=2.46). This effect is 
substantial even in comparison to signiﬁ cant individual level characteristics. In more afﬂ uent 
neighbourhoods, generalised feelings of trust are higher as well (b=0.30, se=0.18) and residents 
participate more in voluntary work (b=0.24, se=0.14). Thus, at the neighbourhood level, we ﬁ nd 
corroborative evidence for hypothesis 3a. On the other hand, in more afﬂ uent municipalities, 
residents have, in general, lower levels of tolerance to neighbours from a different race (b=-0.29, 
se=0.09). The mean income of the municipality is also negatively related to feelings of trust and 
especially so for residents with low income levels (the main effect is b=-0.67, se=0.27; the cross-
level interaction is b=0.33, se=0.19). 
Crime rates within localities and municipalities are not related to our indicators of social 
cohesion, once we control for composition effects and other relevant locality characteristics. 
Therefore, we reject hypothesis 3b. Residential mobility at the neighbourhood level reduces the 
likelihood to participate in voluntary work (b=-2.75, se=1.47). But, overall, there is little support 
for hypothesis 3c. Somewhat surprisingly, residential mobility at the municipality level is even 
positively related to contact with neighbours for the higher educated (as indicated by the cross-
level interaction b=19.97, se=10.74). 
Several general patterns thus emerge. Firstly, not all contextual characteristics are equally 
important. Economic deprivation within neighbourhoods is most clearly negatively related to social 
cohesion. Secondly, we ﬁ nd substantial differences in explanatory models between the dimensions 
of social cohesion. For the dependent variable tolerance to neighbours from a different race, the 
contextual characteristics are consistently related in the opposite direction as predicted by the 
heterogeneity and deprivation propositions. Thirdly, the effects of many contextual characteristics 
on social cohesion are conditional on residents’ income or educational level. However, the assumed 
detrimental effect of locality heterogeneity and deprivation is not consistently stronger for the 
poor or lower educated than for the rich or higher educated. The effect of ethnic diversity does 
not depend on residents’ ethnicity. We have to reject hypotheses 4 and 5. 
4.4.3 On the lack of consistent negative effects of ethnic diversity
We failed to ﬁ nd support for hypothesis 1, according to which social cohesion would be less in 
ethnically more diverse localities. By contrast, many American studies did ﬁ nd such an effect. Do 
the Netherlands really differ from the United States in this respect, or are other issues at play? 
One important issue is that the interpretation of observed relationships between ethnic diversity 
(as measured by the complement of the Herﬁ ndahl Index) is not always clear. The Herﬁ ndahl Index 
(HI) is ‘colorblind’. It is impossible to translate the value of the HI to the real ethnic composition 
of the locality. For example, a HI of 1 simply means there is one ethnic group present in the 
locality, although it does not tell which group this is. See also Voas et al. (2002) for a discussion 
of problems related to the HI. 
The precise ethnic composition of a locality might matter at least as much as the 
more abstract idea of ethnic heterogeneity. However, the size of the native Dutch is strongly 
correlated to ethnic diversity (Pearson’s correlation >0.90). Consequently, in the Netherlands, 
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it is impossible to pull effects of ethnic diversity and the size of the dominant ethnic group 
apart. Nevertheless, additional analyses (not shown) rule out two alternative explanations for the 
relationships between ethnic heterogeneity and social cohesion that we did observe: they are not 
due to the size of your own ethnic group (i.e. the percentage of Turks for Turks, the percentage 
of native Dutch for native Dutch) nor to the presence of one speciﬁ c ethnic minority group. Note 
that the (interpretation) problems related to ethnic diversity affect most previous research. For 
example, for the US, it might not necessarily be diversity that negatively affects social cohesion, 
but percentages of whites, blacks or Latino’s in the locality. Future research is thus warranted. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we raised three research questions regarding locality effects on social cohesion. 
The ﬁ rst asked to what extent social cohesion is affected by ethnic and economic heterogeneity 
within neighbourhoods and municipalities in the Netherlands. The second asked to what extent 
social cohesion is affected by economic deprivation, crime rates, and residential mobility within 
neighbourhoods and municipalities in the Netherlands. We distinguished four indicators of social 
cohesion: contact frequency with one’s neighbours, tolerance to a neighbour from a different race, 
generalised social trust, and volunteering.
The mean income of the neighbourhood turns out to be the most important contextual 
characteristic. More speciﬁ cally, we found that in more prosperous neighbourhoods, residents have 
more contact with their neighbours, have higher levels of trust, and are more likely to do voluntary 
work. A second consistent ﬁ nding is that crime rates do not affect social cohesion. Economic 
heterogeneity at the locality level does not have a consistent negative effect on social cohesion in 
the Netherlands. Similarly, residential mobility does not have a consistent negative effect on social 
cohesion either. And although Putnam (2007) reports that – in line with his constrict proposition 
– ethnic heterogeneity has a negative impact on all forms of social cohesion in the U.S., we come 
to a radically different conclusion. In the Netherlands, ethnic heterogeneity does not have a uniform 
negative effect on social cohesion: whereas it diminishes some forms of social cohesion – at the 
municipality level it is negatively related to the propensity to do voluntary work, it stimulates 
others; tolerance to neighbours from a different race is higher in ethnically heterogeneous 
neighbourhoods. 
The answers to these research questions have important implications. First, given that 
locality characteristics affect different aspects of social cohesion differently, it is imperative that 
social cohesion is not reduced to one single indicator, let alone that different dimensions are simply 
aggregated. The overarching concept of social cohesion is not easily reduced to one or two indicators. 
Second, all in all we ﬁ nd little support for the homophily principle, at least when it comes to the 
expected impact of locality characteristics. At the locality level there is no consistent effect that 
ethnic or economic heterogeneity hinders social cohesion: living amongst dissimilar others does not 
consistently weaken one’s pro-social attitudes or undermine one’s social behaviour. Coffé and Geys 
(2006) came to similar conclusions for economic heterogeneity in Flemish municipalities.9 Possibly, 
even though citizens might prefer contacts with similar others, when they have less but still some 
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opportunities to do so, they do not participate less or have more negative attitudes. 
The third question we set out to answer was to what extent the relationships between 
locality characteristics and social cohesion vary across individuals. Ethnic heterogeneity within 
localities does not have a differential impact on social cohesion across ethnic groups. Also contrary 
to our predications, detrimental effects of locality characteristics are not always weaker for the 
rich and higher educated than for the poor and lower educated. Sometimes they are even stronger 
(e.g. economic heterogeneity is negatively related to trust for the rich but positively for the poor). 
We conclude that it is important to take into account that the impact of locality characteristics 
is conditional on individual level characteristics. However, it remains unclear why this is so. Our 
results show that the conditional effects of locality characteristics across income and educational 
groups are not (only) the result of residential mobility.  
Still, we cannot rule out – and it is indeed very likely – that locality characteristics 
trigger selective residential mobility: not only the attitudes of the remaining residents change 
as a result of speciﬁ c locality characteristics, but residents may selectively move in or out of 
the locality as well. At the locality level, residential mobility is most strongly related to ethnic 
heterogeneity. If especially ethnic heterogeneity triggers (or has triggered) selective residential 
mobility, this may explain why especially our ﬁ ndings regarding tolerance to a neighbour from a 
different race are in the opposite direction as expected. 
We coped with the issue of selective residential mobility in two ways. First, we assumed 
that especially the rich have the economic opportunity to selectively select their place of 
residence and that the higher educated may prefer to some extent to live in heterogeneous 
communities. Hence we expected that negative effects of localities should be stronger for the 
poor and lower educated than for the rich and higher educated. As said before, in general, we did 
not ﬁ nd corroborative evidence for this line of reasoning. Ethnic heterogeneity is not negatively 
related to tolerance in our sample, not for the poor and not for the rich. This contradicts our 
previous ﬁ ndings presented in chapter 3. Second, we assumed that between small geographical 
communities, such as neighbourhoods, (selective) residential mobility is more likely to occur than 
between larger geographical communities, such as municipalities or countries. However, we did 
not ﬁ nd a consistent negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity at the municipality level 
and social cohesion either. Given the relatively low migration rates, selective mobility is likely to 
be negligible at the country level but even within European countries there is no evidence for a 
negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and levels of social cohesion (Gesthuizen et 
al., 2008). All in all we conclude that although the moderating role of residential sorting on the 
impact of locality characteristics on social cohesion should be further investigated, it is unlikely 
that selective residential mobility discredits our conclusions.  
Our multi-level analysis showed that the relationships between contextual characteristics 
and dimensions of social cohesion are to a substantial degree explained by composition effects. 
Aggregated analyses (e.g. Coffé & Geys, 2006; Delhey & Newton, 2005) would not have been 
able to pull composition effects and true contextual effects apart, while simple O.L.S. regressions 
would underestimate the standard errors of the contextual effects.
This study is the ﬁ rst study on social cohesion that tests for locality effects on a random 
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sample of municipalities and neighbourhoods. Both localities turned out to affect social cohesion, 
as we expected. This implies that looking at ever smaller geographical units or communities like 
streets or personal networks is not the only way to proceed. Since the impact of speciﬁ c locality 
characteristics on social cohesion are reversed across neighbourhoods and municipalities (e.g. the 
effect of mean income on feelings of trust) the inconsistency in previous research may indeed be 
due to the different (regional) units of analysis. Cross-national research is warranted in which the 
impact of the same regional locality (or localities) on social cohesion is investigated. 
This chapter implies that (Dutch) policy makers who aim to stimulate social cohesion by 
changing the local living environment of people had best direct their efforts to improve the mean 
levels of income within neighbourhoods. They should also be aware that not all residents within 
localities and dimensions of social cohesion are affected similarly. 
4.6 NOTES
1.  In this chapter higher scores on the respective dependent variables indicate more social 
cohesion. Tolerance to neighbours from a difference race is the opposite as hostility to 
neighbours from a difference race. Higher scores thus indicate less ethnic hostility.
 2. More speciﬁ cally, we are more conﬁ dent to ﬁ nd a detrimental effect of (ethnic and economic) 
heterogeneity, poverty, crime, and residential mobility within localities on social cohesion 
among the poor and lower educated than among the rich and higher educated.
3.  These are: singing/music, sports, hobby, political, interest, and religious organizations, schools, 
neighbours/elderly/handicapped, action groups, and local community organizations. 
4.  The Herﬁ ndahl Index (HI) is given by: HI=∑p2i
i
, where pi is the proportion of the respective 
distinguished ethnic group within the locale. The measure of ethnic heterogeneity is obtained 
by taking the complement of the HI:  1 – HI.  
5.  This operationalization causes an underestimation of the income inequality within 
neighbourhoods and municipalities and our tests regarding the impact of income inequality 
should be considered conservative. The deﬁ nition of the Gini-coefﬁ cient as the mean of 
absolute differences between all pair of individuals is given by: 
∑∑ | yi - yj |
2n2y
n
i
n
j , where y is the 
observed income, n the total individuals, and y bar the mean income. We calculated the Gini-
coefﬁ cient by the SPSS-script provided on Raynald’s SPSS Tools website (http://www.spsstools.
net). As said before, instead of income data at the individual level we use information on the 
mean income level of the complete zip code to construct the Gini-coefﬁ cient. We weighted 
the complete zip codes by the number of residents.
6.  We would like to thank L. Prins and his colleagues of the Dutch police force (Korps Landelijke 
Politiediensten, Dienst Nationale Recherce Informatie, Onderzoek en Analyse) for making 
these data available to us.
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7.  We applied hierarchical models to obtain correct standard errors of the contextual effects. 
Since our neighbourhoods are not randomly selected the intra class correlations are not that 
informative. However, from appendix 4.3 we learn that the variances at the higher levels are 
substantial. To a large extent this variance is due to composition effects.
8.  Note that neither STATA nor R has a build in stepwise model selection procedure. We thank Rense 
Nieuwenhuis for the help during the estimation procedure in R. See http://www.rensenieuwenhuis.
nl for the R script we used to come to our ﬁ nal models as presented in Table 4.2.
9.  One plausible theoretical explanation that economic inequality is important at the country-
level but apparently not at lower contextual levels is that the effect of economic inequality 
at the country-level are mainly driven by institutional fairness perceptions and not so much 
by the cultural dissimilarity that results from differences in economic resources. These 
perceptions of fairness may be forged mainly in national public spheres by political parties 
and the media and not in local environments such as neighbourhoods and municipalities.
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5. TRENDS IN ETHNIC EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY†
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
With growing numbers of immigrants throughout Western Europe, research on the inﬂ uence of 
ethnicity on achievement could foresee rising attention. Previous research on ethnic stratiﬁ cation 
patterns in the Dutch educational system has revealed that ethnic minorities perform worse on 
several indicators of school success than the native population and that inequality takes place at 
different stages in the educational career. It takes ethnic minorities longer to ﬁ nish elementary 
school, and both performance levels as well as success rates are lower at different tracks and 
different levels of the educational system (Dagevos, Gijsberts, & van Praag, 2003; Gijsberts, 2004; 
Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 2003; Oomens, Driessen, & Scheepers, 2003; Statistics Netherlands, 2005; 
Tesser & Iedema, 2001; Wolbers & Driessen, 1996). 
Ethnic inequality of educational opportunities (IEO) is by no way limited to the 
Netherlands. Ethnic IEO has also been observed in, among other countries, Germany (e.g. Alba, 
Handl, & Müller, 1994), France (e.g. Vallet & Caille, 1996), Israel (e.g. Ayalon & Shavit, 2004), and 
the United States (e.g. Glick & White, 2003). However, whereas for example in Germany the ethnic 
inequalities in the school system remain after controlling for socio-demographic characteristic, in 
France ethnic differences generally disappear after taking the socio-demographic characteristics 
into account. Ethnic IEO takes different forms in different countries.
The focus of the study presented in this chapter is on trends in ethnic IEO. The Netherlands 
is an interesting case to study trends in ethnic IEO, for three reasons. First, qualitatively tracked 
educational systems, such as those of the Netherlands, offer the opportunity to describe and 
explain both qualitatively as well as quantitatively ethnic IEO. Raftery’s Effectively Maintained 
Inequality (EMI) proposition (Raftery & Hout, 1993) states that whenever inequality cannot be 
maintained quantitatively between educational levels, the basis for differentiation shifts to the 
qualitative nature of educational tracks. This proposition has not been tested in the context of 
ethnicity based educational inequality. Second, in a comparison of thirteen countries, Shavit and 
Blossfeld (1993) found that the effects of social origin on educational opportunity were stable 
over time for each transition in eleven countries but not in the Netherlands and Sweden.1 It is 
therefore interesting to see whether educational stratiﬁ cation based on social classes or gender 
has been replaced by ethnicity based stratiﬁ cation in the Netherlands. Third, with the present 
data on the Netherlands, it is possible to compare birth cohort trends within and between ﬁ rst 
and second generation migrants. Glick and White (2003) have shown that it is important to 
disentangle those trends, as they turned out to be different for generations in the USA.
It has been reported that the educational disadvantage of ethnic minorities is decreasing 
in the Netherlands (Gijsberts, 2004; Statistics Netherlands, 2005; Tesser, 1995), but we cast doubt 
† Slightly different versions of this chapter have been published in the European 
Sociological Review (Tolsma, Coenders, & Lubbers, 2007b) and in Mens en Maatschappij 
(Tolsma, Coenders, & Lubbers, 2007a). The study on which this chapter is based has been 
presented at ‘Marktdag Sociologie’ in Bruxelles (June 2005). 
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on the validity of the conclusion of these studies. Or studies focused on percentage change 
statistics, which not necessarily correspond to net associations, or they aggregated educational 
levels whereby these studies neglected the tracking nature of the Dutch educational system (in 
vocational educational tracks and general educational tracks). Other Dutch studies report that 
programmes directed to increase the educational achievements of disadvantaged ethnic minority 
pupils hardly had effect (Driessen, 2000; Mulder, 1996). 
In order to explain birth cohort trends in ethnic educational inequality, one ﬁ rst has to 
describe these trends. The ﬁ nal level of completed education is a summary measure of educational 
inequality. In this chapter we therefore ﬁ rst turn to the description of birth cohort trends in ﬁ nal 
educational attainment for Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and the Antilleans, the four major ethnic 
minority groups in the Netherlands, next to that of the native Dutch. Together these ethnic minority 
groups form 7% of the current Dutch population (Statistics Netherlands). Our ﬁ rst research question 
reads: (1) What are the birth cohort trends in ethnic differences in ﬁ nal educational attainment? 
A student’s highest attained educational level is determined by the decisions that have 
to be made at different branching points during the educational career. Ethnicity may affect all 
these different decisions. Several studies focussed on the different dropout rates (or downward 
mobility rates) across ethnic groups (Kalmijn & Kraaykamp, 1996; Statistics Netherlands, 2005), 
but until now the trends in the decisions that have to be made at the different branching points 
during the school career once a previous level has been completed successfully have hardly received 
any attention, although this would link the scholarship of ethnic educational inequality to the 
current literature on class-based educational inequality. We will turn to the explanation of ethnic 
differentials in educational decisions at two different points in the school career: the decision 
after elementary school and the decision after higher general secondary education. We formulated 
the second research question as: (2) What are the birth cohort trends across ethnic groups, both 
within and between generational statuses, in the decisions at successive school transitions? 
That social class is a strong determinant of educational achievement is a well established 
ﬁ nding in social stratiﬁ cation research (Breen & Jonsson, 2005; De Graaf & Luijkx, 1995; Dronkers 
& Ultee, 1995; Rijken, 1999; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). This relationship between social class 
and educational achievement is also observed within ethnic minority groups (Wolbers & Driessen, 
1996). Since most immigrant groups face the burden of a class background that is less favourable 
than that of the native host population, it could very well confound the associations between 
ethnicity and educational opportunities. In most Western societies including the Netherlands, 
men and women have roughly the same average of years of education completed (Rijken, 1999). 
However, differences between men and women with regard to their educational achievement are 
more pronounced for ethnic minority groups as compared to the native Dutch (Dagevos et al., 
2003). The gender composition of the ethnic minority groups has become more equal over time. 
Until now, the trends in the effects of ethnicity on achieved educational level and educational 
transitions controlled for gender and social background have remained unclear in the Netherlands. 
The debate over the persistent existence of an ‘ethnic penalty’ has not been settled yet. Our ﬁ nal 
research question is: (3) To what extent do parental background and the gender composition of 
ethnic groups explain (trends in) ethnic inequality in school careers? 
97
We claim to contribute to the scientiﬁ c literature in several ways. A detailed description of 
the trends in ﬁ nal educational attainment and educational transitions both across and within ethnic 
generations in which educational levels and (vocational and general) tracks are not aggregated and 
net associations are being modelled is missing in the Netherlands, and internationally scarce. We 
aim to ﬁ ll this lacuna in the scientiﬁ c literature on ethnic educational inequality and will describe 
in detail how different birth cohorts of the multi-ethnic Dutch society have been divided by their 
ﬁ nal level of education. This description will also tell us whether the distinction between general 
and vocational educational plays a role in ethnic educational inequality. Furthermore, we aim to 
explain educational transition decisions for different birth cohorts at different branching points 
in the educational career. In doing so, we link the scholarship of ethnic educational inequality 
to the current literature on class-based educational inequality. Moreover, we aim to contribute in 
the discussion on Maximum Maintained Inequality and Effectively Maintained Inequality, and test 
their propositions in a multi-ethnic context. 
5.2 THE DUTCH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
The many decision points and the possibility to reach a level of education by different routes 
are characteristic features of the Dutch educational system. Until 1999, Dutch students could 
choose between four different educational tracks after they completed primary school (see Figure 
5.1). A decision had to be made whether to start a vocational education (LBO) or to continue 
general education at a low, medium or high level (respectively MAVO, HAVO, VWO). One may also 
start a vocational track at a later point in the educational career; after having ﬁ nished a general 
education. Tertiary education consists both of higher vocational education (HBO) and university. 
The vocational track is regarded as the less selective track compared to the general track. Full-time 
education is obligatory for students aged between 4 and 16. Students aged between 16 and 18 
are only partially obliged to follow an education. We would like to point out that only the second 
generation immigrants have been subject to the complete Dutch educational system. 
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general tracks vocational tracks
Tertiary education
Higher secondary education
University
4-6 years
VWO
6 years
HAVO
5 years
MAVO
4 years
Primary education (PE)
8 years (start age 4)
HBO
4 years
MBO
3-4 years
LBO
4 years
Lower secondary education
Primary education
Figure 5.1 The Dutch educational system (until 1999)
5.3 EXPECTATIONS
5.3.1 Modernization thesis
The proposition of modernization theory states that the economies and concomitant occupational 
structures of modern, industrialised countries will come to dictate selection processes based on 
achieved characteristics of individuals. Selection processes present in the educational system or 
on the labour market that are based on ascribed characteristics such as social origin, gender, 
and ethnicity will turn out to be economically inefﬁ cient (Blau & Duncan, 1967). This trend 
from ascription to achievement, which was driven by the economy, was also accompanied by 
a change in the value patterns of western societies (Parsons, 1951). Ascribed characteristics 
not only could not, but also should not play any more an important role in selection processes. 
However, comparative empirical research on educational inequality among social strata has shown 
convincingly that with respect to educational opportunities meritocratization is not a universal 
process among modernised countries (Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). In the 
Netherlands, the importance of social class in educational attainment did decrease (De Graaf & 
Luijkx, 1995). Moreover, gender has also become a less decisive determinant for highest attained 
level of education for the native Dutch (Van der Lippe & Van Doorne-Huiskes, 1995). In agreement 
with the observation that the Netherlands is indeed becoming ever more a meritocratic society 
with regard to the ascribed characteristics social origin and gender, we deduce a modernization 
hypothesis: Ethnic inequality in the educational system will decrease at all levels and for all tracks. 
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5.3.2 Maximally Maintained Inequality (MMI)
Raftery and Hout (1993) pose that at times of educational expansion, educational inequality will 
only decrease at educational levels where enrolment of the elite stratum has been saturated. At 
levels where enrolment is not universal, the elite social stratum will proﬁ t more from educational 
expansion than the less privileged, and increase their attendance rates faster. This has been 
known as the Maximally Maintained Inequality proposition. 
The Netherlands have experienced a period of educational expansion the last decades. 
Although now almost everyone continues their school career after primary education, even in 1999, 
‘only’ 42% of the native Dutch pupils who completed primary school enrolled in the highest levels of 
secondary education (ROA, 2002; Statistics Netherlands, 2005). According to the MMI proposition, it 
is (and was) therefore still possible to maintain inequality quantitatively within secondary education. 
In contrast, since approximately 90 per cent of the native Dutch students who successfully ﬁ nish 
the highest general levels of secondary education enroll in tertiary education, the tertiary level 
can be regarded as saturated for those who ﬁ nish higher secondary education. We therefore deduce 
that: Ethnic inequality will be maintained within secondary education. And: Between students who 
successfully completed higher general secondary education in the Netherlands, ethnic inequality will 
decrease. Note that the ﬁ rst MMI hypothesis contradicts the modernization hypothesis. 
5.3.3 Effectively Maintained Inequality (EMI) 
The educational levels in the Dutch educational system (Figure 5.1) are qualitatively differentiated 
in vocational and general tracks. After primary education and after the higher general levels of 
secondary education, students may choose to continue education either at a vocational or a 
general track. The MMI proposition ignores the fact that educational systems may be tracked. In 
Lucas’ hypotheses of EMI (Lucas, 2001) it is argued that once saturation has been reached at a 
given educational level, inequalities of attaining that level may be replaced by inequalities in 
enrolment in the more selective track. The more selective tracks in the Netherlands are the general 
tracks. As stated above, we only regard the tertiary level as saturated. This leads to the following 
EMI hypothesis: At the tertiary educational level, ethnic inequality will have decreased for the less 
selective vocational track and have increased for the more selective general track. 
5.3.4 Parental background and gender
The inﬂ uence of social origin on educational achievement has diminished in the Netherlands over 
time. However, social origin is still a strong predictor for educational outcomes, even for native 
Dutch. Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands have in general a lower social background than the 
native population. We therefore pose in a ‘social origin hypothesis’ that: Ethnic IEO will decrease 
when we control for parental education and for father’s job status. We will assess whether or not 
ethnicity based inequality disappears after we control for these social origin characteristics, as in 
France (Vallet & Caille, 1996), or partially remain, as in Germany (Alba et al., 1994). 
Gender differentials in educational opportunities are still present in the Dutch society 
(Need & De Jong, 2000), even though, as stated above, gender is becoming a less decisive 
determinant for highest attained level of education for the native Dutch (Van der Lippe & Van 
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Doorne-Huiskes, 1995). Although gender differentials in education are more pronounced for 
ethnic minority groups than for native Dutch, there are also indications that the emancipation 
process in the Dutch educational system for some ethnic minority groups is taking place at a 
different (i.e. faster) pace than for the native Dutch (Gijsberts, 2004). We formulate the following 
‘gender hypotheses’: (a) Gender based IEO within ethnic groups is decreasing. And (b): The gender 
emancipation process in the educational system is taking place at a faster rate for ethnic minority 
groups than for the native Dutch. 
5.3.5 Generational status 
Successive birth cohorts of ﬁ rst generation immigrants may differ in their educational attainment 
due to changing selective migration and due to processes in the educational system in the country 
of origin. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Netherlands was in need for lowly educated manual workers 
and recruited male guest workers from countries such as Morocco and Turkey. These people were 
relatively low educated compared to native Dutch but also compared to Moroccans and Turks in 
the origin country. In the 1970s, the Turks and Moroccans reunited with their (lowly educated) 
family members. In the 1980s, a new type of migration could be observed; young (ﬁ rst and 
second generation) migrants chose to marry a partner from their respective origin country. These 
partners originated from the same rural agricultural areas and villages as the initial migrants, and 
are therefore probably relatively low educated as well. As a consequence, throughout the years, 
predominantly relatively low educated Turks and Moroccans migrated to the Netherlands. However, 
the adult literacy rates for men and women in Turkey and Morocco have risen sharply the last 
decades (UNESCO, various years). But they are still relatively low compared to the literacy rates of 
the other ethnic groups under consideration in this study. Since primary education is saturated in 
the Netherlands, we pose that: The educational inequality at the lowest educational levels (i.e. no 
education and primary education) will have diminished between ﬁ rst generation Turks and Moroccans 
and Moroccans and Turks of second generational status. On the other hand, due to the continues 
(self)selection of relatively low educated Turks and Moroccans, we also expect that: For Moroccans 
and Turks, ethnic educational inequality at educational levels higher than primary education will be 
maintained between generational statuses and native Dutch. 
Up to the 1960s, migration from Surinam to the Dutch mother country was low, but 
those who migrated were mostly students and the highly educated. During the transitional period 
towards independence, more Surinamese migrated to the Netherlands among of which were 
more lower educated Surinamese. The economic crises in Surinam at the end of the 80s caused 
especially the migration of the relatively lower educated to increase. It is difﬁ cult to predict the 
educational achievements of the ﬁ rst generation Surinamese in the Netherlands, for relatively low 
educated Surinamese chose to migrate to the Netherlands at later periods, but at the same time, 
these relatively low educated Surinamese became better educated due to the general educational 
expansion in Surinam (UNESCO, various years). 
From 1954 and onwards, inhabitants of the islands belonging to the Netherlands Antilles 
are free to migrate to the mother country. Initially, only students arrived of whom many re-
migrated after obtaining a degree. After the 50s, migration from the Antilles is mainly driven by 
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the worsening economic conditions on the islands. Due to the strong trend towards (self)selective 
migration favouring the lower educated we expect that: The educational achievements of ﬁ rst 
generation Antillean immigrants of subsequent birth cohorts will have decreased compared to 
Antilleans of second generational status. 
5.4 DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
We used data from the social position, and use of welfare facilities by immigrants surveys (SPVA), 
waves 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002 (Groeneveld & Weyers-Martens, 2003; Martens, 1995, 
1999; Martens, Roelandt, & Veenman, 1992). The SPVA is a household survey of Turkish, Moroccan, 
Surinamese and Antilleans ethnic minorities and a native Dutch reference group and was conducted 
in 13 municipalities in the Netherlands – among which Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague 
– in which the majority of the Dutch ethnic minority members live. The SPVA contains to a high 
extent a representative selection of members of the respective ethnic minority groups with regard 
to age, gender, marital status and nationality. The SPVA Dutch control group is not a perfect 
representative selection of native Dutch residents with regard to ﬁ nal educational attainment. 
Data of the Dutch Labour Force Survey (LFS 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002) were used to reduce this 
non-representivity.2 
With regard to the description of the ﬁ nal education levels across ethnic groups, we 
followed the usual procedure to restrict the sample to respondents who were aged 25 or above 
at the time of the survey. We thereby did not favour young drop-outs and students who followed 
a short educational track. In the school transition analyses we only selected respondents who 
successfully ﬁ nished their previous educational track. In the school transition analyses we included 
generational status as an explanatory variable. Since second generation immigrants only became 
a part of the Dutch society from the 1960s and onwards, we only selected those respondents who 
were born after 1959.
Final educational attainment was measured in 8 categories (0) no education, or not 
completed elementary school ‘<PE’, (1) elementary school ‘PE’, (2) lower vocational ‘LBO’, (3) 
lower general secondary ‘MAVO’, (4) intermediate vocational secondary ‘MBO’, (5) intermediate 
and higher general secondary ‘HAVO/VWO’, (6) higher vocational tertiary ‘HBO’ and (7) university 
‘WO’. We also constructed school transition variables based on the data of the SPVA surveys from 
1988, 1991, 1994 and 1998.3 A person was classiﬁ ed as belonging to an ethnic minority group 
when the respondent himself or either of his parents was born in the origin country. The ethnic 
minorities who were born in the origin country and immigrated to the Netherlands after the age 
of 5 were classiﬁ ed as belonging to the ﬁ rst generation, those born in the Netherlands or age at 
immigration younger than 6 to the second generation. Second generation immigrations became a 
substantive part of the Dutch society from 1960 and onwards. The native Dutch of the SPVA Dutch 
control group are deﬁ ned as persons of whom both parents are born in the Netherlands and who 
themselves were born in the Netherlands. Survey year minus age at time of survey leads to year of 
birth. We deﬁ ned ﬁ ve birth cohorts: cohort 1: 1917-1936; cohort 2: 1937-1946; cohort 3: 1947-
1956; cohort 4: 1957-1966; cohort 5: 1967-1980. We use two indicators for social origin; parental 
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education and father’s job status when the respondent was 15. Parental education is the highest 
educational level attained by either parent. When we did not have information on both parents we 
used the educational level of the parent we had information on. Missing values were substituted 
with mean scores per ethnic group per survey year. We categorised parental educational levels as 
(0) primary education (i.e. ‘<PE’ and ‘PE’), (1) lower secondary education (i.e. LBO and MAVO), 
(2) higher secondary education (HAVO, VWO and MBO), (3) higher professional education (HBO), 
and (4) University (WO). The prestige of father’s job when the respondent was 15 was measured 
by the occupational prestige scale developed by Ultee and Sixma (1983), which ranges from 13 to 
87. Respondents of whom the father never had a job received the lowest prestige score on father’s 
job status. If only information was present on father’s ﬁ rst job, instead of the job when the 
respondent was 15, we used this instead. Missing values were substituted with mean scores per 
ethnic group per survey year. The inclusion or exclusion of respondents with imputed values during 
the analyses does not substantively affect our conclusions. Descriptive statistics are summarised 
in Appendix 5.1. 
5.5 ANALYSES AND RESULTS
5.5.1 Final educational attainment
As the Netherlands have experienced signiﬁ cant educational expansion the last decades, and since 
the ethnic groups that are being analysed in this study have a different age composition, the 
description of trends in ethnic IEO calls for a cohort design. The cell frequencies of the three-way 
ethnicity by cohort by ﬁ nal educational attainment table (see Appendix 5.2) are a function of the 
main effects of Ethnic group (E), ﬁ nal educational attainment (S, for Schooling), and birth Cohort 
(C). Loglinear models are ideal to estimate and describe associations between nominal variables 
free of the marginal distributions and changes in these distributions over time. 
First we assess whether it is necessary to include speciﬁ c ‘Ethnicity by Schooling’ 
associations to estimate the observed frequencies in our table. In order to do this we start with 
a baseline model (Model 1). This baseline model is the saturated model without the parameters of 
interest. The baseline model therefore does not contain the second order interactions of ‘Ethnicity 
by Schooling’ (ES) and the 3rd order parameters modelling birth cohort trends in the ‘Ethnicity by 
Schooling’ interaction (i.e. ‘Ethnicity by Schooling by Cohort’ (ESC)). The less parsimonious model 
2 includes all (non-redundant) ‘Ethnicity by Schooling’ interaction parameters. These parameters 
have the same properties as odds ratios and therefore show whether certain ethnic minority groups 
are positively or negatively associated to speciﬁ c educational levels. 
Next we test whether ‘Ethnicity by Schooling’ associations changed over the speciﬁ ed 
birth cohorts in a linear fashion. In order to do this we add in model 3 three-way interaction 
parameters; ‘ESC(1)’. The only difference between the saturated model and model 3 is that in 
the latter there is only one linear ‘Ethnicity by Schooling by Cohort’ trend parameter for each 
‘Ethnicity by Schooling’ association, hence ESC(1). In contrast, the saturated model includes 
parameters for every speciﬁ ed cohort and each ‘Ethnic group by Schooling’ association. The 3rd 
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order parameters of the saturated model (i.e. the ESC parameters) tell us whether an ‘Ethnicity by 
Schooling’ association that belongs to a speciﬁ c birth cohort deviates from the mean (over birth 
cohorts) ‘Ethnicity by Schooling’ association.4 
We use the BIC statistic as the criterion for model selection. The BIC statistic may be 
considered as a likelihood ratio (L) corrected for sample size and the number of degree of freedom 
(df) used. Parsimonious models are preferred above less parsimonious models. The restricted model 
with the lowest BIC value describes the data best given the degree of freedom it uses. Saturated 
models have a BIC value of zero. We have summarised the BIC values in Table 5.1.
The addition of parameters that represent the associations between ethnicity and ﬁ nal 
educational attainment (model 2), and the addition of a linear trend in these associations (model 
3) are in both cases improvements to the baseline model 1 (see Table 5.1). Model 3 is the 
preferred model, according to the BIC statistic. We therefore reach the conclusion that at speciﬁ c 
educational levels, ethnic speciﬁ c over- and under-representation exist and that trends in ﬁ nal 
educational attainment levels differ across ethnic groups. The associations between ethnicity and 
educational achievement have, in general, been altered in a linear fashion. 
The estimates of the relevant parameters are presented in Table 5.2.5 Positive ‘Ethnicity 
by Schooling’ associations, or ES parameters, refer to an overrepresentation for an ethnic minority 
group at this educational level, compared to the association of native Dutch with this level. 
Signiﬁ cant ESC(1) parameters with opposite signs as the signiﬁ cant ES parameters indicate that 
the association has more closely come to resemble the Dutch association. We italicised these 
parameters. Parameters that reﬂ ect a (signiﬁ cant) persistent inequality are in bold face. Note, that 
the ES association parameters are robust to model speciﬁ cation (model 2 versus model 3 and the 
saturated model, Appendix 5.3).
Table 5.1  Goodness-of-ﬁ t statistics for loglinear models that test the associations between ethnicity and 
educational attainmentabc
LL df P BIC
M1. Baseline (= E S C EC SC) 17417 140 0.0 15963
M2. Baseline + ES 572 112 0.0 -591
M3. M2 + ESC(1) 214 84 0.0 -658
a N=32322, Dutch weighted
b  E, main effect of Ethnicity; S, main effect of completed level of education/schooling; C, main effect of cohort;
ES, association between Ethnicity and Schooling; ESC(1), linear trend over cohorts of ES. 
c  The preferred model is in bold face. 
Source: SPVA, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, and 2002
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All three theories predict that at the primary levels inequality should decrease across ethnic 
groups in the Netherlands. We see that the over-representation for Turks and Moroccans at the 
‘no-education level’ and the over-representation for Turks at the primary elementary level indeed 
decreased (Table 5.2). For example, the ESC(1) parameters for Turks for the educational levels ‘<PE’ 
and ‘PE’ are -1.2 and -0.5 and signiﬁ cant. For Surinamese and Antilleans we do not see a trend 
towards equality. At these low educational levels, trends are likely dominated by ﬁ rst generation 
over second generation immigrants, since especially within these educational categories ﬁ rst 
generation migrants outnumber second generation migrants (Appendix 1). We tentatively conclude 
that self-selective migration of the lowly-educated offsets the positive effects of educational 
expansion in Suriname and the Antilles. 
At the tertiary educational levels, educational inequality between native Dutch and 
Turks and Moroccans remained stable and increased between native Dutch and Surinamese and 
Antilleans. More difﬁ cult to interpret are the parameters for the secondary educational levels. 
Secondary general education seems for native Dutch not the culmination of the educational career. 
The over-representation of some ethnic minorities groups at these secondary levels is not the result 
of native Dutch not reaching these levels, but more likely of ethnic minorities not enrolling in or 
succeeding at the tertiary level. However, we see two interesting phenomena. First of all, for both 
the lower secondary level and the higher secondary level, we see that there is a clear distinction 
between parameters of the vocational track and the general track. This stresses the importance to 
distinguish between qualitative and quantitative inequality when describing ethnic educational 
inequality. Secondly, we see that at the lower secondary level the less selective vocational track 
(LBO) is gaining in importance compared to the lower general track (MAVO); the ESC(1) parameter 
for LBO is larger than this parameter for MAVO for all ethnic minority groups. 
From our results we conclude that there are two reasons not to collapse educational 
categories when assessing educational inequality across ethnic groups. First, trends at the primary 
level will probably dominate trends at higher levels, since ethnic minority groups are strongly over-
represented at these lower categories. Secondly, trends are different for vocational and general 
tracks at the secondary level. Contrary to previous studies in the Netherlands, our results do not 
conﬁ rm the general statement that ethnic inequality with regard to ﬁ nal educational attainment 
has decreased.
5.5.2 School transitions 
We analysed two school career transition points to shed light on the process of the formation 
of ethnic IEO, and to more rigorously test the EMI and MMI propositions. The ﬁ rst branching 
point we analysed takes place after completion of elementary school. At this point, pupils may 
choose between four different educational tracks. For simplicity reasons, we assumed this to be 
a decision whether or not to continue the school career at a higher general level (HAVO/VWO), 
at a relatively lower general level (MAVO), or at a relatively lower vocational level (LBO). Leaving 
the school system is ofﬁ cially only an option for those who have not been subjected to the 
Dutch obligatory educational system, which has been operational since 1969. However, since we 
observed a persistent overrepresentation for the ethnic minority groups at the elementary level, 
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we also assessed whether this is in part due to ethnic minorities who more often than native Dutch 
leave the educational system after elementary school. The second transition we analysed takes 
place after ﬁ nishing higher secondary education (HAVO/VWO). At this stage, pupils may leave the 
educational system or continue their education at the tertiary level, either at the vocational HBO, 
or at the university.6
Both of these school decision nodes consist of several odds. We estimated the odds 
simultaneously for each branching point in multinomial logistic regression models. The regression 
weights regarding the ﬁ rst and second transition are presented as logits in Table 5.3 and Table 
5.4, respectively. In the analyses, we made a distinction between ﬁ rst generation immigrants and 
second generation immigrants and constructed the variable ‘Ethnic group by Generation’. Model 
A (Table 5.2 and 5.3) also includes the trend parameters (i.e. ‘Year of birth’*‘Ethnic group by 
Generation’). We added the variables ‘Gender’, ‘Parental education’ and ‘Father’s job status’ in model 
B to assess the ethnic penalty net of these background variables. In model C we accounted for the 
possibility that changes in educational differentials might be different between men and women 
and that emancipation processes took place at a different pace for ethnic groups. Results of Model 
C are summarised in Appendix 5.4 and Appendix 5.5, respectively for transition 1 and 2.
Transition 1 
Leaving the educational system is only a viable option for ﬁ rst generation Turks and Moroccans 
as the ‘Ethnic group by Generation’ parameters of -4.21 and -3.77 in column 1, Model A show 
(Table 5.3). The chance to leave the educational system for those who followed their education 
in the Netherlands is low, approximately 2% (as estimated by the parameters of our models). We 
further observe that the Dutch trend parameter is -1.02. This means that continuing at the lower 
vocational track has become a less relevant choice compared to the choice to leave the educational 
system for later generation pupils of Dutch descent. Since the trend parameters for the ethnic 
minority groups are either positive or non-signiﬁ cant, we conclude that for this speciﬁ c odd, 
ethnic educational differentials have diminished. This ﬁ nding is in line with all three theoretical 
frameworks; the modernization thesis, MMI proposition and the EMI proposition. 
Of the older cohorts, only second generation Turks less often opt to continue at the 
general level (MAVO) versus to the vocational level (LBO), compared to the native Dutch (-0.63). 
The general track at lower secondary education (MAVO) is gaining in importance compared to the 
vocational level (LBO) for most ethnic groups. However, in comparison with the native Dutch, 
this process is less pronounced for second generation Moroccans and Antilleans (their cohort 
trend interaction parameters are -0.27 and -0.36, respectively). At lower secondary education, 
inequality is therefore maintained qualitatively for speciﬁ c ethnic groups. This clearly refutes the 
modernization thesis. 
 Next, we test the MMI hypotheses, which states that inequality is effectively maintained 
if saturation is not reached. We therefore inspect the relative chance to continue at the higher 
secondary general levels (HAVO/VWO) compared to the chance to continue at the lower secondary 
general level (MAVO, see column 3, Model A, Table 5.3). In sum, all immigrants either experienced 
a negative trend compared to the native Dutch, or second generation minorities experienced 
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no trend relative to the native Dutch and ethnic differentials in the transition odds remained 
stable. This is a clear corroboration of the MMI proposition. For example, the trend interaction 
parameter for Turks is -0.42 whereas the main effect term, which refers to the trend for native 
Dutch, is non-signiﬁ cant. The only exception is the ﬁ rst generation Surinamese, but they will need 
approximately 5 decades to overcome their disadvantaged position (i.e. 1.39/0.29=4.8).
 Generational status affects the relative chances of the transition after primary education, 
but not in a clear consistently manner. For example, whereas in 1960 the odds to continue at 
the MAVO relative to the LBO for ﬁ rst and second generation Turks were 1.48 and 0.42, these 
same odds in 1980 were 1.16 and 1.86, respectively.7 Differences between generational statuses 
for this odd remained more or less stable for Moroccans and Antilleans, and favour the second 
generation immigrants. In general, the chance to continue at the higher secondary general levels 
(HAVO/VWO) relative to the lower secondary general level (MAVO) decreases faster for immigrants 
of second generation compared to immigrants of ﬁ rst generational status. 
 In model B we controlled for gender, parental education and father’s job status. These 
variables contribute considerably to the model ﬁ t (see the Likelihood Ratio values (-2LL) in 
Table 5.3). Moreover, these background characteristics explain in part the effects of ethnicity and 
generational status as we predicted. For example the parameter for ﬁ rst generation Turks referring 
to the transition odd higher secondary general levels (HAVO + VWO) versus lower secondary general 
level (MAVO) diminished from -0.97 in Model A to -0.33 in Model B. We also see that speciﬁ c trends 
in transition odds are for a large part explained by parental background characteristics. This is 
especially true for the native Dutch. However, more importantly, our conclusions regarding ethnic 
educational inequality are not inﬂ uenced by the introduction of these background variables. 
 Next, we tested whether there are gender differences within ethnic groups and whether 
birth cohort trends are different for males and females across ethnic groups (model C, Appendix 
5.4). Our results indicate that only among ethnic minority groups, gender differences exist in the 
choices after primary education. Predominantly male ethnic minority students opt for the lower 
vocational track (LBO) compared to the lower general track (MAVO) and more often opt for higher 
general education (HAVO + VWO) versus lower general education (MAVO). We only detected gender 
differences in birth cohort trends for second generation Turks and ﬁ rst generation Moroccans 
and Antilleans. Within these ethnic groups, lower general education (MAVO) gains in importance 
relative to lower vocational education (LBO) faster for men than for women.
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Transition 2 
Results of the multinomial logistic regression concerning the transition after higher secondary 
education are summarised in Table 5.4. Pupils of Dutch descent opt more often than immigrants to 
continue their educational career after higher general secondary education. Only the odds higher 
vocational (HBO) versus stopping the educational career is shown, however, the redundant odds 
‘university versus stopping’ may be calculated by adding the parameters of column 1 and column 
2. We did not observe signiﬁ cant trends among the ethnic groups in the odds to continue the 
educational career after higher secondary education at the tertiary level (signiﬁ cance calculated 
by binary logistic regression). After higher secondary education, ethnic inequality is quantitatively 
maintained. 
The choice for university versus higher vocational education (HBO) was for ethnic 
minorities of older birth cohorts more popular than for native Dutch. Although only the parameters 
for the Surinamese and second generation Antilleans (0.56, 0.66, and 0.95 respectively) reach 
signiﬁ cance, all other ethnic group by generation parameters are positive as well (with the exception 
of second generation Turks.) In recent years the choice for university gained in importance (see 
the main cohort trend parameter of 0.50 in column 2, Table 5.4). The ethnic group by generation 
cohort interaction effects are all negative, although only the interaction parameters of ﬁ rst 
generation Moroccans, second generation Surinamese, and ﬁ rst generation Antilleans (-0.94, -
0.63, and -0.72 respectively) reached signiﬁ cance. The non-signiﬁ cance of the trend parameters 
is possibly due to the relatively small sample sizes per ethnic group. We tentatively conclude 
that even when, contrary to our expectations, inequality is maintained quantitatively between 
higher secondary education and tertiary education, that, within tertiary education, inequality is 
established qualitatively as well. 
Once again, parental education and gender contribute to the model ﬁ t (see Model B, 
Table 5.4). The chance to stop after higher secondary education is lower for students with higher 
educated parents (see Model B). However, the odd to continue at the tertiary vocational level 
(HBO) versus to stop is higher for students with parents who reached the tertiary vocational level 
(HBO) compared to students with at least one university graduated parent, this parameter is 0.50 
(p=0.08; Model B). This latter ﬁ nding can be explained by the ‘Avoidance of Downward Mobility 
Mechanism’ (Goldthorpe, 2000). Parents and children strive for avoidance of downward social 
mobility (Goldthorpe, 2000). For students with parents of whom at least one possess an university 
degree, both continuing at the tertiary vocational level (HBO) and stopping after higher secondary 
education (HAVO/VWO) is regarded as downward mobility. On the other hand, for students with 
parents who maximally obtained a tertiary vocational level, to enrol in university entails an 
unnecessary risk in order to avoid downwards mobility, since one could fail to graduate from 
university. Father’s job status only affects the odd ‘university versus HBO’. 
We observe that male students more often continue their educational career and when 
they continue it is more often at the university track compared to female students (b=0.47; 
p=0.00; Model B). This latter ﬁ nding is in agreement with previous research of De Graaf and 
Wolbers (2003). Surprisingly, differences across ethnic groups are hardly affected by the inclusion 
of these background characteristics. Model C is estimated without the three-way interaction 
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‘sex*cohort*ethnic group by generation’ since our sample size is relatively small (Appendix 
5.5). The differences between male and female students in the odds to continue at the tertiary 
vocational level versus to stop one’s educational career are diminishing, as indicated by the 
signiﬁ cant interaction of ‘Male*Cohort’ (b=-0.48; p=0.00; Appendix 5.5). We do not observe 
signiﬁ cant differences across ethnic groups in the effect of sex on school transition decisions 
(Appendix 5.5).
5.6 CONCLUSIONS
In a detailed description of ﬁ nal educational attainment levels, we showed that ethnic minorities 
have improved their situation at the lowest educational levels. Also, the under-representation 
that these groups faced within vocational tracks of secondary education has decreased over the 
investigated cohorts. However, inequality regarding ﬁ nal educational attainment between the 
Dutch and ethnic minority groups is maintained at the tertiary level. 
The detailed description of patterns of association between attained educational level 
and ethnicity also showed that (cohort trends in) ethnic inequality takes different forms across 
vocational and general educational tracks of the same level. It is therefore important to take the 
qualitatively differentiated structure of educational systems into account when assessing (ethnic) 
educational differentials. Surprisingly, the distinction between less restrictive vocational tracks 
and more restrictive general tracks does not play a major role during explicit track choices after 
elementary school. For the native Dutch, the general track has gained in importance at the lower 
secondary level. However, this is also true for two out of four ethnic minority groups who followed 
their education in the Netherlands. We therefore expect that the differences between vocational 
and general educational tracks will be more evident in drop-out rates than in transition rates. 
After elementary school, inequality is maintained between lower secondary education 
and higher secondary education. Our analyses make clear that the selection processes for secondary 
education are decisive for ethnic inequality in ﬁ nal education. It might be that migrants themselves 
as well as teachers underestimate migrants’ chances in the educational career. However, at the 
transition point after higher secondary education, we also see that inequality is maintained. 
Native Dutch keep continuing their school after higher secondary education more often than the 
ethnic minority groups. On top of this, the university track becomes more exclusively the domain 
of native Dutch compared to the vocational track (HBO). Both transitions therefore establish 
ethnic educational inequality.
In this study, we made a link between the scholarships on class based educational 
differentials and the ﬁ eld of ethnic educational inequality. Unfortunately, even in a country where 
the effects of social class and gender on educational inequality indicators have decreased, a 
general birth cohort trend towards ethnic educational equality could not be observed. Social 
origin indicators partly explained the ethnic educational differentials, as we predicted. Better 
measurements of social position and the inclusion of (language) ability measures may even further 
reduce the observed ethnic differentials, but for now, our results indicate that ethnic educational 
inequality is maintained even after controlling for background characteristics. At the primary 
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level, gender differentials are only present among ethnic minority groups. We could not detect a 
convincing emancipation process among ethnic minority groups.
Generational status affects the decisions made at school transition nodes, albeit not in a 
consistent way for successive birth cohorts. Later birth cohorts of second generational status are 
sometimes even disadvantaged compared to their ﬁ rst generation counterparts. Third generation 
ethnic migrants (or native Dutch with a migrant heritage) are now starting to attend school. 
Whether the third generation is going to perform better or worse than their second and ﬁ rst 
generation counterparts remains to be seen. Unfortunately, it is not to be expected that inequality 
among second generation immigrants and native Dutch will disappear at the secondary and tertiary 
educational levels for successive birth cohorts. 
Clearly, we have to refute the modernization proposition; ethnic educational inequality 
did not decrease at all levels and all tracks. Within secondary education, inequality is maintained 
quantitatively as the MMI proposition predicted. Even under a condition of saturation, the trends 
in ethnic IEO did not diminish between higher secondary education and tertiary education. In line 
with the EMI proposition, inequality is established qualitatively within tertiary education. Our 
results should temper the optimism of those who expect ethnic differences to dissolve for later 
generations or in due time.
5.7 NOTES
1. In a recent review of the research in social stratiﬁ cation, Breen and Jonssen (2005) mention 
that in other countries the association between social origin and educational attainment 
declined as well (e.g. Germany, France, Italy).
2. All (Dutch) primary respondents and other household members older than 25 were weighted 
to the frequency distribution of respondents of the LFS with the same birth cohort and ﬁ nal 
educational level. Alters younger than 25 received the same weighting factor as the primary 
respondent of the household. Primary respondents of the SPVA younger than 25 were not 
weighted (i.e. received a weight ‘1’), since these age categories are not part of the sample 
population of the LFS. 
3. The SPVA wave of 2002 was excluded from the analysis regarding birth cohort trends in school 
transition choices due to missing information on the school career.
4. The interpretation of the parameters in a loglinear model depends on the deﬁ nition of the 
design matrix. The above example refers to a simple contrast deﬁ nition.
5. That all our restricted models deviate signiﬁ cantly from the full model is due to our large 
sample size. The ES association parameters are robust to model speciﬁ cation (model 2 versus 
model 3 and the saturated model, Appendix 5.3). In the design matrix the vector ESC(1) has 
length one. In a design with 5 cohorts speciﬁ ed this vector is (-0.63; -0.32; 0; 0.32; 0.63). 
The mean ethnicity-schooling association parameter for educational level ‘<PE’ for Turks who 
belong to the oldest birth cohort should therefore be corrected with: -0.63 * ESC(1) = -0.63 * 
-1.2 = 0.8. The estimated ‘Ethnicity by Schooling’ association parameter for Turks who belong 
to the oldest birth cohort is: 4.8 + 0.8 = 5.6.
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6. Following Need and De Jong (2000), students who ﬁ nished the HAVO and continued their 
school career at the VWO are considered as following the ‘university track’. Their decision is 
regarded as similar to the decision to enrol in the university after completion of the VWO. 
7. For ﬁ rst generation Turks born in 1980, this odd is calculated using the formula: 
e-0.23+0.62+2*(0.41-0.53).
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6. EXPLANATIONS FOR ETHNIC EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY†
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In industrial societies, the association between social origin and educational attainment has been 
extensively studied. This association is substantial, but has declined in the Netherlands, as, for 
example, in France and in Sweden (Breen, 2005). Social origin inﬂ uences not only the choices 
students make on the level of schooling they will attend, it also affects their ﬁ eld of study choice. 
In the Netherlands, pupils’ chosen ﬁ eld of study tends to resemble that of their father and is 
guided by the parents’ occupational domain (Van de Werfhorst, De Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2001). 
Next to effects of social origin, research shows that two other ‘ascribed’ characteristics, sex and 
ethnicity, also affect inequality of educational opportunities. 
In most western countries, and the Netherlands is no exception, sex has become less 
decisive in determining the level of education that individuals attain (Van der Lippe & Van Doorne-
Huiskes, 1995). Sex differentials have even reversed in Dutch society today: women are now 
more likely than men to enrol in higher education (Statistics Netherlands, 2007). However, sex 
differences are still pronounced in ﬁ eld of study choices, with women less likely than men to 
choose science subjects (De Jong, Van Leeuwen, Roeleveld, & Webbing, 1998; Portegijs, Hermans, 
& Lalta, 2006). 
Ethnic origin, net of the effect of social origin, inﬂ uences educational outcomes in 
most western countries (Alba et al., 1994; Ayalon & Shavit, 2004; Glick & White, 2003; see also 
Chapter 5). There are signs that ethnic inequality is diminishing in Dutch vocational education. 
However, ethnic inequality at higher levels of general education has remained stable or increased 
(see Chapter 5). When studying educational differentials based on social origin, sex and ethnicity, 
it is thus important to take into account not only differentials in levels of schooling attained (e.g. 
professional college versus university), but also differences in ﬁ elds of study (e.g. science versus 
non-science).
To explain educational decisions, a rational action model has been maturing over the 
years (Boudon, 1974; Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Davies, Heinesen, & Holm, 2002; Goldthorpe, 
1996, 2000; Need & De Jong, 2000; Stocké, 2007; Van de Werfhorst & Andersen, 2005). Breen 
and Goldthorpe (1997) argue that students make instrumentally rational decisions inﬂ uenced by 
several factors: (1) their subjective beliefs about the likelihood of success in different educational 
tracks (success probabilities), (2) the expected costs of remaining in school (study costs) and (3) 
their subjective beliefs about the utility of educational outcomes (educational returns). 
In Breen and Goldthorpe’s explanation, both primary and secondary effects are assumed 
to be at work. Primary effects operate through the association between children’s social origin and 
their average level of demonstrated ability. Secondary effects are the factors that inﬂ uence the 
actual educational choices that pupils make, controlled for ability. In this study we test several 
† A slightly different version of this chapter is forthcoming in the European Sociological 
Review (Tolsma, Need, & De Jong, forthcoming). The study on which this chapter is based 
has been presented at the RC28 Spring Meeting in Nijmegen, the Netherlands (June 2006). 
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hypotheses derived from Breen and Goldthorpe’s model, in order to explain how social position, 
sex and ethnicity affect educational transitions. 
Recently, Stocké (2007) assessed the validity of the Breen-Goldthorpe model in a similar 
manner. He showed for Germany that higher class parents are more likely to believe that their 
offspring will be able to successfully complete a certain degree than lower class parents. To a large 
extent, this difference in expected success probabilities between higher and lower class parents 
can be explained by differences in their children’s ability. Surprisingly, differences between lower 
class children and higher class children in schooling level decisions could not be explained by the 
different expected success probabilities. 
Within the rational action framework ability is often used as a sufﬁ cient indicator for 
differences in success probabilities; that is, differences in ability should explain how ascribed 
characteristics affect school choices just as well as students’ subjective probabilities of future 
academic success. Subjective probabilities are however likely to be also inﬂ uenced by factors other 
than ability. Social strata may differ in their subjective success probabilities because they are more 
or less familiar with the educational system or because they vary in the importance they attach to 
effort relative to ability in determining school success (Breen, 1999). In this study we investigate 
the extent to which success probabilities, estimated subjectively by the students themselves, 
differ according to the ascribed characteristics of social origin, sex and ethnic background, and 
the extent to which ability is responsible for these differences. Furthermore, we test the extent to 
which students’ beliefs about their own chances of success in school explain the effect of social 
origin, sex and ethnic background on school decisions after higher secondary education. 
This research is innovative in three respects. First, the Breen and Goldthorpe model has 
been applied almost solely to the explanation of class differentials. Few scholars have attempted 
to test its predictions for sex-based inequality in educational opportunities (for exceptions, 
see Jonsson, 1999; Need & De Jong, 2000). We examine the extent to which the Breen and 
Goldthorpe model also applies to ethnic differentials in educational decisions. Second, Stocké 
(2007) examined the effect of parental expectations of their children’s future school success. We 
study entry into higher education and argue that at this transition point it is preferable to look 
at the expectations of the students themselves. Therefore, we assess the inﬂ uence of students’ 
beliefs about their own probabilities of success. Third, the literature on ﬁ eld choice is growing fast 
(see Gerber & Cheung, 2008 for an overview). However, we are not aware of any study in which 
success probabilities are incorporated in the explanatory model to predict ﬁ eld choice. We analyse 
the school transition after higher secondary education, when students decide on the level at which 
they want to continue their educational career and their preferred ﬁ eld of study.This leads to the 
following research questions: 
1. To what extent are social origin, sex and ethnicity related to students’ expected probabilities of 
success for tracks in higher education that differ in level and ﬁ eld of study?
2. To what extent does ability explain the relation between social origin, sex and ethnicity and 
these success probabilities?
3. To what extent do students’ expected success probabilities explain the effect of social origin, sex 
and ethnic background on choices of level and ﬁ eld of study in higher education, next to ability? 
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To answer our research questions, we use the Dutch data set Participation in Higher 
Education waves 1995 and 1997. The richness of this data set is unique. It includes measures 
of educational aspirations, information on students’ economic resources, a wide array of ability 
measures and, most importantly, detailed information on students’ beliefs about their chances of 
success – that is, their subjective success probabilities – for different tracks in higher education. We 
analyse the school transition after higher secondary education. At this point, various educational 
options are offered, differing in both level of schooling and ﬁ eld of study.  
6.2 EXPECTATIONS
In this study we focus on the role of success probabilities in school decisions. However, to assess 
its inﬂ uence properly, we need to control for two other mechanisms relevant to the cost-beneﬁ t 
evaluation on which school decisions are based: the utility of educational outcomes and (in)direct 
costs of studying. We ﬁ rst discuss our expectations regarding the likely returns to schooling and 
the impact of differences in students’ economic resources.
An important assumption of Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) is that of ‘relative risk 
aversion’: everyone’s main aspiration is to avoid downwards mobility. Consequently, educational 
aspirations differ between social classes. Students whose parents have higher social positions are 
expected to remain in the educational system longer than students with the same ability level but 
from lower social strata, since students with parents of lower social origins will have satisﬁ ed their 
social aspiration (avoidance of downwards mobility) earlier in their educational career. 
Most empirical tests of the relative risk aversion mechanism seem to support it: social 
aspirations (i.e. the avoidance of downwards mobility) have a pivotal role in explaining how social 
class affects school decisions. Unfortunately, our data set lacks the theoretical constructs to 
operationalise parental social class. However, several studies have shown that relative risk aversion 
also holds when social origin is operationalised as highest parental educational attainment (Davies 
et al., 2002; Need & De Jong, 2000); students make decisions (together with their parents) so as 
to minimize the risk of ending up with an educational level lower than that of their parents. Need 
and De Jong (2000) and Need et al. (2001) show not only that students differ in their educational 
aspirations in relation to their social origins, but also that men and women students have different 
ambitions. Differences in educational aspirations between men and women explain (in part) sex 
differentials in educational decisions (Need & De Jong, 2000). Given these considerations we 
formulate the following hypothesis: Educational aspirations explain (in part) the effect of social 
origin, sex and ethnicity on level choice in higher education (Hypothesis 1). 
We assume that in general, the social returns differ more between the two levels of 
higher education than across ﬁ elds within these levels. Choices for study subjects may be driven 
by concerns for acquiring speciﬁ c types of knowledge as well (Van de Werfhorst, Sullivan, & 
Cheung, 2003). Based on the relative risk aversion mechanism, we expect that differences across 
social origins in ﬁ eld choice are less pronounced than differences with respect to level choice. 
Students’ perceptions of the costs of education differ according to the level of schooling, 
ﬁ eld of study, and the availability of economic resources. Although parental income is closely 
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related to the available economic resources of the parents, parental contributions to cover their 
child’s study costs is probably an even better indicator of the availability of economic resources 
to the student and consequently of the direct costs students incur related to higher education. 
We also take into account students’ ambition to ﬁ nish school as soon as possible. We assume this 
aspiration is related to the importance of foregone income, the indirect cost of studying. This 
leads to our second hypothesis: Differences in parental contribution to study costs and students’ 
ambition to ﬁ nish school as soon as possible explain (in part) the effect of social origin, sex and 
ethnicity on track choice in higher education (Hypothesis 2). 
Next to the expected utility of educational outcomes and the (in)direct costs related to 
studying, the perceived likelihood of future success in the school career is assumed to inﬂ uence 
school transition decisions. Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) argue that the average expectation of 
educational success is lower among students of the lower social strata, because average ability 
levels differ according to social origin. Hence, in similar circumstances, students from less 
favourable social backgrounds will choose less demanding educational tracks. In the Netherlands, 
these primary effects are responsible for approximately 58 per cent of social origin-based inequality 
in the transition to higher levels of Dutch secondary education after primary school (Kloosterman, 
Ruiter, De Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2009). Although ability is assumed to affect school choices through 
its inﬂ uence on subjective success probabilities, the subjective success probabilities themselves 
seldom appear in explanatory models for school decisions (for an exception, see Stocké, 2007). 
 In this study, we examine the extent to which ascribed characteristics are related to 
differences in success probabilities and the degree to which previously demonstrated ability 
accounts for these differentials. Furthermore, we test whether success probabilities explain the 
effect of ascribed characteristics on educational choices. We hypothesise that: Better able students 
estimate their chances of success in higher education higher than students with lower abilities 
(Hypothesis 3). 
Breen (1999) argues that following a Bayesian model of learning it is likely that beliefs 
of expected future school success of children from higher social origins are more heavily inﬂ uenced 
by effort relative to ability than beliefs of lower social origins. This implies that the impact of 
ability on success probabilities is weaker for higher social origins. We assume that ethnic minorities 
have in general less knowledge of the Dutch schooling system compared to native Dutch. As a 
consequence they may be less aware that there is more than ability that makes for a successful 
schooling career and hence base their beliefs of future success more on ability than native Dutch. 
We see no theoretical argument why men and women would differ in the relationship between 
ability and success probabilities. Thus we expect that: The impact of ability on success probabilities 
is weaker for higher social origins than for lower social origins (Hypothesis 4a); The impact of ability 
on success probabilities is weaker for native Dutch than for ethnic minorities (Hypothesis 4b).
The probability of success will inﬂ uence school track decisions and since we expect 
differences in success probabilities across ascribed characteristics, partly because of differences 
in ability, we formulate the following hypotheses: Success probabilities explain (in part) the effect 
of social origin, sex and ethnicity on students’ choices between different levels of schooling and 
ﬁ elds of study in higher education (Hypothesis 5); Ability explains (in part) the effect of success 
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probabilities on students’ choices between different levels of schooling and ﬁ elds of study in higher 
education (Hypothesis 6).
Finally, according to the relative risk aversion mechanism it is to be expected that 
probability of success has a differential impact on school transition decisions across social origins. 
In order to avoid downwards mobility, students from higher social origins are more likely to opt for 
the more demanding levels even if their expected success probabilities are relatively low (Breen 
& Yaish, 2006). Thus: The impact of success probabilities on track choice within higher education is 
weaker for higher social origins than for lower social origins (Hypothesis 7).
We do not have a priori expectations regarding differences in the impact of success 
probabilities on track choice across ethnic groups or among men and women but will investigate 
this possibility in an exploratory fashion. 
6.3 DATA, MEASUREMENTS AND METHODS
To answer our research questions we use the data set Participation in Higher Education wave 
1995 and 1997. This data set was collected by the SCO-Kohnstamm Institute and the Foundation 
for Economic Research (SEO). In 1995 and 1997, ﬁ rst-year students in Dutch higher education 
received a questionnaire concerning their motivations, schooling expectations and labour-market 
prospects. Students were selected to obtain a representative sample of pupils in institutes of higher 
learning (professional college or university), ﬁ elds of study and the university or professional 
college attended. 
In the Netherlands, after completing university-preparatory secondary school (‘VWO’), 
students can choose between two levels of higher education: professionally oriented college 
(‘HBO’) and university. Both these levels offer a wide array of academic disciplines. We expect 
that individual differences in success probabilities will be most pronounced between science and 
non-science ﬁ elds. We therefore grouped the educational tracks in higher education into four 
categories: professional college–science, professional college–non-science, university–science, 
university–non-science. The choice between these four educational options is our main dependent 
variable. An advantage of this categorization is that students with different ascribed characteristics 
are sufﬁ ciently present in each track to test our hypotheses and that both categories contain ﬁ elds 
with high and low economic payoffs. If students expect more social returns from speciﬁ c ﬁ elds, 
the application of rational choice theory to these choices is more or less similar as in other studies 
predicting level of education. It is beyond the scope of the study presented in this chapter to 
explicitly incorporate the hierarchy between ﬁ elds within the same educational level (cf. Ayalon 
& Yogev, 2005; Van de Werfhorst et al., 2001).
Our data set includes no information on students who did not continue their educational 
career after completion of university-preparatory secondary school. However, these students form 
a small minority, approximately 10 per cent in 1996 (Statistics Netherlands, 2007).  
Students’ success probabilities are treated as a dependent variable prior to the analysis 
regarding decisions on the further educational career. The students were asked to rate their 
likelihood of success, in percentages, for different courses of study in higher education irrespective 
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of their current track choice and if applicable, after a year in vocational college to meet the 
enrolment requirements for university tracks. Success probability professional college–science is 
the student’s mean success probability for majors in electrical engineering, computer science and 
laboratory technician (chemistry) at the professional college level. Similarly, success probability 
university–science is the mean score for majors in electrical engineering, computer science and 
chemistry at the university level. Success probability professional college–non-science is the mean 
score for majors in communication studies and elementary school teaching. Success probability 
university–non-science is the mean success probability score for majors in law, communication 
studies and history. Since students had only minimal experience with higher education at the time 
of the interview, we assume that their beliefs have not changed substantially compared to before 
the track choice.
Highest parental education is measured in ﬁ ve categories: (1) primary school, lower 
vocational education (‘LBO’) and lower general education (‘MAVO’); (2) intermediate vocational 
education (‘MBO’); (3) higher general education and pre-university education (‘HAVO’ and ‘VWO’); 
(4) professional college (‘HBO’); and (5) university. Sex was coded as (0) man and (1) woman. Turks, 
Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans are the main ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands and 
formed 6 per cent of the Dutch population in 1997 (Statistics Netherlands). Ethnic background is 
therefore measured in four categories: (1) Dutch; (2) Turks and Moroccans; (3) Surinamese and 
Antilleans; (4) other ethnic background. The last category contains predominantly western ethnic 
minorities. The country of birth of the mother was decisive for the categorization. If the mother 
was born in the Netherlands and the father in a foreign country, then the father’s country of birth 
was decisive.  
After primary school, pupils in the Netherlands receive a teacher’s recommendation for 
an appropriate track of secondary school. This recommendation is generally strongly inﬂ uenced by 
the pupil’s score on a nationally standardised scholastic achievement examination developed by 
CITO (www.cito.nl). Most pupils take this exam in their last year of primary school. We use this 
recommendation after primary school, which is retrospectively asked to students, as an indicator for 
early demonstrated ability. It consists of six categories: (1) below lower general education; (2) lower 
general education; (3) between lower and higher general education; (4) higher general education; (5) 
between higher general education and pre-university education; and (6) pre-university education. 
We also computed a mean grade score of students’ grades in secondary school as an indicator for 
later demonstrated ability. Students’ grades for Dutch are excluded since we expect this grade to be 
correlated with ethnic background – net of ability. Students in secondary school have some freedom 
to choose the subjects they want to take exams in. Science subjects are generally considered to be 
more difﬁ cult than non-science subjects. We therefore counted the number of science subjects in 
which students took exams in secondary school.1 Our explanatory model for success probabilities also 
takes into account students’ exam results in higher education as an indicator of recent demonstrated 
ability. Answer categories are (1) no examinations yet administered; (2) did not participate in 
examinations; (3) passed examinations; and (4) failed examinations.
Parental income is the log of the sum of father’s income plus mother’s income per 
month after taxes according to the child, subtracted by the log of mean parental income. The 
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questionnaire provided income categories to facilitate students’ estimations. We used the middle 
value of each category. The net family income was set at a minimum of 400 euros. Parents’ 
contribution to study costs is measured in euros. Study costs are lower for students who live 
with their parents, so we include a dummy variable living at home (1) and not living at home 
(0). To capture to some extent the importance of foregone income, understood as indirect cost 
of studying, we asked students to what extent they agreed with the following statement: ‘I am 
devoting all of my time to ﬁ nish school as soon as possible.’ Answer categories range from (0) 
completely disagree to (10) completely agree. We label this variable ﬁ nish school ASAP, where 
higher scores indicate a stronger motivation to ﬁ nish school as soon as possible. 
To measure higher education aspirations we asked students to what extent they agreed 
with the statement ‘I have had a lot of doubts about whether to continue my educational career.’ 
Answer categories range from (10) completely disagree to (0) completely agree. Higher scores on 
this variable indicate stronger aspirations for higher education. University aspirations is measured 
as agreement with the statement, ‘I have long had doubts about whether to go to a professional 
college or a university.’ Answer categories range from (10) completely disagree to (0) completely 
agree. We reversed the scoring for students currently enrolled in a professional college so that 
higher scores indicate stronger aspirations for a university degree. 
For categorical variables we included a category for respondents with missing values. For 
interval variables, we replaced missing values with mean values and constructed dummy variables 
to indicate if missing values were imputed. Interval variables are centred around the mean value 
to facilitate interpretation. Respondents with missing values on all four success probabilities were 
excluded from the analyses. 
The success probabilities for the four educational options were nested in individual 
students. We applied hierarchical linear random intercept models to control for a possible 
correlation between the success probabilities of individual students. Dummy variables were used 
to relate the success probability score to the relevant educational option.  
To test whether success probabilities and the other theoretical constructs of the Breen-
Goldthorpe model explain social origin, sex and ethnicity differentials in the choice between the 
four mutually exclusive options in higher education, we used a multinomial conditional logit 
model. Success probabilities differ across the educational options and across students; the other 
explanatory variables vary across individuals only. 
 For the analyses regarding success probabilities, we selected students who had completed 
higher general secondary education (‘HAVO’) or university-preparatory secondary education (‘VWO’) 
and enrolled in further education for the ﬁ rst time (N=6,790). To explain the track decision 
in higher education, we selected students who had completed university-preparatory secondary 
school (‘VWO’) and enrolled in higher education for the ﬁ rst time (N=4,615). The choice for 
professional college is a less standard choice for this group of students, although with 17 per 
cent of VWO graduates opting for a professional college in our sample not a rare one. Students 
who ﬁ nished higher general secondary education (‘HAVO’) have only the two professional college 
options available to them, and are therefore excluded from the analyses regarding the transition 
to higher education. Table 6.1 summarises the descriptive statistics.
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6.4 RESULTS
6.4.1 Descriptives 
According to the Breen-Goldthorpe model, three mechanisms explain the effect of social origin 
on school decisions: (1) primary effects, which is to say, ability is related to social background 
and ability inﬂ uences school decisions since it determines the subjective likelihood of success in 
the various educational tracks; (2) relative risk aversion, which states that children from more 
advantaged backgrounds have higher educational aspirations since the main aim of all social 
classes is to avoid downwards mobility; and (3) availability of economic resources, by which 
children from more advantaged backgrounds have more resources to cushion the costs of studying. 
Table 6.1 conﬁ rms that among students currently enrolled in higher education, those from more 
advantaged backgrounds earned higher grade point averages in secondary school, they had 
stronger aspirations to study at the university level and had parents who contributed more to 
cover their study costs. 
The mechanisms of the Breen-Golthorpe model for explaining school decisions 
are assumed to be universal; they should explain not only the effect of social background on 
educational decisions but also the effects of sex and ethnicity on these decisions. That said, 
ability, educational aspirations and study costs can explain the effect of sex and ethnicity on 
school decisions only if they vary between men and women and across ethnic groups. Table 6.1 
shows that women currently in higher education have a lower grade point average in secondary 
education than men and their ambition to study at the university level is lower than that of 
their male counterparts. On the other hand, women in higher education receive higher parental 
contributions to pay for their study costs than men, although this difference is not very substantial. 
Compared to the other ethnic groups, Surinamese and Antilleans have the lowest grade point 
average, followed by Turks and Moroccans. The native Dutch, together with the ‘other ethnic 
groups’ category (mostly western ethnic minorities), have the highest grade point average. The 
Surinamese and Antillean students have the lowest university aspirations. On the other hand, Turks 
and Moroccans have slightly higher aspirations than the native Dutch. The western immigrants 
have by far the highest aspirations, possibly because this group includes students whose motive 
for coming to the Netherlands was education-related. Differences in parental contribution to study 
costs across ethnic groups are substantial. We thus conclude that the three mechanisms of the 
Breen and Goldthorpe model should – in principle – be able to explain the effect of sex and ethnic 
background on school decisions. 
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6.4.2 Success probabilities
Table 6.2 shows the results of a hierarchical random intercept model with the four subjective 
success probabilities (one per educational option, level 1) nested in the individual students (level 
2). With Table 6.2 we test whether differences in ability cause analogous differentiation in students’ 
subjective probability of educational success (hypothesis 1). The subjective probability of success 
differs across educational levels and ﬁ elds of study. On average, men perceive their chances of 
success at the professional college level in non-science ﬁ elds as approximately 84 per cent, as 
shown by the constant in model 1 (Table 6.2). Science ﬁ elds within professional colleges are 
considered to be more difﬁ cult than non-science ﬁ elds at the university level; success probabilities 
are 57.27 per cent (84.36 + -27.09) versus 71.27 per cent (84.36 + -13.08), respectively. 
On average women estimate their chances 8.60 per cent lower than men (Table 6.2, 
model 1). This stems from the fact that women estimate their chances within science ﬁ elds 
approximately 21 per cent lower than men (6.39 + -27.23; Table 6.2, model 2). On the other hand, 
women estimate their chances within non-science ﬁ elds somewhat (but signiﬁ cantly) higher than 
men: 6 per cent higher for the professional college–non-science track (as shown by the main effect 
of ‘women’) and 2 per cent higher for the university–non-science track (i.e. 6.39 + -4.09; Table 
6.2, model 2). 
Native Dutch students estimate their chances 1.52 per cent lower than western ethnic 
minorities. The success probabilities of Surinamese/Antileans and Turks/Moroccans do not 
signiﬁ cantly deviate from the success probabilities of western ethnic minorities. Students from 
more advantaged backgrounds estimate their success probabilities higher on average; students 
whose parents have maximally attained a degree from a professional college estimate their chances 
5.23 per cent lower than students with at least one parent with a university degree. Students with 
richer parents estimate their likelihood of success higher than poorer students (Table 6.2, model 
1 and 2). 
Model 3 adds ability to model 2. Ability is an important determinant of the subjective 
likelihood of success in higher education; the explained variance of model 3 increased by 7.6 
per cent compared to model 2.2 Students whose teacher’s recommendation after primary school 
was below higher general secondary education estimate their chances lower than students whose 
primary school teacher recommended a higher secondary school level. Both the main effects and 
the squared effects of mean grade point average and number of science subjects are signiﬁ cant 
(at =0.10, two-tailed). The effect of the mean grade point average in secondary school on 
the success probabilities increases the higher the grade point average is. The same holds for 
the number of science subjects taken in secondary school. Students who failed their ﬁ rst exams 
estimate their success probabilities approximately 3 per cent lower than students who passed their 
ﬁ rst exams (Table 6.2, model 3). 
After controlling for these ability measures, the main effect of being a women increases 
from 6.39 to 11.12, implying that women’s underestimation of their success probability in science 
subjects diminished by some 5 per cent in comparison with men and their overestimation of 
their success probability in non-science ﬁ elds increased by 5 per cent (model 3). On average, the 
differences between men and women almost halved; from -8.60 (model 1) to -3.39 (not shown). 
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These results support hypothesis 1. Whereas differences in success probabilities across parental 
education and parental income categories diminished signiﬁ cantly and substantially (25 to 40 per 
cent) after taking into account ability differences, differences between native Dutch and Turks/
Moroccans became (signiﬁ cantly) more pronounced after controlling for ability; Turks/Moroccans 
estimate their success probabilities approximately 5 per cent higher than native Dutch (3.81 - -
1.33; Table 6.2, model 3). This said, even if we take into account ability differences, effects of 
ethnicity and of social origin on success probabilities are relatively small compared to sex effects.
Contrary to our expectation (hypotheses 4), the effect of ability on the success 
probabilities is not lower for students from higher social origins or for native Dutch. The 
expectations of success of students whose parents have higher income levels are even more closely 
related to the mean grade points in secondary school (b=0.93; p=0.03; Table 6.2, model 4). We 
obtain similar conclusions if we interact ‘recommendation after primary school’ or ‘number of exact 
subjects in secondary school’ with social origin and ethnic group (results not shown). We conclude 
that ability – at least as operationalised in this study – is an important, albeit not a perfect, 
indicator for the success probabilities of the students. 
6.4.3 Educational transition decisions
Next, we discuss the results of the conditional multinomial logit model which refers to the track 
choice in higher education (Table 6.3 and 6.4). Table 6.3 summarises the results for the contrast 
university–non-science versus professional college–non-science. Table 6.4 summarises the results 
for the contrast university–non-science versus university–science. The odds to continue the 
educational career at the university–non-science track versus at the professional college–non-
science track is lower for women than for men: the logit is -0.28 (p=0.00) (Table 6.3, model 1). 
If ethnic minorities continue on to higher education, they are more likely than the native Dutch 
to do so at the university level (only the odds with respect to non-science ﬁ elds are shown, Table 
6.3). These ﬁ ndings are in agreement with the ﬁ ndings presented in Chapter 5, in which the same 
time period is studied using different data.
Compared to students whose parents are university graduates, students from less 
advantaged social origins are less likely to opt for a university–non-science study than for a 
professional college–non-science study. Note that parental education has a non-linear effect on 
these odds, as the Breen and Goldthorpe model predicts (cf. Davies et al., 2002); the relative 
chance to continue at the university versus the professional college level is the same for students 
whose parents completed the professional college level and for students whose parents attained 
an intermediate or higher general education. 
 In model 2a, 2b and 2c we control in a stepwise procedure for the three mechanisms 
speciﬁ ed in the Breen and Goldthorpe model, successively, for factors related to study costs, for 
educational aspirations and for ability. Students who receive more money from their parents, 
students who live at home and students who are less eager to ﬁ nish school as soon as possible are 
more likely to study at the university level. For example, the odds of studying a non-science ﬁ eld 
at a university versus at a professional college increases by 8 per cent for every 100 euros extra a 
student receives from his or her parents (b=0.08 (EXP(0.08)=1.08); p=0.00, model 2a, Table 6.3). 
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These proxies for the cost of studying explain part of the effect of social origin (approximately 25 
per cent), but do not explain why sex and ethnic group affect the decision between university–
non-science and professional college–non-science. 
 As expected, students with higher university aspirations are more likely to study at 
the university (b=0.32; p=0.00, model 2b, Table 6.3). More importantly, differences in university 
aspirations fully explain why women are less likely than men to opt for a university–non-science 
study. Compared to model 1, controlling for study costs and educational aspirations reduces the 
effect of parental education by approximately 50 per cent. 
 Model 2c includes the ability variables. The number of exact subjects in secondary school 
and the teacher’s recommendation after primary school do not affect the choice between university 
and professional college. Although students with a higher grade point average in secondary 
education are more likely to continue on to the university, surprisingly, ability differences do not 
explain the effects of parental education and ethnicity on the choice between a non-science ﬁ eld 
of study at the university level versus at the professional college level. 
 Model 3 includes the success probabilities, which vary across educational options 
and students. If the difference in the subjective likelihood of success between the two options 
increases by 1 per cent, the odds of choosing the option with the highest subjective likelihood of 
success increases by 5 per cent (b=0.05; p=0.00, model 3, Table 6.3). After including our measures 
of demonstrated ability as well, the effect of success probabilities falls to 0.03 (model 4, Table 
6.3). This conﬁ rms hypothesis 6. But although success probabilities inﬂ uence school decisions 
– even after controlling for previously demonstrated ability – success probabilities do not explain 
the effect of social origin and ethnicity on level choice in higher education. This is contrary to our 
expectation as formulated in hypothesis 5.  
Factors related to study costs, educational aspirations and success probabilities all 
contribute to the explanation of the decision of what level of higher education to attend. The 
items related to study costs and educational aspirations explain how parental education affects 
the choice between a non-science study at the university level and at the professional college 
level. Moreover, educational aspirations are the most important explanation for the effect of 
sex on the decision between levels in higher education. So far our ﬁ ndings are in line with the 
predictions of the Breen and Goldthorpe model. On the other hand, aspiration differences suppress 
differences across ethnic groups. Surprisingly, neither demonstrated ability nor (gradients in) 
success probabilities explain the effect of ascribed characteristics on the decision between a non-
science ﬁ eld at the university or professional college level. 
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Next, we investigate the odds of choosing a non-science ﬁ eld of study versus a science 
ﬁ eld at the university level (Table 6.4).  Compared to men, women are more likely to opt for a 
non-science ﬁ eld than for a science ﬁ eld (b=1.63, p=0.00; model 1, Table 6.4). The popularity 
of science and non-science ﬁ elds does not signiﬁ cantly differ across ethnic groups or parental 
education categories. On the other hand, students whose parents earn more are more likely to 
choose a non-science ﬁ eld. This is possibly because next to social returns, economic returns 
to education inﬂ uence school decisions as well (Becker, 1964), and students possibly estimate 
their life-long earnings after a non-science study to be higher than those after a science study. 
Unfortunately, our data set lacks information on economic aspirations and expected economic 
returns after different options in higher education. 
Model 2a controls for factors related to study costs. Here we see that students who 
continue to live at home are typically science students (b=–0.43, p=0.00; model 2a, Table 6.4). 
Students with stronger higher education and university aspirations have a greater tendency to 
choose science ﬁ elds (model 2b) as well, but this effect is explained by demonstrated ability (model 
2c). The higher the students’ grade point average, the more likely they are to opt for a science ﬁ eld 
compared to a non-science ﬁ eld (b=–0.56, p=0.00; model 2c, Table 6.4). Unsurprisingly, the more 
exact disciplines students’ took in secondary school, the more likely they are to opt for an exact 
ﬁ eld of study at the university. 
Ability explains the effect of sex and parental income on the odds of choosing a non-
science versus a science ﬁ eld at the university level; the effect of sex diminished from 1.60 (model 
2b) to 1.18 (model 2c), the effect of parental income fell from 0.45 (model 2b) to 0.36 (model 
2c). Turkish and Moroccan students are signiﬁ cantly more likely to opt for a non-science ﬁ eld than 
a science ﬁ eld compared to western immigrants (and the native Dutch) once we take into account 
ability differences. Students whose parents studied at the professional college level are less 
likely to opt for a non-science ﬁ eld than students whose parents studied at the university level, 
after controlling for ability (b=-0.26, p=0.03; model 2c, Table 6.4). Possibly, because students 
with university-educated parents aim to avoid downwards mobility, they are less eager to risk 
enrolling in a difﬁ cult – science – ﬁ eld. Students whose parents were educated at the professional 
college level could avoid downwards mobility even after failing at the university by enrolling in 
a professional college. 
We already saw that gradients in success probabilities across educational options 
inﬂ uence students’ educational decisions (Table 6.3). Naturally, within our conditional logit model 
speciﬁ cation, this choice-speciﬁ c coefﬁ cient is similar in Table 6.4 and Table 6.3. Differences 
between men and women in gradients across options which differ by level were much smaller than 
differences in gradients across options which differ by ﬁ eld (see above). This is probably why 
success probabilities do not explain the effect of sex on the choice of level of schooling (Table 
6.3) but do explain the effect of sex on ﬁ eld choice; the effect of sex fell from 1.60 (Table 6.4, 
model 2b) to 0.85 (model 3). The effect of parental income on ﬁ eld choice almost halved after 
taking into account success probabilities. We thus ﬁ nd strong evidence in support of hypothesis 
5: success probabilities explain the effect of social origin and sex on educational choices which 
differ by ﬁ eld. 
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Model 4 includes both the ability measures and the success probabilities in the explanatory 
model. Compared to model 3, the effects of sex and parental income are not substantially 
different, indicating that ability explains the effect of sex and parental income on ﬁ eld of study 
choice due to the fact that ability differences cause to a large extent analogous differences in 
success probabilities. Ability explains the effect of success probabilities (only) in part. This is in 
agreement with hypothesis 6. Success probabilities explain the effect of sex and parental income 
on ﬁ eld choice better than our ability measures.
So far we assumed that the impact of expectations of success on the decision to 
choose or not choose a speciﬁ c track within higher education is invariant across tracks. We 
next investigate to what extent the impact of success probabilities on the odds to choose a 
speciﬁ c track varies across the distinguished tracks (Table 6.5). Success probabilities are more 
important for the decision whether or not to study science ﬁ elds than for the decision whether 
or not to study non-science ﬁ elds. In other words: expectations of success for science ﬁ elds have 
more inﬂ uence on track choice decisions than expectations of success for non-science ﬁ elds. The 
difference is most pronounced within the professional college level: the impact of expectations of 
success on the log-odd for professional college–science is 0.05 and for professional college–non-
science 0.02 (Table 6.5, model 1). The individual-speciﬁ c coefﬁ cients as reported in Table 6.3 and 
Table 6.4 do not change substantially if we allow the impact of expectations of success to vary 
across tracks (not shown).
Contrary to our expectations (hypothesis 7), the impact of success probabilities does not 
vary (signiﬁ cantly) across social origins (Table 6.5, model 2 and 3). On the other hand, women 
are in general less inﬂ uenced by their expectation of success than men; if we assume an invariant 
effect of success probabilities across tracks, the interaction with ‘women’ is signiﬁ cant (b=-0.10, 
p=0.00; not shown). Since in model 4 (Table 6.5) only the interaction for expectations of success 
for university–non-science reached signiﬁ cance (b=-0.11, p=0.01), we tentatively conclude that, 
especially for women, expectations of success are more important for decisions regarding science 
ﬁ elds than non-science ﬁ elds.3  
6.5 CONCLUSIONS
Men and women students, students from different social origins and students with different 
ethnic backgrounds estimate their probabilities of success for various tracks in higher education 
differently. Women estimate their chances of success lower for science ﬁ elds but higher for non-
science ﬁ elds compared to men. Turks and Moroccans rate their success probabilities higher than 
the native Dutch, Surinamese, Antilleans and western ethnic minorities. Students with more 
privileged social origins rate their success probabilities higher as well. 
Although previously demonstrated ability is an important determinant of subjective 
success probabilities and ability explains to a large extent (approximately 50 per cent) differences 
across students of different sex and parental education categories, surprisingly, and contrary 
to our expectations, ability does not fully explain differences across ascribed characteristics. 
Ability even suppresses differences across ethnic groups. Naturally, our operationalization of the 
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theoretical construct ‘previously demonstrated academic ability’ is not ideal since they are based 
on self-reports. Our imperfect measurement of ability may have led us to underestimate ability’s 
explanatory power for differences in success probabilities across ascribed characteristics. On the 
other hand, we used three different indicators of ability to explain success probabilities instead 
of just one. Our results indicate that ability is not a perfect indicator for success probabilities 
and other factors may inﬂ uence students’ estimations of future success as well. In relation to 
this, we hypothesised that especially students from higher social origins and native Dutch ground 
their success probabilities on effort next to ability and hence that the relationship between 
ability and expectations of success would be weaker among these groups. We did however not 
ﬁ nd corroborative evidence for this hypothesis, possibly because ability as operationalised in this 
study is already a reﬂ ection of both ability and effort. 
We examined the school decision taken after university-preparatory secondary education 
for a speciﬁ c track of higher education. We distinguished four tracks, which differ in level 
(university versus professional college) and ﬁ eld of study (science versus non-science). We found 
supportive evidence for the relative risk aversion mechanism: students with higher educated 
parents have stronger university aspirations than students with lesser educated parents, and 
these differences in aspirations explain some 50 per cent of the effect of parental education 
on the choice between the two levels of higher education. Moreover, differences in educational 
aspirations fully explain why women are less likely than men to opt for schooling at a university 
rather than at a professional college, at least in 1995 and 1997. Nowadays, women are more likely 
than men to opt for university schooling (Statistics Netherlands, 2007). Future research should 
examine whether this is due to a change in educational aspirations. 
Parents’ contributions to cover study costs, whether the student lives at home, and 
students’ eagerness to ﬁ nish school as soon as possible – both factors which we assume are related 
to the perceived direct and indirect costs of studying for the student – explain about 25 per cent 
of the effect of parental education and income on schooling level choice. However, these factors 
do not explain the effect of sex and ethnic origin on the decision between university–non-science 
and professional college–non-science. This is possibly because differences in perceived study 
costs between men and women students and across ethnic groups are small (after controlling 
for parental income). With respect to the chosen ﬁ eld of study, only living at home contributes 
to the explanatory model; however, it does not explain the effect of ascribed characteristics on 
ﬁ eld choice. Science ﬁ elds are considered to be more difﬁ cult than non-science ﬁ elds. Students 
who choose a difﬁ cult ﬁ eld may have more need to budget their time and therefore decide to 
remain living at home. Alternatively, science and non-science students may simply have different 
residence preferences. 
The further students come in their educational career, the weaker the association is 
between social origin and ability, due to the selection processes encountered previously in the 
educational career. But even among students who successfully completed a higher track of secondary 
education, those from more advantaged backgrounds have signiﬁ cantly better demonstrated ability. 
Since we ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant relationship – although admittedly not a very strong relationship, 
ability and hence success probabilities should explain the effect of social origin on track choice 
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in higher education according to the Breen-Goldthorpy model. Although, students with a higher 
grade point average at the secondary school level are more likely to opt for the more prestigious 
university level, we did not observe the primary effects mechanism when we examined the choice 
for a speciﬁ c level in higher education. Neither ability nor success probabilities explain the effect 
of social origin on the level choice, after controlling for educational aspirations. On the other 
hand, ability and perceived success probabilities explain the effect of sex and social origin on 
ﬁ eld choice. This is probably because perceived success probabilities vary more across ﬁ elds than 
across levels in higher education and because our results indicate that educational aspirations do 
not play a key role when academic level is held constant. We therefore posit that most students 
judge the social returns similarly for educational tracks that differ in ﬁ eld but not in level, at least 
more similarly than the social returns for tracks which differ in level but not in ﬁ eld. This implies 
that enrolling in a difﬁ cult ﬁ eld of study at the university level constitutes an unnecessary risk of 
downwards mobility, especially for students whose parents have a university degree. 
Related to the latter point, we argued that the selection on success probabilities is 
likely to be stronger among lower origin students than among higher social origins students since 
students of higher social origins are more concerned with status demotion and hence accept 
greater risks in order to avoid downwards mobility. Our results did however not support this claim; 
we did not ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant differential impact of success probabilities across social origins. 
However, we tentatively conclude that women are less inﬂ uenced by their expectations of success 
than men. Perhaps the track choices of women are more than men driven by concerns for acquiring 
speciﬁ c types of knowledge.    
Success probabilities contribute to the explanation of school decisions, as predicted. 
But as said before, similar to differences in ability, differences in success probabilities do not 
explain the effect of ascribed characteristics on level choice. This contradicts the Breen and 
Goldthorpe model, but is in agreement with the earlier ﬁ ndings of Stocké (2007) who analyzed 
school decisions at the start of secondary education when the relationship between social origin 
and ability is still relatively strong. This strengthens our interpretation that our (null) ﬁ ndings 
are not due to the relatively weak relationship between social origin and ability at the entry 
point of higher education. On the other hand, Stocké’s ﬁ ndings cannot be dismissed, because he 
relates to the effects of success probabilities as estimated by parents rather than by the students 
themselves. 
This said, success probabilities as estimated by students explain the effect of sex 
and social origin on ﬁ eld choice and it does so even better than ability. After controlling for 
differences in success probabilities, ability does not further explain the effects of sex and social 
origin on ﬁ eld choice. We thus conclude that ability explains the effect of sex and social origin 
on ﬁ eld choice due to its inﬂ uence on students’ perceptions of their own chances of success. This 
supports the underlying ‘primary effects’ mechanism of the Breen and Goldthorpe model. At the 
same time, ability is not a sufﬁ cient indicator for the success probabilities of the students; success 
probabilities are better able to explain the inﬂ uence of ascribed characteristics on ﬁ eld choices 
than ability measures. The appropriateness of ability as an indicator for success probabilities may 
depend on the transition decision and whether one considers the success probabilities as estimated 
6. Explanations for Ethnic Educational Inequality | Conclusions
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by the parents or the students. Future research should establish empirically whose perception of 
the likelihood of future educational success is more important for different transition decisions 
during the educational career.  
This study showed that cost-beneﬁ t evaluations inﬂ uence not only schooling level 
choices, but ﬁ eld of study choices as well. The results are mixed with respect to the applicability 
of the Breen and Goldthorpe model for explaining the effect of sex and ethnic origin on school 
decisions. The relative risk aversion mechanism offers the strongest explanation for the effect of 
social origin on level choice. Differences between men and women in their level choice in higher 
education are completely explained by differences in aspirations. This highlights the importance 
of the relative risk aversion mechanism. Subjective success probabilities explain differentials in 
ﬁ eld choice across social origins and between the sexes. Ethnicity’s effect on school decisions 
cannot be explained by differences in the perceived costs of studying, aspirations or success 
probabilities. On the contrary, these theoretical constructs suppress ethnic differences. This last 
puzzling ﬁ nding warrants further scientiﬁ c attention. 
6.6 NOTES 
1.  These exact subjects are mathematics, computer science, economics, biology, physics and 
chemistry.
2.  (1 – ((390.63 + 135.36) / (447.21 + 121.79))) * 100 = 7.6 
3.  Expectations of success do not inﬂ uence transition decisions differently across ethnic groups 
(not shown).
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7. EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND ETHNIC HOSTILITY†
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Non-western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands – as in most other western countries – have more 
often a disadvantaged position than the native population. They are in general lower educated, 
more often active in the lower echelons of the labour market, and unemployment rates are higher 
among non-western ethnic minority groups as well (Statistics Netherlands, 2008). The structural 
non-integration at the ethnic group level is persistent over time (Gijsberts, 2004; see also Chapter 
5). Besides a structural dimension, integration also has a cultural dimension (Berry, 1997). Ethnic 
intermarriage is the ﬁ nal step in the cultural integration process. Opposition to ethnically mixed 
relationships measures the preference for the own group and preferred ethnic distance towards 
other groups and is as such an attitudinal indicator of cultural integration. To what extent 
minorities identify themselves with their host country as opposed to their country of origin is 
also an important attitudinal indicator of the level of cultural integration. In this chapter we will 
investigate to what extent indicators of structural integration, such as educational attainment 
and involvement with the host country, are related to cultural integration, as expressed through 
views regarding ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation with the host country. We will 
investigate the cultural integration among both ﬁ rst and second generation migrants of the four 
major non-western ethnic groups in the Netherlands; the traditional guest workers groups of Turks 
and Moroccans, who are predominantly Muslim, and ethnic groups from the former Dutch colonies, 
Surinamese and Antilleans.
Studies on ethnic hostility among Muslim minorities in western European countries hint 
that especially among seemingly high educated and also otherwise structurally well integrated 
Muslim minority members, Muslim fundamentalism is prevalent (Buijs et al., 2006; Werbner, 2001). 
In the Netherlands, higher educated minority members more often than lower educated migrants 
perceive that they or their group are being discriminated against and more often feel rejected 
by the host country (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009; Jaspers & Lubbers, 2005; Kessler, Mickelson, 
& Williams, 1999). Among Moroccans and Turks in Rotterdam, in particular the higher educated 
perceive larger cultural distance (Entzinger 2008) and compared to lower educated counterparts, 
higher educated Moroccans were found to be more prone to vote for the AEL, a political party 
which rejects the Dutch integration policies (Jaspers & Lubbers, 2005). These ﬁ ndings may be 
regarded as somewhat contra-intuitive since it is often expected that cultural integration and 
structural integration go hand in hand (e.g. Alba & Nee, 2003; Gordon, 1964; Portes & Rumbaut, 
1990) and since previous research consistently showed a negative effect of education on ethnic 
hostility, nationalism and far right-wing voting behaviour among native or dominant ethnic 
groups (Gijsberts et al., 2004; Lubbers, 2001; Quillian, 1996). Several authors therefore speak of 
an “integration paradox” (Buijs et al., 2006; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009). 
† A slightly different version of this chapter is currently under review, co-authors are Mérove 
Gijsberts and Marcel Lubbers.
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Interestingly, most previous empirical studies among ethnic minorities reveal in 
particular a positive relation between education and perceived group discrimination or between 
the educational attainment of minorities and perceived ethnic hostility among natives, they do 
not refer to the relation between education and ethnic hostility among minorities towards the 
host country or natives. For an exception, see the study on stereotypes among ethnic minorities 
towards the indigenous population from Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007). As a result of this focus 
on meta-views and perceptions of discrimination, the effect of education on ethnic hostility 
among minority groups is not clear. Similarly, the effect of education on ethnic identiﬁ cation is 
also ambiguous. Previous studies on this topic revealed inconsistent ﬁ ndings. For example, where 
Nesdale (2002) has shown that migrants in Australia identify more to their ethnic group with 
higher educational levels, in France, the odds that higher educated migrants identify to France 
compared to their own ethnic group are higher than among lower educated migrants (Abu-Rayya, 
2007). Previous studies thus raise questions regarding the assumed positive effect of education 
on (attitudinal indicators of) cultural integration. 
In this chapter we will investigate the link between educational attainment and 
involvement with the host country on opposition to ethnically mixed relationships (among both 
the majority group and ethnic minorities) and identiﬁ cation with the country of origin versus the 
host country (for minority groups only). More speciﬁ cally, we will focus on the direct and indirect 
effects of education on these two attitudinal indicators of cultural integration. The research 
question of this chapter reads: To what extent and why is educational attainment linked to indicators 
of both ethnic hostility among and cultural integration of ethnic minorities (i.e. opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation with the country of origin)? 
We will use data from the Survey Integration of Minorities 2006 (SIM 2006), a unique 
large scale and representative data set among the major ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands 
and a Dutch control group. We derive hypotheses from theories that turned out to be dominant 
in explaining such attitudes among natives; Ethnic Competition Theory (Coenders et al., 2005; 
Scheepers et al., 2002) and Contact Theory (Allport, 1979 [1954]; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
Media usage and Cultivation Theory (Gerbner, 1969) have previously been offered as a possible 
explanation for the integration paradox (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009) and we will therefore theorise 
on media effects as well. 
Our study is innovative in several aspects. First, attitudes of ethnic minorities to the 
majority received relatively little attention, and we know no studies that focussed explicitly on 
(the differences in) educational attainment effects between natives and various ethnic groups 
of different generational statuses. In this chapter we will apply multiple mediator models to 
investigate to what extent education affects opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and 
ethnic identiﬁ cation directly and indirectly (through mediator variables) (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Second, although both opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and ethnic identiﬁ cation may 
be regarded as indicators of cultural integration, to the best of our knowledge, they have never 
been investigated simultaneously before. In this chapter we study to what extent effects of 
indicators of structural integration on opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and ethnic 
identiﬁ cation are comparable. Third, to asses the universality of our hypotheses we will test them 
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among four ethnic minority groups in the Netherlands of both ﬁ rst and second generation and 
among native Dutch. The Netherlands is an interesting site of study for the cultural integration 
of migrants since it is a move away from the classic immigration countries (e.g. United States, 
Canada, Australia) where most previous studies have been concentrated. 
The integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands has been a policy issue since 
the late seventies (Blok, 2004). In accordance with the assumption within the ideology of 
multiculturalism that strong ethnic group identiﬁ cations will improve intergroup relations, the 
ﬁ rst so-called guest workers of the 1960s and 1970s were encouraged to maintain their ethnic 
group identity. However, multicultural integration policies have been increasingly questioned and 
the Netherlands went through a shift from the ideology of multiculturalism to one of assimilation 
(2000-2004) (Coenders et al., 2008; Joppke, 2004). Within the assimilation ideology, ethnic 
minorities are expected to abandon their cultural identity and adopt the dominant group’s way of 
life. From a policy point of view it is thus relevant to investigate the mechanisms behind (cultural) 
integration and if these are similar across culturally different ethnic minority groups with different 
migration histories and between migrants of ﬁ rst and second generational status.
7.2 EXPECTATIONS 
7.2.1 Different threats for different educational categories 
Ethnic Competition Theory (ECT) (Coenders et al., 2005; Scheepers et al., 2002) is a synthesis of 
Realistic Conﬂ ict Theory (Blalock, 1967; Coser, 1956; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif & Sherif, 
1953) and Social Identity Theory (Brown, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). ECT poses that ethnic groups 
compete for scarce resources such as jobs, housing, power and cultural values (Blalock, 1967; 
Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Coenders et al., 2005; Coser, 1956; Quillian, 1995). This competition 
is experienced in a zero-sum type relationship (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996); e.g. ‘they’ take ‘our’ 
jobs. Both perceptions of group threat and perceptions of threats to one’s self-interest  reinforce 
the need to maintain or achieve a positive social identity, according to ECT.  As a result of this 
need for a positive social identity, boundaries between the ethnic ingroup and outgroup become 
more rigid and the salience of the ingroup identity increases (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Where the ethnic ingroup is in general positively evaluated, members of ethnic outgroups are 
depersonalised and stereotyped (Brown, 2000; Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moreover, 
the positive bias towards the ingroup is often accompanied with hostility towards outgroups and 
ethnic exclusionism (Coenders, 2001; Sumner, 1959 [1906]). 
ECT has met extensive cross-national corroborative evidence (Coenders et al., 2005; 
Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006). Although, the threat mechanism is almost solely 
used to explain and predict the attitudes of native (or dominant) ethnic groups, Poppe and 
Hagendoorn (2003) formulated and tested hypotheses on how ethnic competition and perceived 
threat would affect the level of national identiﬁ cation and ethnic hostility of minority populations. 
They showed that for Russian minorities in former Soviet Republics the same mechanisms were 
at work. 
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As argued by ECT, individuals who hold similar social positions as the majority of outgroup 
members, who are consequently more directly in competition with members of outgroups for scarce 
resources, will experience more ethnic group threat and hence express more ethnic social distance 
and identify stronger to their ethnic ingroup. Moreover, individuals with fewer resources are also 
presumably more susceptible to perceive ethnic outgroups as a threat. In the Netherlands, the 
lowest educated – also among ethnic minority groups – face higher unemployment levels and have 
the lowest levels of resources. At the same time, higher educated ethnic minorities are more likely 
to be (or to have been) in circumstances with relatively more natives, either due to their place of 
residence (i.e. whiter neighbourhoods) or for example due to the ethnic composition of their work 
place. Note that in contrast, lower educated natives and not the higher educated natives are more 
likely to be in circumstances with relatively more members of ethnic outgroups. 
Given the consistent ﬁ nding from previous research that education is negatively related 
to ethnic hostility and that lower educated have less resources than higher educated, we expect 
that: Educational attainment will be negatively related to opposition to ethnically mixed relationships 
for all ethnic groups in the Netherlands, and that educational attainment will also be negatively 
related to identiﬁ cation with the country of origin among minority groups (Hypothesis 1). 
However, due to the relatively common prevalence of perceptions of threat among higher 
educated minorities compared to higher educated natives, we expect that: The negative effect of 
education on opposition to ethnically mixed relationships will be smaller for ethnic minority groups 
than for native Dutch (Hypothesis 2).
 Although perceptions of threat among higher educated minorities are more common 
than among higher educated natives, we still expect that perceptions of group threat are less 
common among higher educated minorities than among lower educated minorities; there is a 
similar gradient in perceptions of threat across educational categories across ethnic minority 
groups and the native population but the gradient is less steep among ethnic minority groups. 
Thus: Perceptions of threat should interpret the (negative) effect of education on opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation with the country of origin among minority groups, 
according to ECT (Hypothesis 3).
7.2.2 Homogenization of educational categories
Education affects ethnic hostility not only because perceived threat is related to educational 
levels. Education asserts its negative inﬂ uence on ethnic hostility – at least among dominant 
or native ethnic groups – also because the cognitive skills developed at school protect the 
formation of ill informed, derogative stereotypes. Due to the increased educational opportunities 
for all social classes following educational expansion in western societies (Breen & Jonsson, 
2005), the people ending up in the lowest categories of the educational system became a more 
homogenous group with fewer educational skills (cf. Gesthuizen, De Graaf, & Kraaykamp, 2005; 
Gesthuizen & Kraaykamp, 2002). The less severe selection moments during the educational 
career introduced more heterogeneity among higher educated but the homogenization of the 
lowest categories is likely to have a stronger impact than the lost exclusivity of the highest 
educational categories, since individuals with a completed higher education still remain a fairly 
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selective group. As a consequence of the homogenization process, among native populations, 
members of educational categories have thus become more distinct with respect to their skills. 
Likely as a consequence of this, the educational effect on ethnic hostility increased among 
native Dutch in the time period 1975-1998 (Jaspers, 2008), as well as over birth cohorts in the 
US (Quillian, 1996). 
Although we do not have longitudinal data to our availability, ethnicity-based 
educational inequality present in the Netherlands implies that homogenization of educational 
categories reached different stages across ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities – especially of ﬁ rst 
generational status – are overrepresented at the bottom of the educational hierarchy (see Chapter 
5). For ﬁ rst generation migrants this is in part due to selective migration and to less favourable 
circumstances to start or continue one’s educational career in the country of origin. Second 
generation migrants in the Netherlands are less likely to continue their educational career after 
successfully having completed general secondary education (i.e. HAVO or VWO) (see Chapter 5). 
Second generation Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans who do enrol in higher education 
obtained, in general, lower grade point averages in secondary education than their native Dutch 
counterparts (see Chapter 6). Given these considerations, we assume that minorities – both of 
ﬁ rst and second generational statuses – with relatively low educational degrees (below higher 
education) constitute a more heterogeneous group than their native Dutch counterparts with 
respect to their cognitive skills. Given the link between homogenization at the bottom of the 
educational hierarchy and the strength of the (negative) effect of education on ethnic hostility, 
we come to the same hypothesis as above, namely, that the negative effect of education on ethnic 
hostility (i.e. opposition to ethnically mixed relationships) is smaller for ethnic minority groups 
than for native Dutch. 
Note that Ethnic Competition Theory and considerations around the homogenization 
process of educational categories give two reasons why (differential) distributions of educational 
degrees across ethnic groups asserts an inﬂ uence on the effect of education on ethnic hostility. 
First, because ethnic minorities have more often lower educational attainments than native 
populations, natives who are lower educated themselves are more directly in competition with 
ethnic outgroups than higher educated natives, perceive more ethnic threat, and are consequently 
expected to express more ethnic hostility. If ethnic minorities were predominantly higher 
educated, the negative effect of education on ethnic hostility among natives would be weaker. 
Similarly, since especially higher educated minorities have similar position as members of the 
native population, we expect the negative effect of education on ethnic hostility among ethnic 
minority groups to be weaker. According to this threat-mechanism, ethnic threat should interpret 
the (negative) effect of education on indicators of ethnic hostility. Secondly, the differential 
distribution of educational degrees across ethnic groups is reﬂ ected in differences in homogeneity 
of cognitive skills of educational categories across ethnic groups. Lower educated minorities 
constitute presumably a less homogenous category with respect to cognitive skills than lower 
educated natives. Consequently, the negative effect of education on ethnic hostility is expected 
to be weaker across ethnic minority groups.
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7.2.3 Media usage, perceptions of group discrimination and involvement with the host country
One of the explanations of an integration paradox is located in differences between educational 
categories in media usage (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009). Better educated migrants have better 
language proﬁ ciency and hence are more likely to take notice of the news supply from the host 
country (Peeters & D’Haenens, 2005). Media coverage studies have often reported that ethnic 
minorities in the media are associated with problems and criminality (Lubbers, Scheepers, & 
Vergeer, 2000) or were otherwise portrayed stereotypically (Shadid, 2006). Minorities themselves 
report that they do not recognise themselves in the host country media (Bonfadelli, Bucher, & 
Piga, 2007). For many Moroccans adolescents in the Netherlands, the media are a symbol of the 
Islam phobia of the host country (Buijs et al., 2006, p. 238).
Gerbner’s cultivation hypothesis describes that people’s reality is affected by media 
messages, and more so when one consumes those messages more (Gerbner, 1969). It is thus to be 
expected that native Dutch who consume more (Dutch) media hold more hostile attitudes towards 
minorities. Compared to migrants using ethnic media, migrants who use national media more often 
think that the majority holds negative views on minorities, and perceive higher levels of group 
discrimination (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009). Assuming a positive relationship between the negative 
meta-views on the one hand, and ethnic hostility and identiﬁ cation with the Netherlands on the 
other hand, we expect that: Ethnic minorities who make use of Dutch media are more likely to be 
opposed to ethnically mixed relationships, just as native Dutch, and similarly, ethnic minorities who 
make use of Dutch media are more likely to identify with their country of origin (Hypothesis 4a).
In order to be able to consume Dutch media, one should have at least some grip of 
the Dutch language. To assess the net effect of media, we will therefore investigate the impact 
of proﬁ ciency in Dutch as well. Due to language constraints, lower educated ethnic minorities 
are less exposed to negative images on them from the Dutch media. As a consequence, lower 
educated ethnic minorities will have less hostile attitudes to the group producing these images. 
Following this line of reasoning, we expect that: A negative relation between education and hostility 
among minority groups may be suppressed by media usage and perceptions of group discrimination 
(Hypothesis 5a).
However, media effects on ethnic hostility among members of dominant ethnic groups 
in survey research have turned out to be rather weak and often disappear after controlling for 
educational attainment. This implies that media preferences are strongly affected by structural 
characteristics and that opposes our formulated expectation from Cultivation theory. Instead 
of being a feeding source of ethnic hostility, the use of Dutch media by minority groups may 
indicate an expression of ‘national preferences’ and an involvement with the host country (Abu-
Rayya, 2007; Peeters & D’Haenens, 2005). Involvement with the host country has been shown 
to be related to identiﬁ cation with the host country for migrants in France (Abu-Rayya, 2007). 
We therefore pose the more likely hypotheses that: Dutch media usage is negatively related to 
both opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and to identiﬁ cation with the country of origin 
among ethnic minorities (but not for native Dutch) (Hypothesis 4b); The presumed negative relation 
between education and these two attitudinal indicators of cultural integration among minority 
groups is interpreted by Dutch media usage (Hypothesis 5b). 
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Similarly, we expect that: The use of media from the country of origin is positively related 
to opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and to identiﬁ cation with the country of origin among 
ethnic minorities (Hypothesis 6). 
7.2.4 Contact experiences
Contact opportunities for ethnic minorities are positively related to actual contact experiences 
(Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2007; Martinovic, Tubergen, & Maas, 2008). Given that higher educated 
migrants are surrounded more by native Dutch than lower educated migrants, higher educated 
migrants have a greater opportunity to associate with native Dutch than lower educated migrants. 
Positive contact with members of ethnic outgroups leads to the recognition of heterogeneity within 
the outgroup, causes negative stereotypes to diminish and ultimately that the in- and outgroup 
are decategorised (Brown, 2000). As a consequence, members of outgroups are perceived as less 
threatening and prejudice is reduced (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Negative contact experiences 
on the other hand may give rise to negative affections to outgroup members – probably by 
enforcing negative stereotypes, attenuating group boundaries, and increasing feelings of ethnic 
threat (Jaspers, 2008). Among native populations, contact with ethnic outgroups is positively 
related to ethnic tolerance (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), even if the optimal meeting conditions as 
formulated by (Allport, 1979 [1954]) are not met. In the US, interracial contact experiences do 
not seem to affect attitudes of blacks towards whites (Sigelman & Welch, 1993). Prior research 
on the effect of contact among minority populations in Europe is scarce but for the Netherlands, 
Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) found that ethnic minorities who maintain more contact with native 
Dutch hold fewer negative stereotypes. 
We assume that contact in leisure time is in general positive and will provide 
counterexamples to the possible derogative stereotypes one may have, both for ethnic minority 
groups and native Dutch. Hence, we expect that: Contact in leisure time is negatively related to 
opposition to ethnically mixed relationships (for all ethnic groups) and to identiﬁ cation with the 
country of origin (for minority groups) (Hypothesis 7).
Since higher educated migrants will have more contact opportunities than lower educated 
migrants, we expect that: A negative impact of education on ethnic hostility among ethnic migrants 
is in part interpreted by contact experiences in leisure time (Hypothesis 8).
Since lower educated natives have more inter-ethnic contact opportunities than higher 
educated natives, one could expect that contact experiences in leisure time suppress the negative 
effect of education on ethnic hostility among natives. However, for natives it has been demonstrated 
that especially the higher educated have more positive inter-ethnic contact experiences – due to 
their less hostile attitudes directed to ethnic outgroups. For natives, the more likely hypothesis is 
therefore that contact in leisure explains in part the negative impact of educational attainment 
on ethnic hostility as well.
We regard personal experiences of being discriminated against as a type of negative 
contact. Following the argument above, we thus expect that: Personal experiences of discrimination 
are positively related to opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and to identiﬁ cation with the 
country of origin among ethnic minorities (Hypothesis 9). 
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Higher educated minorities have more opportunities to come into contact with natives 
but these natives are likely to be higher educated as well. Higher educated natives express less 
ethnic hostility and may consequently be expected to be less prone to discriminate. If, as a result 
of this, higher educated minorities are less likely to experience discrimination, this would lead 
to the expectation that: The educational effect among ethnic migrants is in part interpreted by 
negative contact experiences (Hypothesis 10). The explanatory model is summarised in Figure 7.1 
and the hypotheses in Table 7.1. 
Education
Education
Controls
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
c
c
Y
Y
Controls
Group threat
Dutch media
Origin media
Positive contact
Negative contact
Figure 7.1  Multiple mediator model of the impact of education on opposition to ethnically mixed relationships 
and identiﬁ cation with the origin country (Y) (paths from controls to mediators not shown)
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7.3 DATA, MEASUREMENTS AND METHODS
In this study we use data from the Survey Integration of Minorities 2006 (SIM 2006). These 
data were collected among minority groups in the Netherlands by the Netherlands Institute for 
Social Research (SCP) in 2006. A two-stage sample was drawn from the population registers of 
all communities in the Netherlands (for more information, see Dagevos, Gijsberts, Kappelhof, & 
Vervoort, 2007). The survey covers random samples from the four largest ethnic minority groups 
– Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antilleans – and a native Dutch comparison group. First 
generation migrants are born in the respective country of origin, second generation migrants 
are born in the Netherlands and have at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. For each 
ethnic group around 1000 participants aged ﬁ fteen years and older were interviewed face-to-face 
(computer-assisted personal interviewing). Only those participants who were expected not to 
be ﬂ uent in Dutch (those who were foreign born and arrived in the Netherlands after the age of 
15) were interviewed in their native languages by bilingual interviewers. Response rates varied 
between 46% among the Surinamese and 60% among the Turkish (55% among the native Dutch). 
These response rates are higher than comparable research among ethnic minority groups in the 
Netherlands, such as the Social Position, and Use of Welfare Facilities by Immigrants Surveys (see 
Chapter 5). 
The dependent variable opposition to ethnically mixed relationships was measured with 
the following survey item: ‘Would it bother you if one of your children chooses a (native Dutch / 
non-native Dutch) as his/her partner?’, with answer categories (4) Yes, it would bother me a lot, 
(3) Yes, it would bother me, (2) Neutral, (1) No, it would not bother me, and (0) No, it would 
not bother me at all. The ethnic identiﬁ cation question, which we use as our second dependent 
variable, reads: “Do you feel more (ethnicity of origin country) or Dutch?’, with answer categories: 
(4) I feel completely (ethnicity of origin country), (3) I feel more (ethnicity of origin country) 
than Dutch, (2) I feel just as much (ethnicity of origin country) as Dutch, (1) I feel more Dutch 
than (ethnicity of origin country), and (0) I feel completely Dutch.1 Higher values thus correspond 
to lower levels of attitudinal cultural integration. The dependent variables correlated positively 
and signiﬁ cantly with each other (r=0.42).  
Our main independent variable is educational attainment and was measured in years: 
4, no education; 6, primary education only; 8, lower vocational education; 10, lower general 
education; 10.5, medium vocational education; 11.5, medium general education or higher general 
education; 15, higher vocational education; and 16, university. Students currently in school were 
treated as if successfully having completed their current level. 
Our dataset offers information on perceptions of ethnic group discrimination, which we 
assume will be closely related to perceptions of group threat and thus to be positively related to 
opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and ethnic identiﬁ cation. The variable we label group 
threat is measured by the item ‘Some people say that non-natives are being discriminated against 
by native Dutch. How often does this happen?’, (1) never, (2) almost never, (3) once in a while, 
(4) often, (5) very often. Dutch media usage and origin country media usage are the means score 
of ‘How many times a week do you read Dutch/origin country newspapers’?, and ‘How many times 
a week do you watch Dutch/origin country TV channels?’, with answer categories: (1) never, (2) 
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less than once a week, (3) once or twice a week, (4) three or four times a week, (5) ﬁ ve or sixe 
times a week, and (6) every day. Positive contact is operationalised by the survey item ‘In your 
leisure time, do you often, sometimes or never associate with native Dutch/non-native Dutch’. We 
recoded it to (0) never, (1) sometimes, and (2) often contact with outgroup members in leisure 
time. Negative contact is operationalised as ‘Have you yourself ever been discriminated against by 
native Dutch? How often did this happen?’, (0) never, (1) almost never, (2) once in a while, (3) 
often, (4) very often. 
We will brieﬂ y discuss control variables that may affect ethnic views and possibly 
inﬂ uence the effect of education as well; age, sex, social class, language proﬁ ciency and religiosity. 
Sex was coded as (1) male and (0) female. Age is measured in years. Since education is an 
important determinant of social class we will control for respondents’ labour market position. 
We categorised respondents who were currently employed for 12 hours a week or more and not 
following education in the following social classes: technocrats, socio-cultural specialists, routine 
non-manual occupations, small employers, manual supervisors and skilled manual occupations, 
semi-unskilled manual occupations and farm labourers, based on Güveli’s adaptation (Güveli, 
2006) of the original class schemata of Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (Erikson et al., 1979). 
We included an additional category indicating if someone was currently following education. Other 
respondents who did not work 12 hours a week or more were categorised as ‘non- or un-employed’.2 
The variable proﬁ ciency in Dutch is the mean score on the following items: ‘Do you experience 
problems with the Dutch language while conversing in Dutch?’, ‘Do you experience problems with 
the Dutch language while reading newspapers, letters, or ﬂ yers?’, ‘Do you experience problems 
while writing in Dutch?’, with answer categories: (1) yes often, (2) yes sometimes, and (3) no, 
never. The Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was 0.91. Finally, opposition to ethnic intermarriage 
is likely to overlap with opposition to religious heterogamy and ethnic identiﬁ cation is likely 
to coincide with religious identiﬁ cation. We therefore decided to control for church/mosque 
attendance (measured in times per year) as well. 
Missing values on interval level variables were replaced with the mean value for each 
respective ethnic group. For categorical variables we included the category ‘missing’ if necessary. 
Most missing values were observed with respect to perceived group threat (3 per cent).3  Note 
that generational status, group threat, negative contact and proﬁ ciency in Dutch are not available 
for native Dutch. Descriptive statistics for our total sample as well as the bivariate relationships 
between ethnicity and our indicators of cultural integration are summarised in Table 7.2. 
To test our hypothesis, we apply multiple mediator models. These models were estimated 
in SPSS using a macro developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) (see also: http://www.comm.ohio-
state.edu/ahayes/SPSS%20programs/indirect.htm). The models were estimated separately across 
ethnic groups and generational status, since preliminary analyses showed that many mediation 
effects were moderated by both ethnicity and generational status. 
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7.4 RESULTS
7.4.1 Bivariate relationships
In Table 7.2 we see that Turks and Moroccans are more opposed to mixed relationships than 
native Dutch and Surinamese and Antilleans less. Second generation migrants are less opposed to 
mixed relationships than ﬁ rst generation migrants. More or less the same ethnic and generational 
differences are found with respect to identiﬁ cation with the country of origin. Turks identify 
most with their country of origin, followed by Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese. Once again, 
second generation migrants identify less with the country of origin than the ﬁ rst generation. 
7.4.2 Multiple mediator models 
In Table 7.3 and Table 7.4, we summarised the estimates of the multiple mediator models. The 
estimate of the total effect of education (after controlling for age, sex, social class, language 
proﬁ ciency, and religiosity) is shown on the ﬁ rst row (corresponding to arrow ‘c’, Figure 7.1). Below 
the total effect of education, we see the parameter estimates of the direct effect of education 
and the mediator variables on the dependent variable (arrow ‘c’’ and arrows ‘b’). In the bottom 
rows we see the bootstrapping results for the total indirect effect of education and the partial 
indirect effect of education through the proposed mediators (paths ‘a*b’) and the 90 per cent bias 
corrected conﬁ dence interval of the respective boot strap point estimate. In Appendices 7.1 and 
7.2 we summarised the direct effect of education on the mediator variables (arrows ‘a’) and the 
direct effects of the control variables. 
Opposition to ethnically mixed relationships
For native Dutch, we see the expected signiﬁ cant negative relationship between (the total effect 
of) education and opposition to ethnically mixed relationships (b=-0.06, se=0.01), as well as for 
ﬁ rst generation Turks (b=-0.06, se=0.02), ﬁ rst generation Moroccans (b=-0.10, se=0.02) and ﬁ rst 
generation Antilleans (b=-0.02, se=0.01, Table 7.3). For ﬁ rst generation Antilleans the negative 
impact of education on opposition to ethnically mixed relationships is weaker than for native 
Dutch (signiﬁ cance tests not shown), in accordance with our expectation of weaker relationships 
between education and ethnic hostility among minorities (hypothesis 2). For ﬁ rst generation 
Surinamese and all immigrants of second generational status, education is not signiﬁ cantly related 
to opposition to mixed relationships at all. This may be considered as an integration paradox. 
 Perceived group threat only increases ethnic hostility among ﬁ rst generation Antilleans. 
Among ethnic minorities, perceived group threat is thus not a determinant of personal feelings 
of ethnic hostility, this is contrary to what we expected on the basis of ECT. Since perceptions 
of group threat do not inﬂ uence ethnic hostility, they did not interpret the education effect 
(contrary to hypothesis 3). Perhaps, perceptions of group discrimination – our measure of group 
threat – are not a good indicator of perceptions of ethnic threat. 
Dutch media usage and positive contact experiences are both (fairly) consistently 
negatively related to opposition to mixed relationships among minorities of ﬁ rst generational 
status, as well as positive contact for minorities of second generational status (Table 7.3). Note 
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however that Dutch media usage does not affect opposition to mixed relationships for Antilleans 
(of both ﬁ rst and second generation), for second generation Moroccans and only reaches the 
boundary of signiﬁ cance for second generation Surinamese. But all in all we ﬁ nd more corroborative 
evidence that, at least for ﬁ rst generation ethnic minority members, Dutch media usage is an 
indicator of involvement with the host country and as such is negatively related to ethnic hostility 
than that the Dutch media is an important source of negative feelings towards natives. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Dutch media usage is also negatively related to opposition to mixed relationships 
among native Dutch b=-0.08 (se=0.04; Table 7.3). 
Negative contact experiences are, as predicted (hypothesis 10), positively related to 
opposition to mixed relationships for ﬁ rst generation Turks (b=0.10, se=0.05), ﬁ rst generation 
Surinamese (b=0.12, se=0.04), second generation Moroccans (b=0.19, se=0.10), and second 
generation Antilleans (b=0.09, se=0.05). The parameter estimates are positive for other ethnic 
categories as well (with the exception of second generation Turks) and even reach the boundary 
of signiﬁ cance for second generation Antilleans (b=0.08, se=0.05; Table 7.3). 
The total effect of education is signiﬁ cantly interpreted through the proposed mediators 
for native Dutch and for all ethnic groups of ﬁ rst generational status; the 90 per cent biased 
corrected conﬁ dence interval lies below zero for all ethnic groups (Table 7.3). Among minorities of 
second generation, we observed a signiﬁ cant interpretation of the education effect for Surinamese 
and Antilleans but not for second generation Turks and Moroccans. Contact with outgroup members 
in leisure time most consistently signiﬁ cantly interprets the effect of education, but not for 
second generation Turks and Moroccans. This is not because positive contact does not reduce 
ethnic hostility among these latter groups, but because higher educated Turks and Moroccans do 
not have (signiﬁ cantly) more positive contact with natives in leisure time than lower educated 
Turks and Moroccans (Appendix 7.1). 
Dutch media usage explains in part the effect of education on opposition to ethnically 
mixed relationships among ethnic minorities. There is one exception: for second generation 
Moroccans, Dutch media usage does not interpret the education effect. Origin country media usage 
was consistently positively related to more opposition to ethnically mixed relationships, however, 
we do not observe an indirect effect of education through origin country media consumption. 
Higher educated ethnic minority members do not use less media from their country of origin than 
lower educated ethnic minorities (Appendix 7.1). We tentatively conclude that involvement with 
the country of origin is less easily altered by policy measures directed at the structural integration 
(e.g. educational programs) than involvement with the host country. 
We ﬁ nd far less signiﬁ cant mediation effects for second generation minorities than 
for their ﬁ rst generation counterparts. The variation across generations is due to differences 
in the direct effects of educational attainment on the mediator variables (Appendix 7.1). The 
positive effect of educational attainment on Dutch media usage, and contact in leisure time, and 
the negative effect of education on personal experienced discrimination, is weaker for second 
generation Turks and Moroccans than for their ﬁ rst generation counterparts (Appendix 7.1). 
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This may be part of the explanation for the integration paradox among second generation Turks 
and Moroccans: higher educated Turks and Moroccans do not make more use of Dutch media, do not 
have more contact with natives in leisure time and do not experience less personal discrimination. 
Moreover, for second generation Moroccans, Dutch media usage does not lead to less opposition 
to ethnically mixed relationships, as we already saw above. We tentatively conclude that especially 
for second generation Moroccans, who are low in the ethnic hierarchy within the Netherlands 
(Hagendoorn, 1995), Dutch media usage is not an indicator of involvement with the host country, 
or at least to a lesser extent, but rather a source for ethnic hostility (Buijs et al., 2006, p. 238). 
Ethnic Identiﬁ cation
We see a consistent picture with respect to ethnic identiﬁ cation (Table 7.4) but effects are more 
pronounced with respect to ethnic identiﬁ cation than for opposition to ethnically mixed marriages 
and especially so for second generation migrants. Consequently, we ﬁ nd fewer differences in the 
explanatory mechanism between generations. In agreement with hypothesis 1 we ﬁ nd a signiﬁ cant 
total negative effect of education (after controlling for sex, age, social class, language proﬁ ciency, 
and religiosity) on identiﬁ cation with the country of origin for (ﬁ rst and second generation) Turks 
(b=-0.03, se=0.02; b=-0.06, se=0.03, respectively), ﬁ rst generation Moroccans (b=-0.04, se=0.02), 
second generation Surinamese (b=-0.04, se=0.03), and ﬁ rst generation Antilleans (b=-0.03, 
se=0.02). As with opposition to ethnically mixed relationships, for ﬁ rst generation Surinamese, 
education is not related to ethnic identiﬁ cation. The absence of an (total) education effect among 
second generation Antilleans may be due to a ﬂ oor effect; in general second generation Antilleans 
identify themselves almost solely to the Netherlands (Table 7.2). The absence of a negative 
education effect among ﬁ rst generation Surinamese and second generation Moroccans may be 
considered as supporting the idea of an integration paradox. 
Perceived group threat is not – at least not consistently – related to stronger 
identiﬁ cations with the country of origin; only for ﬁ rst generation Turks and Surinamese do we 
observe a signiﬁ cant positive effect (b=0.20, se=0.04; b=0.09, se=0.05; respectively (Table 7.4)). 
For these groups, group threat even signiﬁ cantly suppresses the negative impact of education 
(Table 7.4). The higher ﬁ rst generation Turks and Surinamese are educated, the stronger the 
perception of perceived group threat (Appendix 7.1), and the stronger this perception, the stronger 
the identiﬁ cation with the country of origin. This is contrary to our expectation as formulated in 
hypothesis 3 in which we formulated the expectation that group threat would interpret and not 
suppress the negative education effect. Dutch media consumption is related to less identiﬁ cation 
with the country of origin for Turks (b=-0.14, se0.03; b=-0.13, se=0.06; for respectively ﬁ rst and 
second generation) and Moroccans (b=-0.13, se=0.03; b=-019, se=0.07; for respectively ﬁ rst and 
second generation) and for ﬁ rst generation Antilleans (-0.10, se=0.04). The use of media from 
the origin country is consistently related to stronger identiﬁ cations with the country of origin. 
This effect was substantially weaker with respect to opposition to ethnically mixed relationships. 
Involvement with the host country may thus strengthen ethnic group identiﬁ cations but not 
necessarily ethnic hostility. Contact in leisure time with native Dutch is also consistently related 
to less identiﬁ cation with the country of origin for all ethnic groups. These ﬁ ndings thus once 
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again give support to the idea that involvement with the host country, as expressed by Dutch 
media usage and contact with natives in leisure time is positively related to cultural integration. 
Negative contact – as measured with personal experiences of discrimination - strengthens 
identiﬁ cation with the country of origin but not for Turks and second generation Moroccans. Given 
our ﬁ ndings, we conclude that negative contact has a less consistent impact on (attitudinal 
indicators of) cultural integration than positive contact.
Our mediators signiﬁ cantly interpret the education effect for all ethnic categories with 
a signiﬁ cant total effect of education. Although consumption of media from the country of origin 
was strongly positively related to identiﬁ cation with the country of origin, it may come as no 
surprise that origin country media usage does not interpret the education effect; educational 
attainment was not related to this mediator as we already observed above (see Appendix 7.1). 
Once again, we ﬁ nd that the negative effect of education is (fairly consistently) interpreted by 
Dutch media usage and contact with natives in leisure time. 
7. Educational Attainment and Ethnic Hostility | Results
Ta
bl
e 
7.
4 
 Pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
m
ul
ti
pl
e 
m
ed
ia
to
r 
m
od
el
s 
pr
ed
ic
ti
ng
 id
en
ti
ﬁ c
at
io
n 
w
it
h 
th
e 
or
ig
in
 c
ou
nt
ry
 (
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
an
d 
m
ed
ia
to
r 
va
ria
bl
es
 a
nd
 in
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
 e
du
ca
ti
on
 t
hr
ou
gh
 m
ed
ia
to
r 
va
ria
bl
es
).
1s
t 
ge
n.
 T
ur
ks
1s
t 
ge
n.
 M
or
oc
ca
ns
1s
t 
ge
n.
 S
ur
in
am
es
e
1s
t 
ge
n.
 A
nt
ill
ea
ns
b
se
b
se
b
se
b
se
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(t
ot
al
)
-0
.0
3*
0.
02
-0
.0
4*
*
0.
01
0.
02
0.
02
-0
.0
3~
0.
02
Di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(d
ire
ct
)
0
0.
01
0
0.
01
0.
02
0.
02
0
0.
02
Gr
ou
p 
th
re
at
0.
20
**
0.
04
0.
03
0.
04
0.
09
~
0.
05
0.
02
0.
05
Du
tc
h 
m
ed
ia
-0
.1
4*
*
0.
03
-0
.1
3*
*
0.
03
-0
.0
5
0.
04
-0
.1
0*
0.
04
Or
ig
in
 m
ed
ia
0.
13
 *
*
0.
03
0.
17
**
0.
03
0.
19
**
0.
05
0.
20
**
0.
04
Po
si
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.2
6*
*
0.
05
-0
.2
8*
*
0.
05
-0
.1
9*
*
0.
06
-0
.2
8*
*
0.
06
Ne
ga
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.0
2
0.
04
0.
05
0.
04
0.
17
**
0.
05
0.
13
**
0.
04
In
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
a
b
90
%
 C
I
b
90
%
 C
I
b
90
%
 C
I
b
90
%
 C
I
To
ta
l i
nd
ire
ct
 e
ff
ec
t
-0
.1
8
-0
.2
5
-0
.1
1
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
9
-0
.1
8
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
7
0.
02
-0
.2
1
-0
.2
6
-0
.1
5
Gr
ou
p 
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
io
n
0.
09
0.
04
0.
16
0.
01
0.
00
0.
03
0.
03
0.
01
0.
09
0.
00
-0
.0
1
0.
03
Du
tc
h 
m
ed
ia
-0
.1
6
-0
.2
4
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
6
-0
.2
4
-0
.0
9
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
1
0.
02
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
9
-0
.0
1
Or
ig
in
 m
ed
ia
0.
01
-0
.0
2
0.
06
0.
01
-0
.0
4
0.
06
0.
04
0.
00
0.
09
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
0
0.
01
Po
si
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.1
2
-0
.2
0
-0
.0
7
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
9
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
6
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
2
-0
.2
0
-0
.0
7
Ne
ga
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
4
0.
01
0.
02
0.
00
0.
06
0.
04
0.
00
0.
09
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
5
0.
02
Co
nt
in
ue
d 
on
 n
ex
t 
pa
ge
Ta
bl
e 
7.
4 
co
nt
in
ue
d
2n
d 
ge
n.
 T
ur
ks
2n
d 
ge
n.
 M
or
oc
ca
ns
2n
d 
ge
n.
 S
ur
in
am
es
e
2n
d 
ge
n.
  
An
ti
lle
an
s
b
se
b
se
b
se
b
se
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(t
ot
al
)
-0
.0
6*
0.
03
0.
03
0.
04
-0
.0
4~
0.
03
-0
.0
1
0.
03
Di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
(d
ire
ct
)
-0
.0
4
0.
03
0.
05
0.
03
-0
.0
3
0.
03
0.
02
0.
03
Gr
ou
p 
th
re
at
0.
07
0.
08
-0
.0
1
0.
09
0.
03
0.
08
0.
03
0.
09
Du
tc
h 
m
ed
ia
-0
.1
3*
0.
06
-0
.1
9*
*
0.
07
-0
.0
3
0.
07
0.
02
0.
07
Or
ig
in
 m
ed
ia
0.
22
**
0.
05
0.
24
**
0.
06
0.
22
*
0.
09
0.
63
**
0.
14
Po
si
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.1
9*
0.
08
-0
.4
0*
*
0.
10
-0
.1
6
0.
11
-0
.3
7*
*
0.
14
Ne
ga
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.0
7
0.
07
0.
18
**
0.
07
0.
17
*
0.
07
0.
30
**
0.
08
In
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
a
b
90
%
 C
I
b
90
%
 C
I
b
90
%
 C
I
b
90
%
 C
I
To
ta
l i
nd
ire
ct
 e
ff
ec
t
-0
.2
1
-0
.3
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.1
3
-0
.3
8
0.
13
-0
.1
3
-0
.2
8
-0
.0
7
-0
.2
9
-0
.5
8
-0
.0
9
Gr
ou
p 
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
io
n
0.
00
-0
.0
3
0.
06
0.
00
-0
.0
7
0.
04
0.
00
-0
.0
2
0.
04
0.
00
-0
.0
3
0.
07
Du
tc
h 
m
ed
ia
-0
.1
0
-0
.2
3
-0
.0
3
0.
00
-0
.1
5
0.
12
-0
.0
2
-0
.1
1
0.
03
0.
00
-0
.0
8
0.
03
Or
ig
in
 m
ed
ia
-0
.0
9
-0
.2
6
0.
05
-0
.0
7
-0
.2
3
0.
13
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
3
-0
.0
1
0.
05
-0
.0
6
0.
22
Po
si
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
9
0.
05
-0
.0
6
-0
.2
6
0.
12
-0
.0
5
-0
.1
7
0
-0
.1
7
-0
.3
3
-0
.0
4
Ne
ga
ti
ve
 c
on
ta
ct
0.
00
-0
.0
3
0.
07
0.
00
-0
.1
7
0.
09
-0
.0
1
-0
.1
1
0.
04
-0
.1
7
-0
.4
0
-0
.0
3
**
p<
0.
01
; 
*p
<0
.0
5;
 ~
p<
0.
10
 (
tw
o 
si
de
d 
te
st
 o
f 
si
gn
iﬁ 
ca
nc
e)
a 
pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
es
 o
f 
in
di
re
ct
 e
ff
ec
ts
 h
av
e 
be
en
 m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d 
by
 1
0 
to
 f
ac
ili
ta
te
 in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
on
164
7.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter our aim was to identify the effect of educational attainment on two indicators 
of cultural integration; opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation with the 
country of origin. Educational attainment has consistently been shown to be negatively related 
to ethnic hostility, nationalism and far right-wing voting behaviour among native populations. 
However, for ethnic minorities, several authors reported an integration paradox: higher educated 
minorities supposedly perceive more discrimination, supposedly express more, not less ethnic 
hostility and supposedly identify more, not less to their country of origin. In the present study, 
we tested more thoroughly what the differences are between the largest Dutch ethnic minority 
groups and generations in the interpretation of the effect of education on attitudes of cultural 
integration. 
Let us ﬁ rst recapture the differential effects of education among ethnic groups. 
Compared to native Dutch, educational achievement was substantially weaker negatively related 
to opposition to ethnically mixed relationships for all ethnic groups, except for ﬁ rst generation 
Turks and Moroccans. For second generations migrants, the effect of education on opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships was even absent. Note however that for none of the distinguished 
ethnic categories or generations, we observed a positive relationship between educational 
attainment and opposition to ethnically mixed relationships or identiﬁ cation with the country of 
origin – which based on the integration paradox only might have been expected.
 Our second aim was to explain the effects of education. Within Ethnic Competition 
Theory, educational attainment has a pivotal role in explaining ethnic hostility among dominant 
ethnic groups since the higher educated experience less ethnic group threat. In line with ECT, 
for native Dutch, we observed a signiﬁ cant negative direct effect of education on opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships. For ethnic minority groups, most of the total effect of education 
on opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation to the country of origin could 
be interpreted by measures of involvement in the host country, through media usage and contact 
experiences. However, this is not to be expected if the educational effect should predominantly be 
explained by perceptions of group threat as ECT argues. Perceptions of group discrimination – which 
we assumed to be closely related to perceptions of ethnic group threat for ethnic minorities – did 
not affect opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and could consequently not be the reason 
for the smaller or absent direct education effect among ethnic minorities. Perceptions of group 
threat even suppressed the education effect on ethnic identiﬁ cation for ﬁ rst generation Turks and 
Surinamese, since higher educated Turks and Surinamese experience more threat, not less. We 
tentatively conclude that the group threat mechanism, or more generally, ECT, is less applicable 
to minority groups than to native populations; threats are not predominantly concentrated among 
lower educated minorities and perceptions of threats do not consistently lead to more ethnic 
hostility and to less cultural integration. 
We found extensive corroborative evidence for contact theory among both ethnic 
minority groups and the native Dutch. Contact in leisure time is negatively related to opposition 
to ethnically mixed relationships and to identiﬁ cation to the country of origin among all ethnic 
groups. Negative contact, indicated by the personal experiences of being discriminated against, 
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is positively related to opposition to ethnically mixed marriages and to identiﬁ cation with the 
country of origin for most distinguished ethnic categories as well. However, as with all cross-
sectional research on contact theory, we must be cautious to interpret these relationships in a 
causal manner. 
Although higher educated migrants have more contact opportunities with native 
Dutch than lower educated migrants, second generation Turks and Moroccans do not experience 
more positive contact experiences and (together with second generation Surinamese) do not 
experience less negative contact experiences the higher they are educated. Hostility among the 
native population may be part of the reason for this. Although not excepted, this is in line with 
previous research which demonstrated that not only low educated minorities face discrimination 
at the labourmarket but high educated minorities as well (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Gras, 
Bovenkerk, Gorter, Kruiswijk, & Ramsoedh, 1996). We tentatively conclude that, in the Netherlands, 
ethnic hostility among native Dutch hampers the integration of especially second generation 
migrants and especially of second generation Turks and Moroccans. The extent of which should be 
subject of future research. 
Previous scholars suggested that the negative effect of education on cultural integration 
could be suppressed by national media usage, since the higher educated presumably consume 
more Dutch media and Dutch media usage leads to negative meta-views (e.g. ‘They think we are 
all criminals.’). This in turn would increase ethnic hostility and identiﬁ cation with the country of 
origin. We found only meager corroborative evidence for this causal mechanism. Higher educated 
minorities generally consume more Dutch media usage than lower counterparts (second generation 
Turks and Moroccans are exceptions to this general relationship). But for all ethnic groups, except 
for second generation Moroccans, Dutch media usage interpreted and not suppressed the negative 
effect of education on origin country identiﬁ cation. Dutch media usage is thus foremost an 
indicator of involvement with the host country and to a lesser extent a feeding source for ethnic 
hostility, and this possibly only for second generation Moroccans. 
Second generation migrants are less opposed to ethnically mixed relationships and 
identify more with the Netherlands than their ﬁ rst generation counterparts. However, educational 
attainment does not have the expected negative impact on ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities 
of second generational status. For second generation Turks and Moroccans this is somewhat 
worrisome since these groups are still relatively opposed to ethnically mixed relationships, this in 
contrast to second generation Surinamese and Antilleans who are fairly tolerant. 
 In this chapter we proposed to investigate the effect of education on opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships and for ethnic identiﬁ cation. Opposition to mixed relationships 
is closely related to ethnic distance and ethnic hostility. We therefore applied theories with 
considerably merits in explaining both a wide array of indicators of ethnic hostility and in 
explaining the salience of national identities; Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory. 
We conclude that for ethnic minority groups Ethnic Competition Theory turned out to be more 
appropriate to explain group identiﬁ cations than ethnic hostility. But all in all, the threat 
mechanism could not be convincingly corroborated by our analyses. Within the contact theory 
research tradition, to focus on the tenability of the mechanism among minority population and to 
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investigate the impact of negative contact is still a relative novelty. Albeit with a cross-sectional 
dataset, we found strong support for contact theory; both positive as negative contact were 
related to opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation with the country of 
origin among ethnic minorities as predicted. 
We conclude that the term integration paradox should be used with care. We did not ﬁ nd 
a general positive relationship between education and a lack of cultural integration, rather a weak 
or absent negative effect. Moreover, the effect of educational attainment is different for different 
attitudinal indicators of cultural integration. At the same time, the impact of policies that are 
intended to stimulate socio-cultural integration by offering educational programs will be meager, 
as the effects of education are – especially among second generation minorities – weak.
7.6 NOTES
1. It is possible that someone who identiﬁ es more with the ethnicity of origin than with the 
Netherlands identiﬁ es stronger with the Netherlands than someone who exclusively identiﬁ es 
with the Netherlands. A dichotomous variable with the categories: (1) feel completely 
ethnicity of origin country versus (0) do not feel completely ethnicity of origin country does 
not suffer from this ambiguity. We did not observe differences in signs among the direct 
effects of education and the mediator variables on both these variables within respectively 
OLS and logistic regression models. Moreover, with a few exceptions, relationships signiﬁ cant 
in the OLS model were signiﬁ cant in the logistic regression model and vice versa.
2. According to ECT, social class is thus likely to interpret the presumed negative effect of 
education on ethnic hostility and identiﬁ cation with the country of origin as well. However, 
to test this formally, we need to select respondents who are currently employed. Since this 
would result in a loss of approximately 50 per cent of our respondents, we decided against 
it.
3. We controlled for missing values in our analyses but since the inclusion or exclusion of these 
control variables did not substantially alter the parameter estimates of interest, they are not 
shown.
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8. CONCLUSION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter of this book I will assess to what extent I have been successful in answering 
the core question of the book; what might be the sociological reasons for the fact that some 
people belonging to particular ethnic groups, situated in time and place, hold more (or less) 
ethnic hostility than others? I will reﬂ ect on the theoretical implications of my empirical ﬁ ndings, 
and will give my opinion on which direction future research should take. But ﬁ rst let me brieﬂ y 
sketch the structure of this book again and recapitulate the different focuses of its two parts. 
Part 1 attempted to shed more sociological light on the question of why some people 
express more ethnic hostility than others, by examining the impact of social mobility experiences 
and of characteristics of the local living environment on ethnic hostility. Previous research mainly 
identiﬁ ed current or static characteristics of individuals that are related to ethnic hostility. I argued 
in Chapter 2, the ﬁ rst chapter of Part 1, that more dynamic explanations for ethnic hostility should 
be taken into account as well. I therefore applied a ‘dynamic perspective’ and investigated the 
impact of social mobility on ethnic hostility. The second chapter of Part 1, Chapter 3, assessed the 
importance of various characteristics of municipalities and neighbourhoods with respect to ethnic 
hostility. Up to now, such a ‘local context perspective’ had received relatively little attention. 
The third and last chapter of Part 1, Chapter 4, investigated the importance of various locality 
characteristics on indicators of social cohesion. Chapter 4 built on Chapter 3 in two important 
ways. In Chapter 3, I assessed, among other things, to what extent different indicators of ethnic 
hostility are affected differently by the locality. In Chapter 4, I investigated to what extent 
explanatory models and the theoretical frameworks for ethnic hostility could also be applied to 
explain other indicators of social cohesion not related to ethnic hostility. Secondly, both Chapters 
3 and 4 took into account a multi-ethnic group perspective but in different and complementary 
ways. Chapter 3 investigated the impact of locality characteristics on ethnic hostility among 
natives directed towards different ethnic outgroups, Chapter 4 the impact of the locality on ethnic 
hostility and other social cohesion indicators among both the native Dutch population and among 
different ethnic minority groups. 
In the ﬁ rst part of this book I not only endeavoured to identify novel determinants 
of ethnic hostility, but by looking at ethnic hostility from three different perspectives – i.e. a 
dynamic, local context, and multi-ethnic group perspective – I was able to provide new empirical 
tests for frameworks commonly used to explain ethnic hostility, such as Ethnic Competition Theory 
(cf. Coenders, 2001; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002) and Contact Theory 
(Allport, 1979 [1954]; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).
 In the second part of this book, my aim was to contribute to the understanding of 
ethnic hostility by focusing on the role played by educational attainment in the formation of 
ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities. From previous research I already knew that educational 
attainment is an important determinant of ethnic hostility among dominant or native populations. 
I expected however that effects of education might differ across ethnic groups. This expectation was 
founded on previous research that describes differential distributions of educational levels across 
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ethnic groups (Statistics Netherlands, 2005) and research that relates distributions of educational 
levels to the strength of the educational effect among dominant ethnic groups (Jaspers, 2008). An 
accurate and detailed description of the educational integration of the four major ethnic minority 
groups had been lacking so far though. The description of trends in educational integration was 
therefore the topic of the ﬁ rst chapter of Part 2. This subject was viewed from a dynamic and a 
multi-ethnic group perspective: I not only investigated ethnic educational differentials at one 
point in time, but focused on birth cohort trends in ethnic educational inequality as well. Moreover, 
I compared ethnic educational differentials across the major ethnic groups in the Netherlands. The 
next chapter of Part 2, Chapter 6, built on the previous one and here my aim was to explain ethnic 
educational inequality. My theoretical point of departure in this chapter was the Breen-Goldthorpe 
model (Breen & Goldthorpe, 1997; Goldthorpe, 1996, 2000). This model had been used mainly to 
explain trends in class-based educational differentials and their stability. The model is formulated 
in such a way that it should – at least in principle – be able to explain all kinds of educational 
differentials. Chapter 6 thus investigated the tenability of the Breen-Goldthorpe model in a multi-
ethnic context. 
Besides the presumed differential distribution of educational levels across ethnic groups, 
a second reason to expect differential effects of education on ethnic hostility across ethnic groups 
came from previous, mostly qualitative research which claimed that higher educated and also 
otherwise seemingly well-integrated ethnic minorities express more, not less ethnic hostility 
(Buijs et al., 2006; Werbner, 2001). Since the relationship between educational attainment and 
ethnic hostility among ethnic minority groups had not been investigated before in a rigorous 
quantitative manner, I made this my subject of the last chapter of Part 2. 
Although Chapters 5 and 6 did not contribute directly to the answer of the core question 
of this book, they do give a more complete picture of the integration of ethnic minorities in the 
Netherlands. Part 2 investigates the educational integration of ethnic minorities (the ﬁ rst two 
chapters) and the cultural integration of ethnic minorities as expressed by a lack of opposition 
to ethnically mixed relationships and a lack of identiﬁ cation with the country of origin. A more 
complete picture of the integration of minorities is offered than by looking at the cultural 
dimension only. Moreover, the ﬁ rst two chapters of Part 1 served as a foundation for one of the 
arguments explicated in the last chapter of Part 2, Chapter 7, where I related ethnic educational 
inequality to the strength of the educational effect across ethnic groups. 
 I will now proceed to discuss my conclusions for each chapter in a consecutive order, 
brieﬂ y recapitulating the research question and my expectations. Then I will summarise my main 
results before moving to chapter-speciﬁ c conclusions. For each part there will be a ﬁ nal concluding 
remark. Findings of both Parts 1 and 2 have profound implications for Ethnic Competition Theory 
and Contact Theory, and give rise to new directions for future research. These implications and 
new questions deserved a separate section. The present chapter ends with a summary of the main 
messages of this book. 
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8.2 QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF PART 1
8.2.1 Social Mobility and Ethnic Hostility
Research questions of Chapter 2
In Chapter 2, I argued that individuals’ attitudes towards ethnic outgroups are affected both by the 
social position of their parents and by their own social position in adulthood. Previous empirical 
research has conﬁ rmed the relevance of the family of origin in relation to prejudicial attitudes 
(Jaspers et al., 2008), yet the relative importance of social origin versus social destination had so 
far remained unclear. Chapter 2 sets out to answer the following question:
To what extent does intergenerational educational and class mobility affect indicators of ethnic 
hostility (i.e. stereotypes, ethnic threat and opposition to ethnic intermarriage)? 
The relative importance of social origin versus social destination depends largely on the relative 
importance of early socialisation into the attitudes typical of the social-origin position by parents 
and other members of the origin position versus latter circumstances on the formation of attitudes 
towards ethnic outgroups in adulthood, such as perceptions of competitive ethnic threat. Since 
socialisation tends to take place early in life (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991) and many attitudes tend 
to be rather stable during the life course (Glenn, 1980), a ‘socialisation perspective’ would expect 
a larger role for origin positions than destination positions. On the other hand, following Ethnic 
Competition Theory, ethnic hostility may be related more closely to current perceptions of material 
self- and group-interests. If we follow Ethnic Competition Theory, we should expect a larger role 
for destination positions than for origin positions. Since downward social mobility is likely to 
increase feelings of frustration and perceptions of ethnic competition (Bettelheim & Janovitch, 
1964; Scheuch & Klingemann, 1967), I expected that downward social mobility would increase 
ethnic hostility independently of the speciﬁ c origin-destination combination (Marshall & Firth, 
1999). 
Results of Chapter 2
The results presented in Chapter 2 indicate that intergenerational mobility has, as expected, 
a substantial impact on ethnic hostility. I found that people adapt to the attitudes of the 
destination category, but the extent of this attitudinal adjustment depends on the speciﬁ c origin 
and destination combination. If someone is socially mobile and enters a new social position whose 
members are generally less hostile towards ethnic minorities than the members of the social-
origin position, people are more likely to acculturate to the characteristic attitudes of their new 
social position, and the relative impact of the social origin compared to the impact of the social 
destination on indicators of ethnic hostility is negligible.1 On the other hand, when the social 
destination is more hostile towards ethnic minorities than the origin position, the relative impact 
of the origin position is substantial. I showed that the inﬂ uence of the social origin under speciﬁ c 
conditions even exceeds the inﬂ uence of the social destination. This means that the importance 
of the social origin position with respect to ethnic hostility has been underestimated in previous 
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research and that ideally, to explain ethnic hostility, one should look beyond the current or static 
characteristics of individuals and take on a more dynamic perspective. 
Conclusions of Chapter 2
The main conclusion of Chapter 2 is that acculturation to less hostile attitudes is more likely to 
occur than acculturation to hostile attitudes, at least in the Netherlands. This ﬁ nding supports 
what I have called in Chapter 2 the tolerance dominance hypothesis: acculturation to the level 
of ethnic hostility as expressed by the achieved social position will be stronger when these are 
more in congruence with the dominant culture of tolerance within society. In their present form, 
neither Socialization Theory nor Ethnic Competition Theory can completely explain that under 
speciﬁ c conditions the social origin position has a stronger impact on ethnic hostility and in 
other circumstances the destination is more important. Future research is thus warranted. I urge 
researchers to investigate to what extent the same ‘tolerance dominance’ mechanism is observed 
for other attitudes (e.g. tolerance of homosexuals or a postmaterialist value orientation) or other 
forms of mobility (intra-generational mobility or marriage heterogamy).
Cross-societal comparative research provides a promising approach to better understand 
how variation in norms of tolerance conditions the effects of individual factors that predict ethnic 
hostility. To illustrate this point: among European Union member states, ethnic hostility (i.e. 
resistance to multicultural society, avoidance of social contacts with immigrants) is highest in 
Greece (Coenders et al., 2005; Coenders et al., 2007). Let us assume that the dominant norm 
in Greece is not one of being tolerant towards members of ethnic outgroups. Let us further 
assume that social positions (educational categories, social classes) still differ in terms of ethnic 
hostility in Greece. Following social mobility, will acculturation to less ethnic hostile attitudes 
be more likely than acculturation to more ethnic hostile attitudes in Greece? Following my own 
proposition, I would expect otherwise, since there is no dominant culture of tolerance. 
Finally, I would like to pose an alternative explanation for the ﬁ nding that acculturation 
to less hostile attitudes is more likely than to more hostile attitudes following social mobility. 
From this alternative explanation it is possible to deduce a contradictory hypothesis regarding the 
effect of social mobility to a more tolerant position on ethnic hostility in countries where there 
is no dominant culture of tolerance. This would add to the importance of investigating possible 
cross-national variation in consequences of social mobility. The alternative explanation ﬁ nds its 
foundation in the fact that many attitudes tend to be rather stable during the life course (Glenn, 
1980). Processes resulting in tolerance and hostility may to some extent be irreversible. Given 
the results of Chapter 2, I now posit that attitudes of ethnic tolerance may be more ﬁ xed than 
hostile attitudes towards ethnic outgroups; attitude change is more likely when one is hostile 
towards ethnic outgroups than when one is tolerant. This could also explain why an ethnically 
hostile social destination would have less impact than a tolerant social destination position 
for one’s current ethnic attitudes. Once in a position of tolerance, you are no longer in the 
position to (easily) develop ethnic hostility. This would imply that for socially mobile individuals, 
acculturation to less hostile attitudes is more likely regardless of dominant societal norms. The 
possibility of irreversibility or asymmetry in the formation of attitudes towards ethnic groups is 
175
something that, to the best of my knowledge, sociological theories on ethnic hostility have not 
yet taken into account. 
But why should less hostile (i.e. more tolerant) attitudes be more stable than more 
hostile attitudes? One should realise that ethnic hostility is not only inﬂ uenced by perceptions of 
threat but also, for example, by cognitive skills or individuals’ level of open-mindedness (Hello, 
2003). Cognitively more able and open-minded persons are less likely to be hostile towards 
ethnic outgroups. Cognitive skills (and probably also open-mindedness) are something that, once 
developed, cannot be lost or unlearned. Güveli and colleagues argue that social positions not 
only differ in their characteristic level of hostility due to differing levels of ethnic threat, but 
also because speciﬁ c social positions require or develop skills, causing a person to be less hostile 
to outgroups (Güveli et al., 2007a, 2007b; Lubbers & Güveli, 2007). This implies that hostile 
individuals may become more tolerant through two mechanisms following social mobility: through 
the development of skills that cause someone to become less hostile towards ethnic outgroups 
and by moving to economic environments where ethnic competition is less salient. The attitudes 
of tolerant individuals are only inﬂ uenced by the different competitive environment following 
social mobility. 
8.1.2 The Local Living Environment and Indicators of Ethnic Hostility
Research questions of Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, I also looked beyond current characteristics of individuals that may affect ethnic 
hostility, but this time by investigating the impact of the local living environment on ethnic 
hostility. As argued by Ethnic Competition Theory, ethnic competition over scarce resources, either 
at the individual or the group level, actual or perceived, enhances negative sentiments against 
ethnic outgroups by provoking threats to personal and group interests (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 
1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Scheepers et al., 2002). Up to now, 
the importance of types of ethnic competition had remained unclear. And whereas previous research 
on contextual determinants of ethnic hostility mainly studied the impact of characteristics of 
relatively large geographical units (Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1996; Semyonov et al., 2006; Wagner 
et al., 2006), I argued that effects of characteristics of municipalities and neighbourhoods could 
also be expected. My aim for Chapter 3 was therefore to ﬁ nd an answer to the question: 
To what extent do characteristics of Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities related to 
(perceptions of) economic, cultural or safety threats affect ethnic hostility (i.e. opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage)?
Following the rationale of Ethnic Competition Theory, I expected that within neighbourhoods 
and municipalities that could be characterised by relatively large ethnic outgroups (or sudden 
increases herein), low or deteriorating socio-economic status, the presence of mosques, high 
crime rates or high residential mobility rates, ethnic hostility would be more common. With 
respect to the size of ethnic outgroups within the direct living environment, Contact Theory would 
lead to the expectation that the higher the percentage of ethnic minorities in the neighbourhood 
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and municipality, the less ethnic hostility (i.e. the lower the opposition to ethnic intermarriage). I 
also expected that due to residential sorting, the impact of contextual characteristics might differ 
between the higher and the lower educated. Individuals with lower educational levels are likely to 
be relegated more often to neighbourhoods with higher percentages of ethnic minorities due to 
economic constraints and less due to preferences than individuals with higher educational levels 
(Massey et al., 1994; Wagner et al., 2006). I therefore expected a smaller positive effect of relative 
outgroup size on ethnic hostility for the higher educated than for the lower educated.2 
Results of Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, I showed that there exists a signiﬁ cant and substantial variation in ethnic hostility 
across neighbourhoods and municipalities; however, to a large extent these differences are due 
to compositional differences. This said, even after controlling for individual level characteristics I 
found signiﬁ cant relationships between characteristics of neighbourhoods and municipalities and 
ethnic hostility. 
Within the Netherlands, native Dutch do not hold more, but less hostile views on 
ethnic outgroups when the size of such groups in municipalities is larger. This relationship is 
not conditional on the educational level of the inhabitants and is thus in agreement with the 
predictions derived from Contact Theory. At the neighbourhood level the mechanisms are somewhat 
more complicated. For the higher educated, outgroup size is related to less ethnic hostility, and 
this ﬁ nding thus also supports Contact Theory. It is likely, however, that it is also partly the 
result of selective in- and out-migration, since for the lower educated, who have less opportunity 
to move out of bad neighbourhoods, larger ethnic outgroup sizes within the neighbourhood are 
related to more ethnic hostility, as Ethnic Competition Theory predicts. 
A deteriorating socio-economic status at the neighbourhood and municipality levels 
increases ethnic hostility, as Ethnic Competition Theory would predict. But other measures which 
I assumed to be related to (perceptions of) ethnic competitive threat, such as the presence of 
Mosques, crime rates, and residential mobility at the neighbourhood and municipality levels, do 
not consistently affect ethnic hostility. 
Chapter 3 applies a multi-ethnic group perspective. I investigated opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage among native Dutch towards Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese. Native Dutch were 
most opposed to ethnic intermarriage with Moroccans, followed by ethnic intermarriage with 
Turks (cf. Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003). However, the explanatory models for opposition to ethnic 
intermarriage with each respective outgroup did not differ. 
Conclusion of Chapter 3
The local living environment constituted by municipalities and neighbourhoods inﬂ uences 
ethnic hostility. However, the relationships between relevant neighbourhood and municipality 
characteristics, such as relative outgroup size and socio-economic situation, and ethnic hostility 
are weak compared to the impact on ethnic hostility of individual-level characteristics such as 
educational attainment.
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I conclude that the threat mechanism evoked by the proximity of ethnic outgroups, 
positive contact experiences due to increased contact opportunities when one lives in close 
proximity to members of ethnic outgroups, and selective residential migration all take place 
at the same time within neighbourhoods and municipalities characterised by a sizeable ethnic 
outgroup. 
Ethnic Competition Theory argues that ethnic competition and perceptions thereof 
cause ethnic hostility to increase. Our ﬁ ndings show that at the locality level, only characteristics 
associated to (perceptions of) economic competition are positively related to ethnic hostility. I 
assumed that perceptions of cultural competition would be inﬂ uenced by the presence of Mosques 
and safety threats by crime rates and residential mobility. If this is correct, my ﬁ ndings would 
imply that only variation in economic competitive threat and not cultural or safety threats within 
a nation inﬂ uence ethnic hostility. A necessary next step is to assess to what extent cultural 
threats at the national level (the presence of places of worships for different ethnic groups) and 
safety threats (national crime rates) can explain cross-national variation in ethnic hostility next 
to economic threats (socio-economic status). On the other hand, my assumption that perceptions 
of cultural competition would be inﬂ uenced by the presence of Mosques within the locale living 
environment and safety threats by crime rates and residential mobility within the locale might 
not be correct. Perhaps perceptions of cultural and safety threats are more inﬂ uenced by the mass 
media, which takes its cues from levels of threat at the national level, than by characteristics of 
the local living environment? Future research is warranted. 
8.1.3 The Local Living Environment and Indicators of Social Cohesion 
Research questions of Chapter 4
Chapter 4 investigated the impact of characteristics of neighbourhoods and municipalities on four 
indicators of social cohesion: contact frequency with one’s neighbours, tolerance of a neighbour 
from a different race, generalised social trust and volunteering. The choice for these dependent 
variables enabled me to assess to what extent the impact of neighbourhoods and municipalities 
was similar for an indicator of both ethnic hostility and social cohesion between ethnic groups 
(i.e. tolerance/opposition to a neighbour from a different race), and for indicators of social 
cohesion that referred to associative life and generalised trust.
Although ethnic and economic heterogeneity, poverty, crime and residential mobility 
of the local environment are all allegedly related to lower levels of different dimensions of social 
cohesion (cf. Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Letki, 2008; Putnam, 2007), it remained unclear 
which of these characteristics matters most and whether the impact of contextual characteristics 
is consistent for different indicators of social cohesion. Building on my results of Chapter 3, I also 
argued in Chapter 4 that it is very likely that the impact of the community on indicators of social 
cohesion depends on the characteristics of its residents, such as ethnic background, income and 
educational degree. So far, these so-called cross-level interactions have received relatively little 
attention. The research question of Chapter 4 was:
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To what extent, and for whom, do ethnic and economic heterogeneity, economic afﬂ uence, crime 
rates and residential mobility within Dutch neighbourhoods and municipalities affect indicators 
of social cohesion (i.e. contact frequency with one’s neighbours, tolerance of a neighbour from a 
different race, generalised social trust and volunteering)?
I derived a hypothesis regarding the impact of locality characteristics on indicators of social 
cohesion mainly from the homophily principle (Blau, 1977; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson 
et al., 2001). But I also assessed to what extent Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory 
would lead to different expectations. The homophily principle simply states that people like others 
who resemble themselves, and that people have the tendency to associate with these similar 
others while having a ‘natural aversion to heterogeneity’ (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Lehning, 
1998). I expected that in ethnically and economically diverse communities inhabitants would 
share fewer characteristics and have more divergent lifestyles than inhabitants of homogenous 
neighbourhoods and municipalities, hence these individuals would have fewer (positive) ties with 
others. Next to degree of heterogeneity, I argued that neighbourhoods and municipalities differ in 
the extent to which they offer their inhabitants the resources to meet and mingle under favourable 
circumstances. I identiﬁ ed three of these locality characteristics which may obstruct indicators of 
social cohesion: poverty, criminality and residential mobility.
I expected the homophily principle to be less applicable to the higher educated and 
the rich, and that instead they would prefer living in a diverse locality, at least more so than 
individuals with lower incomes and lower educational degrees. This could be true especially 
within the Netherlands, with its history of strong endorsement by the elite of the ideology of 
multiculturalism (see introduction of this book). Hence I expected heterogeneity, poverty, crime 
and residential mobility to have a less severe detrimental effect on indicators of social cohesion 
for the higher educated and the rich than for the lower educated and the poor. Finally, following 
the homophily principle, I expected that increasing heterogeneity would have a less negative 
impact on indicators of social cohesion for ethnic minorities living in these localities than for the 
native Dutch. 
Results of Chapter 4
Of the investigated locality characteristics, economic afﬂ uence at the neighbourhood level is 
most consistently positively related to different indicators of social cohesion. Within economically 
deprived neighbourhoods, neighbours have less contact with each other, volunteer less and have 
lower levels of trust. This relationships holds even if we control for composition effects, that is, 
for the characteristics of the individuals living in these neighbourhoods, and after taking into 
account other relevant characteristics of the living environment.
 Ethnic and economic heterogeneity within neighbourhoods and municipalities does not 
have a consistent negative impact on different indicators of social cohesion for the residents 
living in these localities. After taking into account composition effects and other relevant locality 
characteristics, crime rates are not related to the four distinguished indicators of social cohesion 
in Chapter 4 either. Residential mobility within municipalities induces speciﬁ c indicators of social 
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cohesion (e.g. it fosters contact with neighbours) but deteriorates others (e.g. residents are less 
likely to volunteer when mobility rates are higher). 
Putnam (2007) reports that, in the United States, ethnic heterogeneity has a negative 
impact on all forms of social cohesion. I come to a radically different conclusion for the 
Netherlands; the impact of ethnic diversity depends on the speciﬁ c indicator of social cohesion 
under investigation. Social cohesion cannot be reduced to one single indicator, let alone simply 
aggregating different indicators. Contrary to previous ﬁ ndings in the US, for the Netherlands I did 
not ﬁ nd a consistent negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on indicators of social cohesion., 
neither among the native Dutch nor among ethnic minority groups. 
Just as Chapter 3, Chapter 4 applies a multi-ethnic group perspective. This time I 
investigated to what extent ethnic groups differ in ethnic hostility towards one another and 
in other indicators of social cohesion. I also explored to what extent ethnic diversity within 
the locality affected indicators of social cohesion differently across ethnic groups. I tentatively 
conclude that, in general, non-Western ethnic minority groups have more contact with their 
neighbours than native Dutch, less opposition to neighbours from a different race, lower levels of 
generalised trust, and volunteer less. Ethnic diversity within the locality did not affect indicators 
of social cohesion differently for native Dutch than for ethnic minority groups. 
Conclusion of Chapter 4
The local living environment not only affects ethnic hostility, as already shown in Chapter 3, but 
other indicators of social cohesion too. It is however not ethnic or economic diversity which is 
consistently related negatively to indicators of social cohesion, as could be expected on the basis 
of the homophily principle, but economic deprivation within neighbourhoods. Within economically 
deprived neighbourhoods, neighbours have less contact with each other, volunteer less and have 
lower levels of trust. 
 Different indicators of social cohesion are affected differently by both individual-level 
characteristics and contextual characteristics. This is in contrast with the results of Chapter 3, 
where I found that explanatory models for different indicators of ethnic hostility are more or less 
similar. We should go back to the drawing board to design a theoretical framework that explains the 
differential impact of locality characteristics on different indicators of social cohesion. Admittedly, 
in Chapter 4 I ‘only’ investigated a limited selection of indicators of social cohesion, but note that 
this is an improvement over many previous works in which only one indicator is being investigated 
or different indicators are simply aggregated. This said, other indicators of social cohesion should 
be investigated as well in order to discover – or more ideally, to test theoretically deduced 
– patterns in explanatory models for indicators of social cohesion. Since social cohesion refers to 
ties between individuals, a step forward would be to theorise on how the local living environment 
affects (ego-centered) networks. As long as the diversity within one’s living environment remains 
below a certain threshold, this diversity may not be reﬂ ected in the diversity of one’s own network 
and therefore not lead to a reduction in indicators of social cohesion that refer to associate life 
with members of the ethnic ingroup. Unfortunately, with the data used in Chapter 4, I was unable 
to investigate these ‘who-with-whom’-like questions. 
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In relation to the latter point, scholars interested in the impact of locality on indicators 
of social cohesion have mostly operationalised ethnic heterogeneity by taking the complement of 
the Herﬁ ndahl Index. However, the precise ethnic composition of a locality might matter at least 
as much as the more abstract idea of ethnic heterogeneity. I did investigate this in Chapter 4 
and concluded that neither the sizes of speciﬁ c outgroups or the size of the ethnic ingroup affect 
indicators of social cohesion. If there are effects on indicators of social cohesion due to the 
presence of different ethnic groups, they are either the result of the group size of the dominant 
ethnic group – in our case the native Dutch – or really due to ethnic diversity.3 Unfortunately, 
within the Netherlands it is empirically impossible to pull these two effects apart. I therefore urge 
scholars to investigate this point further in more ethnically diverse societies. 
In Chapter 4, I argued that selective residential mobility could bias the estimates of the 
inﬂ uence of locality characteristics. Unfortunately, I did not have longitudinal data – let alone 
experimental data – available to me. The best I could do was to assume that individuals with higher 
educational degrees or higher income levels are more likely to live in speciﬁ c neighbourhoods and 
municipalities because they prefer to do so (at least more so than the poor and lower educated), 
and face fewer economic constraints with respect to their locality choice than the poor and 
relatively lower educated. Following this rationale, I was more conﬁ dent of ﬁ nding detrimental 
effects of bad locality characteristics on indicators of social cohesion among the poor and the 
lower educated. The results of my analyses could not corroborate this expectation though, so I 
found no (indirect) evidence for residential mobility. I also assumed that residential sorting would 
be less pronounced across municipalities than across neighbourhoods, but in municipalities I 
did not ﬁ nd negative effects of economic or ethnic heterogeneity either. It is thus unlikely that 
selective residential mobility will discredit my main conclusions. 
8.1.4 Concluding remarks on Part 1
In Part 1, I moved away from traditional explanations for ethnic hostility that ﬁ nd their origins in 
current or static characteristics of individuals, and showed that experiences of intergenerational 
educational and class mobility affect ethnic hostility. The impact of a person’s current social 
position depends on her social origin and on society’s culture of tolerance. Following social 
mobility, people are more likely to adopt to less hostile attitudes than more hostile ones. A 
more dynamic perspective on ethnic hostility thus proved fruitful. In order to predict or explain 
someone’s level of ethnic hostility, we should take into account experiences from the past. 
Next to individual-level characteristics, characteristics of relatively small geographical units 
affect ethnic hostility as well; especially those related to the socio-economic status of the locale 
affect ethnic hostility and other indicators of social cohesion as predicted. Local context matters, 
and a local context perspective contributes to the understanding of ethnic hostility – but is one’s 
local living environment important for the explanation of ethnic hostility? It is safe to conclude that 
individual-level characteristics like educational attainment are more important in the explanatory 
model than characteristics of neighbourhoods, at least for society’s dominant ethnic group. The 
relative importance of the local living environment remains unclear, however, and is most likely 
underestimated. Scholars should be cautious when attaching conclusions regarding the impact of 
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local living environments (on ethnic hostility) based on estimated variance components in multi-
level models for two reasons. First, the relevant local context is not only theoretically hard to identify 
but also methodologically difﬁ cult to operationalise, and second, the reliability of the measured 
contextual characteristics is very likely to be lower than that of individual-level characteristics. 
Although my results indicate that the native Dutch are more hostile towards speciﬁ c 
ethnic minority groups (cf. Hagendoorn, 1995; Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003), I did not ﬁ nd any 
discrepancy in the proposed explanatory models for hostility among native Dutch directed at 
different ethnic groups. The application of the multi-ethnic group perspective also revealed 
that ethnic hostility and other indicators of social cohesion are differently distributed across 
ethnic groups. But once again I could not explain why this was the case. The multi-ethnic group 
perspective did not offer more answers but did raise more questions, and as such was also valuable 
in terms of increasing our (future) understanding of ethnic hostility. 
The theoretical implications of the ﬁ ndings of Part 1 with respect to Ethnic Competition 
Theory and Contact Theory are discussed in section 8.3. 
8.2 QUESTIONS, RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF PART 2 
8.2.1 Trends in Ethnic Educational Inequality
Research questions of Chapter 5
Educational attainment is an important determinant for economic self-sufﬁ ciency, social class 
and life-long earnings. The educational integration of ethnic minority groups is therefore a good 
indicator of the level of structural integration of these ethnic groups. This book’s core focus lies on 
the explanation of ethnic hostility. Ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities, which I regarded as an 
important aspect of their cultural integration, was the subject of Chapter 7. But by ﬁ rst addressing 
my attention to the trends in, and explanations for, the educational integration of minorities, 
I offered a more complete picture of the integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, the results of both Chapters 5 and 6 served as a foundation for the argumentation laid 
out in Chapter 7. 
Although previous research on ethnic stratiﬁ cation patterns in the Dutch educational 
system reveals that the educational distribution of minority groups do not resemble that of the 
native Dutch, up to now the precise extent of ethnic inequality in educational opportunities and 
how these have changed over successive birth cohorts had remained unclear. The question I set 
out to answer in Chapter 5 was:
What are the birth cohort trends across ethnic groups in ﬁ nal educational attainment and school 
transition decisions, and to what extent does social background explain these differences? 
According to the modernisation proposition, in modern societies the economies and concomitant 
occupational structures dictate selection processes based on achieved characteristics of individuals 
(Blau & Duncan, 1967). In Western modern societies, selection criteria not based on achieved 
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characteristics are morally sanctioned; ascribed characteristics not only cannot, but also should 
not play an important role in selection processes (Parsons, 1951). As the Netherlands is becoming 
an ever-more meritocratic society with regard to the ascribed characteristics of social origin and 
gender, I also expected the ethnic inequality of educational opportunities to have decreased at all 
levels and for all tracks. On the other hand, comparative empirical research on educational inequality 
among social strata has shown that with respect to educational opportunities, meritocratisation 
is not a universal process among modernised countries (Breen & Jonsson, 2005). As argued by 
Raftery and Hout, and summarised in their Maximally Maintained Inequality (MMI) proposition, 
at times of educational expansion educational inequality will only decrease at educational levels 
where enrolment of the elite stratum has been saturated (1993). Based on the MMI proposition 
I expected inequality to be maintained between ethnic groups within secondary education, yet 
a reduction in ethnic inequality in the odds of enrolling in tertiary education between students 
of different ethnic origins who successfully completed higher general secondary education in 
the Netherlands. Once saturation has been reached at a given educational level, inequalities of 
attaining that level may be replaced by inequalities in enrolment in the more selective track, 
according to Lucas (2001). The more selective tracks in the Netherlands are the general tracks 
(as opposed to vocational tracks). This would imply that at the tertiary educational level, ethnic 
inequality will have decreased for the less selective vocational track and increased for the more 
selective general track. 
Results of Chapter 5
Ethnic educational inequality did not decrease at all levels and all tracks. Ethnic differences in 
ﬁ nal educational attainment are maintained; the underrepresentation of ethnic minority members 
with a degree in tertiary education remained more or less stable. Within secondary education, 
inequality is maintained quantitatively as well. Moreover, pupils of Dutch descent opt more often 
than immigrants to continue their educational career after higher general secondary education, 
and even under a condition approaching saturation pupils of ethnic minority groups do not seem 
able to close the gap in enrolment rates.
Based on my results, it seems that inequality is also established qualitatively within 
tertiary education: in recent years the choice for university gained in importance, apparently more 
so for native Dutch than for ethnic minority groups. However, due to a lack of statistical power I 
have to make the last conclusion with some caution. I urge others (and myself) to replicate this 
ﬁ nding when suitable data becomes available. 
The unfavourable social background of many students with an ethnic minority heritage 
partly explained the ethnic educational differentials, as predicted, but an ethnic penalty still 
remained after controlling for social position. Moreover, the social background composition of 
ethnic minority groups was not the reason for an absence of a general trend towards ethnic 
educational equality. 
Conclusion of Chapter 5
Ethnicity is an ascriptive trait that still shapes schooling outcomes decisively. Even in a country 
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were class-based and sex-based educational differentials have been diminishing, educational 
inequality is not generally declining between non-Western minority groups and the native Dutch. 
Clearly, we have to refute the hypotheses derived from the modernisation proposition; ethnic 
educational inequality did not decrease at all levels and all tracks. But is modernisation theory 
wrong?4 Is a selection process based on ethnicity economically inefﬁ cient within educational 
institutions? Not if it is harder to judge the achievements and potential of minorities and there 
are sufﬁ cient other perfect (or suitable) candidates without an ethnic minority background for the 
same position to choose from. And are selection criteria based on ethnicity (morally) sanctioned, 
not only de jure but also de facto? These are questions that need to be addressed in the future. 
In Chapter 5, I also showed that trends in ethnic educational inequality differ profoundly 
between ethnic groups. This illustrates the importance of a multi-ethnic group perspective. Based 
on my results it is not to be expected that inequality among second generation ethnic minorities 
and native Dutch will disappear at the secondary and tertiary educational levels for successive 
birth cohorts. Third generation ethnic minorities are now starting to attend school. Whether 
the third generation is going to perform better or worse than their second and ﬁ rst generation 
counterparts remains to be seen. My results should temper the optimism of those who expect 
ethnic differences to dissolve for later generations or in due time.
Even under a condition of saturation, the ethnic inequality in transition rates from 
secondary education to tertiary education did not diminish. This is a puzzling ﬁ nding and needs 
further research attention. The detailed description of patterns of association between attained 
educational level and ethnicity also showed that ethnic inequality and cohort trends in it take 
different forms across vocational and general educational tracks of the same level. In line with 
the Effectively Maintained Inequality proposition, inequality is established qualitatively within 
tertiary education. 
 Chapter 5 raised the question of how decisions of individual students contribute to the 
ethnic inequality observed. This question led to the study described in Chapter 6. 
8.2.2 Explanations for Ethnic Educational Inequality
Research questions of Chapter 6
Chapter 6 investigated how ethnicity affects the decision for a speciﬁ c track in higher education. 
Building on the results of Chapter 5, I took the qualitatively differentiated structure of the Dutch 
educational system in general university tracks and vocational tracks of professional colleges into 
account. I also took into account that tracks, at both university and professional college, differ 
in study ﬁ elds. 
My point of departure was the Breen-Goldthorpe model. According to this model, 
students’ transition decisions are based on the expected direct and indirect costs associated with 
each transition choice, on their subjective beliefs about the utility of educational outcomes, and 
on subjective beliefs about the likelihood of success in the different available track options. The 
beliefs of expected future academic success are likely to be inﬂ uenced by factors other than ability, 
such as knowledge of the schooling system and preferred study effort. If students with the same 
demonstrated ability but with different ethnic backgrounds have different expectations of future 
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school success, this may account to some extent for existing ethnic educational differentials. The 
research question I set out to answer in Chapter 6 was: 
To what extent do subjective estimates of success probabilities explain the effect of social origin, sex 
and ethnicity on students’ choices between different school tracks in Dutch higher education?
Parents of ethnic minority pupils are less likely to have experienced the Dutch school system 
than parents of native Dutch pupils. Chapter 5 shows that pupils with a non-Western ethnic 
heritage remain underrepresented in tertiary education. They will have fewer ethnic role models 
from which information regarding tertiary education could be derived. I therefore assumed that 
ethnic minority students tend to have less knowledge of the Dutch schooling system than the 
native Dutch, and that as a consequence they may be less aware that there is more than ability 
which makes for a successful academic career. Hence I expected their beliefs of future success 
to be more heavily inﬂ uenced by ability than the success probabilities of native Dutch students. 
Since I expected differences in success probabilities across social groups, ethnic groups, and male 
and female students, even after controlling for previous demonstrated ability, I expected these 
probabilities to explain (in part) the effect of social origin, sex and ethnicity on students’ choices 
between different levels of schooling and ﬁ elds of study in higher education. 
Results of Chapter 6
Previously demonstrated academic ability is an important – albeit not perfect – determinant of the 
subjective likelihood of future academic success. Pupils from more advantaged social backgrounds 
have higher expectations of success, and this is largely due to their better demonstrated ability. 
Women have lower expectations of success for science ﬁ elds than men, but higher expectations 
for non-science ﬁ elds, even after taking ability differences into account. I also showed that Turks 
and Moroccans expect to have more success in higher education than native Dutch counterparts 
with similar ability levels, but that, contrary to my expectations, this is not because higher grades 
increase expectations faster for these ethnic groups.5 Still, differences in success probabilities 
were relatively small across ethnic groups compared to differences across social origin or sex. 
Future research should try to clarify the mechanisms of why ethnic groups and male and female 
students differ in their expectations of future school success. 
Success probabilities explain to a large degree the effect of sex and parental income on 
choice of study ﬁ eld, as expected. However, success probabilities could not explain differences 
across ethnic groups in choice of study ﬁ eld. Also contrary to my expectations, success probabilities 
do not explain the effect of ascribed characteristics on the choice between general and vocational 
tracks. The latter ﬁ nding clearly contradicts the Breen-Goldthorpe model. 
Conclusion of Chapter 6
The Breen-Goldthorpe model is a very promising theoretical framework for the explanation of 
school transition decisions. The assumption within this model that ability is a sufﬁ cient indicator 
for students’ success probabilities needs to be relaxed though, since in the ﬁ rst place ascribed 
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characteristics inﬂ uence success probabilities next to previous demonstrated ability (although for 
reasons as yet unknown), and secondly since success probabilities explain the impact of ascribed 
characteristics on school transition decisions better than demonstrated ability. Future research 
should try to shed more light into why ascribed characteristics like social origin, sex and ethnicity 
affect expectations of success in the educational system.
Subjective success probabilities explain differentials in choice of study ﬁ eld across social 
origins and between the sexes. However, ethnicity’s effect on school transition decisions cannot 
be explained by either differences in the perceived costs of studying, educational aspirations or 
success probabilities. Why the Breen-Goldthorpe model is less applicable to ethnic minority groups 
remains unclear. This puzzling ﬁ nding warrants further academic attention. 
The educational integration of ethnic minorities is lacking, as evidenced in Chapter 5. In 
Chapter 6 I showed that a theory with considerable merits for explaining school transition decisions 
of students from different social backgrounds or sexes is less applicable towards explaining the 
school transition decisions of ethnic minority students. Why would this be so? The ﬁ ndings of both 
Chapters 5 and 6 raise more doubts as to whether the effect of educational attainment on ethnic 
hostility is similar across ethnic groups. This was the subject of Chapter 7.
8.2.3 Educational Attainment and Ethnic Hostility
Research questions of Chapter 7
Educational attainment has consistently been shown to be an important determinant of ethnic 
hostility among the native population. The analyses presented in Part 1 of this book once again 
conﬁ rm this conclusion, although of course here I also showed that social mobility experiences 
and locality characteristics have a substantial impact on ethnic hostility. The results of Part 1 and 
the ﬁ rst two chapters of Part 2 begged the question of the extent of which and why educational 
attainment affects indicators of ethnic hostility and of the related phenomenon of cultural 
integration (i.e. opposition to ethnically mixed relationships, identiﬁ cation with the country 
of origin) among ethnic minority groups. The question regarding the link between educational 
integration and indicators of cultural integration can also be traced back to the ﬁ ndings of mostly 
qualitative studies regarding a presumed integration paradox among ethnic minority groups (Buijs 
et al., 2006; Werbner, 2001). Higher-educated minorities supposedly perceive more discrimination, 
not less; express more, not less ethnic hostility; and identify more, not less, with their country of 
origin. This is considered somewhat counterintuitive since, as said before, educational attainment 
has consistently been shown to be negatively related to ethnic hostility, nationalism and far right-
wing voting behaviour among native populations. However, most previous quantitative empirical 
studies among ethnic minorities addressing the integration paradox focus on meta-views and 
perceptions of discrimination (e.g. Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009; Jaspers & Lubbers, 2005). The effect 
of education on ethnic hostility among minority groups and on identiﬁ cation with the host country 
had remained unclear. The research question I set out to answer in Chapter 7 was therefore: 
To what extent and why is educational integration linked to the cultural integration (i.e. opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cation with the country of origin) of ethnic minorities?  
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To derive hypotheses I once again used Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory. The 
starting point of Chapter 7 was that the causal mechanisms for cultural integration among ethnic 
minorities, as expressed through views regarding ethnically mixed relationships and identiﬁ cations 
with the country of origin, should be similar to the causal mechanisms which lead to ethnic 
hostility among native populations. I expected that higher educated minorities would perceive 
less ethnic threat, would have more positive and fewer negative contact experiences, and would 
be more involved with their host country and less involved with their origin country. This in turn 
would explain why higher educated minorities are more culturally integrated (i.e. are less opposed 
to ethnically mixed relationships and identify less with their country of origin). 
Results of Chapter 7
In Chapter 7 I found that, in general, educational achievement was substantially more weakly 
related to ethnic hostility (i.e. opposition to ethnically mixed relationships) for minority groups 
than for the native Dutch. I could not identify a negative effect of education on opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships for second generation minorities. This ﬁ nding, which is in line 
with the previously observed integration paradox, could be explained by the fact that second 
generation minorities (especially Turks and Moroccans) do not experience more positive and fewer 
negative contacts with the native Dutch the higher their educational level.
In contrast to what I expected on the basis of Ethnic Competition Theory, ethnic group 
threats did not explain the effect of education among ethnic minorities. On the other hand, I 
found extensive corroborative evidence for Contact Theory among both ethnic minority groups and 
the native Dutch. Contact in leisure time is negatively related to opposition to ethnically mixed 
relationships and to identiﬁ cation with country of origin among all ethnic groups. Also in line with 
Contact Theory, negative contact is positively related to opposition to ethnically mixed marriages 
and to identiﬁ cation with country of origin. 
Higher educated minorities generally consume more Dutch media than their lower educated 
counterparts. Dutch media usage is negatively related to ethnic hostility and to identiﬁ cation with 
the country of origin. Only for second generation Moroccans did I ﬁ nd supportive evidence for 
the claim that Dutch media usage is a feeding source for ethnic hostility. The unique position of 
second generation Moroccans in this respect may be due to the fact that Moroccans are evaluated 
most negatively by the native Dutch in comparison to Turks and Surinamese/Antilleans (see 
results of Chapter 3). 
Conclusion of Chapter 7
Second-generation migrants are less opposed to ethnically mixed relationships and identify more 
with the Netherlands than their ﬁ rst generation counterparts. However, educational attainment 
does not have the expected negative impact on ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities of second 
generational status. For second generation Turks and Moroccans this is somewhat worrisome, since 
these groups are still relatively opposed to ethnically mixed relationships. However, the term 
integration paradox should be used with care, since I did not ﬁ nd a general positive relationship 
between education and a lack of cultural integration, rather a weak or absent negative effect.
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The results of Chapter 7 imply that even if, with increasing mean levels of education and 
when ethnic minorities start identifying with their host country, ethnic (marital) segregation will 
not necessarily diminish. Why identiﬁ cation with the country of origin is more often negatively 
related to educational attainments than other indicators of cultural integration (i.e. opposition to 
ethnically mixed relationships) deservers further scientiﬁ c attention. Scholars should devote more 
attention to the identiﬁ cation of effects of ethnic identity on phenomena like ethnic hostility, 
physical and mental health, and labour market positions, which cannot be attributed to or 
explained by characteristics that are causally prior to ethnic identiﬁ cation. 
The group-threat mechanism of Ethnic Competition Theory is, in its present form, less 
applicable to minority groups than to native populations. I will come back to this conclusion in 
section 8.3.
8.2.4 Concluding remarks on Part 2
In Part 2, I investigated the educational integration of ethnic minorities, the cultural integration 
of ethnic minorities and the link between these dimensions of integration. A worrisome conclusion 
is that the educational integration of ethnic minorities is lacking and that the unfavourable 
socio-economic background of many minority students could not account for this. Ethnicity is an 
ascriptive trait that decisively shapes schooling outcomes.
But why is ethnicity an ascriptive trait that decisively shapes schooling outcomes? 
I tried to explain ethnic educational differentials in educational opportunities with the Breen-
Goldthopre model. Although this model is a promising theoretical framework for the explanation 
of class-based – and to a somewhat lesser extent sex-based – educational inequality, it has 
considerably fewer merits within a multi-ethnic context; how ethnicity affects schooling outcomes 
remains unclear. 
The Breen-Goldthorpe model focuses on explanations for student’s academic demands. 
A way forward would be to expand this one-level demand model with a supply-side level and an 
institutional-context level. To what extent do teachers and school institutions offer or promote 
students with a minority background a suitable track of education? To what extent and why do 
formal institutional rules (e.g. rules governing enrolment) affect ethnic educational differentials? 
It is here that I expect to ﬁ nd answers for persisting ethnic educational inequality.
Part 2 linked the social research tradition of stratiﬁ cation to the tradition of social 
cohesion. This proved fruitful: given the persistent unequal distribution of educational degrees 
across ethnic groups, I expected differential effects of educational attainment on ethnic hostility 
among the major ethnic groups in the Netherlands.6 The results corroborated my expectation; 
in general, educational attainment has a weaker negative relationship with indicators of ethnic 
hostility among ethnic minority groups than among society’s dominant ethnic group.
In Chapter 3, part of the ﬁ rst section of this book, I investigated ethnic hostility among 
the native Dutch population directed to different ethnic groups. My results were in agreement with 
previous research on the existence of an ethnic hierarchy within the Netherlands (Hagendoorn, 
1995; Hagendoorn & Pepels, 2003). In Chapter 7, I took a complementary minority perspective. 
The level of cultural integration (i.e. a lack of opposition to ethnically mixed relationships and a 
8. Conclusion | Questions, results and conclusions of Part 2
188
lack of identiﬁ cation with the country of origin) differed considerably across ethnic groups; Turks 
and Moroccans are more opposed to mixed relationships than native Dutch, and Surinamese and 
Antilleans less. 
Adherents of the assimilation ideology should decide for themselves whether identity 
acculturation, without educational acculturation or acculturation on other domains, is sufﬁ cient. 
This said, based on the results of Chapter 7 I conclude that, in the Netherlands, ethnic hostility 
among the native population hampers the integration of ethnic minorities, especially second 
generation migrants, and even more speciﬁ cally, second generation Turks and Moroccans. The 
precise extent should be subject of future research. 
8.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR ETHNIC COMPETITION THEORY AND CONTACT 
THEORY: NEW QUESTIONS
8.3.1 Theoretical implications for Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory from Part 1
Theoretical implications from Chapter 2
Within the framework of Ethnic Competition Theory, actual competition between members of ethnic 
groups presumably induces perceptions of ethnic competition. These perceptions increase feelings 
of ethnic threat, which in turn reinforce ethnic hostility. Chapter 2 shows that acculturation to less 
hostile attitudes is more likely (or easier) than acculturation to more hostile attitudes regarding 
ethnic outgroups. I attributed this to the fact that ethnic tolerance (not ethnic hostility) is the 
dominant social norm within Dutch society. More generally, I posited that acculturation to dominant 
social norms is more likely to occur than acculturation to less accepted or deviant norms. 
Building on these results, we may expect other effects of the dominant social norm 
regarding ethnic outgroups on the development of ethnic hostility among individual members of 
society. I would argue that individuals are more prone to perceive ethnic group competition when 
there are more individuals within society that express or seek to legitimise their negative thoughts, 
feelings or behaviour towards ethnic outgroups. Hence the prevalence of ethnic hostility within a 
society may condition the correlation between actual ethnic group competition and perceptions 
of it. Scholars have previously shown that, as a certain norm-violating behaviour becomes more 
common, it will negatively inﬂ uence conformity to other norms and rules (Keizer, Lindenberg, & 
Steg, 2008). In line with these empirical ﬁ ndings and given the rationale given above, I expect 
that when there are more people violating the social norm of ethnic tolerance, ethnic hostility 
in all its different guises will spread more easily. The ﬁ rst hypothesis I posit which needs to be 
tested by future research is: 
Actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio-
historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – will have a stronger 
positive effect on perceptions of ethnic competitive threat and hence on ethnic hostility in countries 
where ethnic hostility is more prevalent. 
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This is of course not to say that there will always be a trend towards more ethnic hostility 
within society; there are other factors inﬂ uencing such hostility (e.g. educational attainment, 
religiosity). Moreover, I just discussed results showing that acculturation to less hostile attitudes 
is easier than acculturation to more hostile attitudes, as long as the dominant social norm is 
one of social tolerance. Thus, in societies with a culture of tolerance there may very well be two 
counteracting self-strengthening mechanisms. 
Theoretical implications from Chapters 3 and 4
There was an important inconsistency between the results of Chapters 3 and 4, which I have not 
mentioned before explicitly. In Chapter 3, I found that for native Dutch with an educational degree 
below average, the size of the outgroup in the neighbourhood was positively related to opposition 
to ethnic intermarriage, in line with Ethnic Competition Theory. For the relatively higher educated 
this relationship was reversed, as could be expected given selective residential mobility. In sharp 
contrast, in Chapter 4 I found that for native Dutch the size of the outgroup is negatively related 
to rejection of neighbours from a different race, as would be expected on the basis of Contact 
Theory, but this negative relationship was weaker (not stronger) for the relative rich.7 
The two datasets used in Chapters 3 and 4 were collected after different sample 
selection procedures. The dataset used in Chapter 4, CV04, contained an oversampling of ‘bad 
neighbourhoods’, and compared to the dataset of Chapter 3, NKPS02, has far more respondents 
living in neighbourhoods with a substantial proportion of ethnic minorities. Hence, within the 
CV04, the actual relationship between outgroup size and ethnic hostility within neighbourhoods 
with relatively high proportions of ethnic minorities has more inﬂ uence on the estimated effect of 
outgroup size on indicators of ethnic hostility than within the NKPS02. I now expect the following 
hypotheses to hold: 
1a. When outgroup sizes start to increase (beginning with zero per cent), outgroup sizes within 
neighbourhoods will decrease levels of ethnic hostility for the rich and higher educated. 1b. 
After a certain threshold, outgroup sizes will start to reinforce ethnic hostility for the rich and 
higher educated. 
2a. When outgroup sizes start to increase (beginning with zero per cent), outgroup sizes within 
neighbourhoods will increase levels of ethnic hostility for the poor and lower educated. 2b. 
After a certain threshold, outgroup sizes will start to diminish ethnic hostility for the poor and 
low educated. 
Of course, these hypotheses have been induced from my results and not been theoretically 
deduced. This is because the relevant theories, Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory, 
are simpliﬁ cations of reality and do not take into account possible relevant conditional nonlinear 
relationships. A possible reason for this omission is that to theoretically deduce hypotheses – which 
I strongly adhere to – without formalised theoretical models is far more difﬁ cult with (conditional) 
nonlinear relationships. We thus need to formalise our theoretical frameworks. A nice example of a 
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formal sociological model is the Breen-Goldthorpe model, which I applied in Chapter 6. 
At what outgroup size this ‘certain threshold’, or tipping point, occurs ideally follows 
from this formalised model. It is however more likely that it has to be determined by empirical 
investigation. For example, Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) showed that the more ethnic minorities 
there are in one’s neighbourhood the more contact native Dutch have with ethnic minorities, at 
least as long as the proportion of ethnic minorities remains below 50 per cent. After this tipping 
point contact decreases again. But note that these authors do not take into account a possible 
conditional curvilinear relationship. Moreover, their sample of respondents from ‘concentration 
neighbourhoods’ is relatively small. Consequently, their predicted relationship between the 
presence of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood and contact of native Dutch with members of 
ethnic minority groups is likely to reﬂ ect more closely the actual relationship among the rich and 
higher educated than among the poor and lower educated. 
Contact with members of ethnic outgroups and selective residential mobility may 
explain a negative relationship between outgroup sizes within neighbourhoods and ethnic 
hostility, perceptions of ethnic threat may explain a positive relationship. Consequently, if the 
above propositions meet corroborative empirical evidence, these explanatory mechanisms operate 
differently for the rich and higher educated than for the poor and lower educated (see Figure 8.1). 
I expect that residential mobility is sooner a viable option for the rich than for the poor. The poor 
need a stronger push factor. I would also argue that the higher educated and rich will have relatively 
more positive contact experiences when outgroup sizes are small within the locality, compared 
to the lower educated and poor. The reason being that they are not in direct competition with 
members of ethnic outgroups and are as a consequence more likely to meet (or select) members 
of ethnic outgroups under favourable circumstances (shops, sportclubs, etc.). In contrast, the low 
educated and poor will start to experience competitive threat and negative contact experiences 
immediately with rising outgroup sizes. Once outgroup sizes reach a speciﬁ c threshold, the poor 
with negative views towards ethnic outgroups will start to leave their neighbourhoods as well. 
But the ones who remain may start to experience some positive contact experiences as well, which 
deteriorate their prior existing ethnic stereotypes. In contrast, with larger ethnic outgroup sizes, 
positive contact experiences will not become more likely for the rich and high educated, negative 
contact experiences will be harder to avoid, and as a consequence the threat mechanism may 
start to dominate the selective residential mobility and positive contact mechanism. A possible 
situation in agreement with this rationale is depicted in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1. Conditional curvilinear effects of outgroup size on ethnic hostility
Hostility reduction as a result of positive contact experiences, ethnic hostility formation 
due to perceptions of threat, and selective residential mobility only constitute a part of my 
explanation for the relationship between outgroup sizes within the locality and level of ethnic 
hostility. Considered on their own, Contact Theory and Ethnic Competition Theory would lead to 
contradictory hypotheses regarding the impact of ethnic outgroup sizes within the locality. To 
deduce contradictory hypotheses from established theoretical frameworks is something to strive 
for, since they commonly pinpoint where something in our understanding and our theories has 
gone awry. Empirically testing contradictory hypotheses normally shows us which theory is wrong 
and which one is right (or more wrong/right than the other). However, neither Ethnic Competition 
Theory nor Contact Theory is wrong – ‘just’ underspeciﬁ ed. Perceptions of threat will lead to 
more ethnic hostility, all else being equal. And under ceteris paribus conditions, positive contact 
experiences will lead to a reduction in ethnic hostility. Of course the problem is that larger 
outgroup sizes within the locality both induce perceptions of threat and increase the likelihood of 
positive contact experiences. Statements like ‘the more A the more B the more C’ should be made 
more informative (cf. Ultee, 1974): to what extent do larger outgroup sizes lead to perceptions of 
ethnic threat and positive contact experiences?, and to what extent do perceptions of threat and 
positive contact experience increase or decrease ethnic hostility? 
Moreover, I argue that Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory cannot be 
considered on their own, since levels of threat cannot be held constant with changing levels 
of contact experiences and vice versa; perceived threat and contact experiences affect one 
8. Conclusion | Theoretical implications for Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory: new questions
192
another. Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory should be incorporated into one formal 
theoretical framework. Note that an integration of the propositions of Contact Theory and Ethnic 
Competition Theory is not new. Stephan and Stephan integrated contact experiences and threat 
in their Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000); positive contact diminishes threat. 
And Robert Park already recognised and explicated within his assimilation theory that for actual 
competition between ethnic groups to exist there has to be (negative) contact between members 
of these groups (Park, 1950).8 It may be clear that residential mobility should also be taken into 
account within this new integrated and formalised theoretical framework. 
Thus following Chapters 3 and 4, I would argue that future research should investigate 
when (depending on ethnic outgroup sizes within the locale), for whom (the rich and the poor, 
the higher educated and the lower educated), to what extent and why the threat mechanisms 
and contact mechanisms come to the fore – ideally, guided by hypotheses deduced from a formal 
theoretical model that incorporates Ethnic Competition Theory, Contact Theory and selective 
residential mobility. 
8.3.2 Theoretical implications for Ethnic Competition Theory and Contact Theory from Part 2
In Chapter 7, I did not ﬁ nd corroborative evidence for the expectation derived from Ethnic 
Competition Theory that ethnic minorities who perceive group discrimination would be more 
opposed to ethnically mixed relationships and would more strongly identify with their country of 
origin. One could argue that perceptions of group discrimination are empirically and theoretically 
distinct from perceptions of ethnic-group threat measured by more traditional survey items such 
as ‘They take away our jobs’. I admit that future research should try to replicate my ﬁ ndings 
with these traditional operationalisations of perceptions of group threat. If these more classical 
measurements of group threat do lead to more ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities, the 
question becomes: why are perceptions of group discrimination not perceptions of ethnic group 
threat? And yet, I cannot see how discrimination could not lead to perceptions of ethnic group 
threat. I therefore want to propose a reﬁ nement of Ethnic Competition Theory instead. 
 Initially, the general proposition of Ethnic Competition Theory read: ‘The stronger the 
actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, socio-cultural or socio-
historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – the stronger the perceived 
ethnic threat, that in turn reinforces the mechanisms of social (contra-) identiﬁ cation, leading to 
stronger nationalistic and ethic exclusionistic attitudes.’ (Coenders, 2001, pp. 42-43). The ethnic 
outgroup poses a threat to the social position of the ethnic ingroup as a whole, but the outgroup 
is a stronger threat for individuals who hold similar social positions as the majority of outgroup 
members, since these individuals are more directly in competition with members of outgroups for 
scarce resources, according to Ethnic Competition Theory. The explandum has been generalised in 
subsequent publications, and Ethnic Competition Theory should in principle be able to explain all 
indicators of ethnic hostility and not only nationalistic and exclusionistic attitudes.9 
Ethnic Competition Theory however implicitly equates the ingroup with society’s dominant 
ethnic group. The social positions that are most directly in competition with members of outgroups 
were considered to be members with few resources (the lower educated, the unemployed and 
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manual labourers). However, higher educated ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are generally 
more directly in competition with natives than their lower educated counterparts but they also 
have more resources. It is therefore crucial to distinguish the effect of ‘a similar social position’ 
from the effect of resources on ethnic hostility. Chapter 7 shows that, in general, higher educated 
minorities experience more ethnic group threat (cf. Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2009). I now posit that: 
The positive effect of the actual competition between ethnic groups – induced by socio-economic, 
socio-cultural or socio-historical circumstances, whether at the individual or the contextual level – on 
perceived ethnic group threat will be stronger for individuals who hold similar social positions as the 
majority of outgroup members.
However, in Chapter 7, I did not ﬁ nd corroborative evidence that ethnic group threat is related to 
higher levels of ethnic hostility among minorities. It is likely that perceptions of ethnic (group) 
threat will be stronger related to ethnic hostility when they are experienced by individuals with 
few resources, since for them group interests will more directly further their self-interests and for 
them consequences of ethnic group competition will be more severe; a higher educated minority 
may end up in a job that does not match his/her ability due to group discrimination, but a low 
educated minority will end up unemployed. Thus: 
The positive effect of perceived ethnic threat on ethnic hostility will be stronger for individuals with 
fewer resources. 
8.4 RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 
This book shows that, next to static individual characteristics, taking into account social mobility 
experiences contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of ethnic hostility. Individuals 
acculturate to the attitudes typical of their social destination, yet acculturation is more likely to 
occur when these attitudes are in closer agreement with the tolerant societal norms. 
The neighbourhood and municipality people live in affect the salience of hostile attitudes 
towards ethnic outgroups among its residents. Neighbourhood poverty or a deteriorating socio-
economic status is fairly consistently related to more ethnic hostility and less social cohesion. An 
important null-ﬁ nding was that neither outgroup sizes nor ethnic diversity are consistently related 
to more ethnic hostility and less social cohesion. 
 Educational attainment is an important determinant of ethnic hostility among native 
or dominant populations in a society, but it is more weakly negatively related to indicators of 
ethnic hostility among ethnic minorities. To some extent this could be attributed to the unequal 
distribution of educational attainments across ethnic groups, but the salience of ethnic hostility 
among society’s dominant ethnic group is also likely to inﬂ uence the cultural integration of ethnic 
minorities and their ethnic hostility directed to the host country.
This book ended with new questions and testable propositions. Hopefully these questions 
and propositions will inspire new research. 
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8.5 NOTES
1. Diagonal Mobility Models (Hendrickx et al., 1993; Sobel, 1981, 1985) were applied in 
Chapter 2. Within these models, stable respondents, respondents who did not experience 
social mobility, are assumed to constitute the core of the respective social position and to 
express the characteristic attitudes of this social position. These core members function as a 
reference for the socially mobile. When speaking of a (more) tolerant social position, I refer 
to mean levels of ethnic hostility as expressed by these core members.
2. In my expectation I implicitly assumed that the threat mechanism dominates over the contact 
mechanism. If however the contact mechanism dominates, selective residential mobility would imply a 
stronger negative effect of relative outgroup size for the higher educated than for the lower educated. 
3. The estimated effect of the group size of the native Dutch on ethnic hostility is of course 
exactly the opposite as the estimated effect of the group size of non-natives.
4. According to Inglehart (1997), Modernisation Theory’s central claim is that economic, cultural 
and political change go together in coherent patterns. It is however not always clear what 
the deﬁ ning characteristics of modernisation theory are (Roxborough, 1988), Here I am only 
concerned with the proposition (not the theory) that industrialisation is accompanied by a 
trend from ascription to achievement.
5. Turks and Moroccans enrolled in higher education are a more selective group than native 
Dutch students. However, this cannot explain that Turks and Moroccans currently enrolled 
in higher education do not have higher expectations of success than native Dutch students. 
Granted, Turks and Moroccans probably need higher expectations of success in higher secondary 
education than native Dutch students before they decide to enrol in higher education. But if 
there were no effect of ethnicity on success probabilities, this would imply that their ability 
levels would be higher than native Dutch students as well, which they are not. Thus ethnicity 
affects success probabilities, although for reasons so far unknown. 
6. In Chapter 2, I also linked social stratiﬁ cation research to research with a focus on social 
cohesion. Here I related social mobility experiences to indicators of ethnic hostility.
7. It is not likely that this paradox can be attributed to the different indicators of ethnic 
hostility, opposition to ethnic intermarriage and opposition to a neighbour from a different 
race are closely related; both are expressions of the preferred social distance people want to 
keep between themselves and members of ethnic outgroups. It cannot be attributed either 
to the fact that I estimated a cross-level interaction with education and outgroup size in 
Chapter 3, and in Chapter 4 I reported a cross-level interaction with income. This interaction 
improved the model ﬁ t more than the cross-level interaction with education, but both went 
in the same direction and both were signiﬁ cant.
8. Only recently have negative contact experiences been receiving more attention (Jaspers, 2008).
9. In its original form, competition at the contextual level referred to the competition at the 
national level between a nation’s dominant ethnic group and ethnic outgroups. In Part 
1, Chapters 3 and 4, I investigated to what extent characteristics of neighbourhoods and 
municipalities affect ethnic hostility. The results were promising. The contextual level that 
Ethnic Competition Theory refers to may thus be understood as any geographical unit.
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APPENDIX 2.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS SOCON DATA SET
Mean or correlation a
Min. Max. Mean SD % Stereotypes Ethnic threat
Dependent variablesb
 Stereotype scale 0.00 4.00 1.54 0.75
 Ethnic threat scale 0.00 4.00 1.62 0.93
Mobility variablesc
Occupational destination
 Technocrats 22.79 1.37 1.34
 Socio-cultural specialists 16.66 1.18 1.18
 Routine non-manual occ. 27.69 1.45 1.57
 Small employers 4.98 1.71 1.64
 Manual sup. and skilled manual occ. 10.07 1.60 1.80
 Semi-unskilled man. occ. and farm lab. 17.81 1.63 1.86
Occupational origin
 Technocrats 21.33 1.35 1.41
 Socio-cultural specialists 8.08 1.35 1.29
 Routine non-manual occ. 10.88 1.34 1.36
 Small employers 20.38 1.54 1.54
 Manual sup. and skilled manual occ. 21.41 1.45 1.65
 Semi-unskilled man. occ. and farm lab. 17.92 1.56 1.72
Educational destination
 University 1.15 1.09
 College 1.24 1.20
 O and A levels 1.35 1.28
 Secondary vocational 1.50 1.59
 Lower secondary education 1.56 1.64
 Lower vocational or elementary school 1.67 1.89
Educational origin
 University 1.32 1.31
 College 1.32 1.35
 O and A levels 1.37 1.31
 Secondary vocational 1.38 1.38
 Lower secondary education 1.34 1.23
 Lower vocational or elementary school 1.51 1.64
Non-mobility independent variablesd
 Sex
   Male 50.00 1.48 1.49
   Female 50.00 1.40 1.56
 Church attendance 0.00 52.00 8.77 17.78 0.04 0.05
 Age 18.00 70.00 45.60 13.30 0.20 0.08
 Survey year
1995 28.82 1.37 1.38
2000 31.07 1.33 1.41
2005       40.11 1.58 1.72
a All ANOVA F-tests and Pearson’s correlations are signiﬁ cant at the α<0.10 signiﬁ cance level
b  Descriptives calculated for respondents who are included in either the occupational or educational 
 mobility analyses and with a valid score on the respective dependent variable.
c Descriptives calculated for respondents who are included in the respective mobility analyses 
 (occupational or educational) and with at least a valid score on one of the dependent variables
d Descriptives calculated for respondents who are included in one or more mobility analyses.
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APPENDIX 2.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS NKPS DATA SET 
 Mean or correlationa
Min. Max. Mean SD % Ethnic Intermarriage scale
Dependent variablesa
 Ethnic Intermarriage scale 0 12 6.67 3.04
Mobility variablesb
Occupational destination
 Technocrats 26.48 6.04
 Socio-cultural specialists 19.12 5.57
 Routine non-manual occ. 27.50 6.52
 Small employers 4.44 7.27
 Manual sup. and skilled manual occ. 7.94 6.89
 Semi-unskilled man. occ. and farm lab. 14.51 6.94
Occupational origin
 Technocrats 23.74 6.08
 Socio-cultural specialists 9.87 5.78
 Routine non-manual occ. 12.76 6.16
 Small employers 17.26 6.83
 Manual sup. and skilled manual occ. 20.99 6.44
 Semi-unskilled man. occ. and farm lab. 15.39 6.54
Educational destination
 University 10.69 5.53
 College 25.97 6.05
 O and A levels 7.50 6.36
 Secondary vocational 22.62 6.85
 Lower secondary education 11.36 7.06
 Lower vocational or elementary school 21.87 7.77
Educational origin
 University 4.92 5.48
 College 10.69 5.83
 O and A levels 5.96 6.42
 Secondary vocational 11.64 6.58
 Lower secondary education 11.11 6.37
 Lower vocational or elementary school 55.68 7.07
Non-mobility independent variablesc
 Sex
   Male 42.05 6.57
   Female 57.95 6.74
 Church attendance 0 70 9.484981 0.14
 Age   18 79 47.43752   0.22
a All ANOVA F-tests and Pearson’s correlations are signiﬁ cant at the α<0.10 signiﬁ cance level
b Descriptives calculated for respondents who are included in either the occupational or educational 
 mobility analyses and with a valid score on dependent variable.
c Descriptives calculated for respondents who are included in the respective mobility analyses 
 (occupational or  educational) and with a valid score on the dependent variables
d Descriptives calculated for respondents who are included in one or both mobility analyses.
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APPENDIX 2.3 MOBILITY TABLES
Mobility type: Occupational Mobility; Dependent variable: Stereotypes; Data source: SOCON
Respondent’s class
Father’s class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Technocrats
mean 1.42 1.15 1.45 1.86 1.35 1.75 1.41
SD 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.64 0.62 0.76 0.74
N 179 122 139 16 39 50 545
2. Socio-cultural specialists
mean 1.25 1.31 1.60 1.56 1.49 1.38 1.39
SD 0.67 0.66 0.60 0.93 0.69 0.84 0.68
N 51 69 54 9 7 17 207
3. Routine non-manual occupations
mean 1.44 1.21 1.48 1.56 1.75 1.51 1.43
SD 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.45 0.72 0.71 0.72
N 75 55 89 8 9 37 273
4. Small employers
mean 1.50 1.32 1.58 1.93 1.76 1.92 1.65
SD 0.67 0.63 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.70 0.73
N 98 62 148 55 44 102 509
5. Manual supervisors and skilled manual 
occupations
mean 1.41 1.11 1.59 1.84 1.78 1.64 1.55
SD 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.90 0.78 0.72 0.77
N 102 69 153 25 82 106 537
6. (Semi-)unskilled manual occupations
mean 1.51 1.39 1.51 2.01 1.83 1.95 1.68
SD 0.70 0.54 0.70 0.63 0.74 0.80 0.75
N 75 48 116 10 71 127 447
7. Total
mean 1.43 1.23 1.53 1.86 1.72 1.79 1.54
SD 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.75
N 580 425 699 123 252 439 2518
Mobility type: Occupational Mobility; Dependent variable: Ethnic threat; Data source: SOCON
Respondent’s class
Father’s class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Technocrats
mean 1.37 1.20 1.62 1.71 1.39 2.00 1.46
SD 0.76 0.85 0.98 0.97 0.73 1.01 0.90
N 178 123 141 17 38 47 544
2. Socio-cultural specialists
mean 1.16 1.20 1.71 1.56 1.75 1.09 1.35
SD 0.75 0.76 0.84 1.08 0.93 0.61 0.82
N 53 69 52 8 8 16 206
3. Routine non-manual occupations
mean 1.35 1.13 1.56 1.33 1.63 1.66 1.42
SD 0.86 0.63 0.88 1.20 0.92 0.84 0.85
N 77 55 90 9 8 38 277
4. Small employers
mean 1.35 1.36 1.60 1.88 2.05 2.00 1.68
SD 0.78 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.90
N 95 63 140 54 43 110 505
5. Manual supervisors and skilled manual 
occupations
mean 1.48 0.99 1.78 2.10 2.12 2.02 1.74
SD 0.80 0.75 0.94 1.02 0.97 0.94 0.97
N 103 69 156 24 82 108 542
6. (Semi-)unskilled manual occupations
mean 1.47 1.48 1.85 1.83 2.09 2.20 1.88
SD 0.75 0.67 0.94 1.06 0.91 0.98 0.93
N 78 49 113 9 70 124 443
7. Total mean 1.38 1.21 1.69 1.83 1.96 2.00 1.62
SD 0.78 0.77 0.92 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.92
N 584 428 692 121 249 443 2517
Continued on next page
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Appendix 2.3 continued
Mobility type: Occupational Mobility; Dependent variable: Ethnic intermarriage; Data source: NKPS
Respondent’s class
Father’s class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Technocrats
mean 5.74 5.52 6.62 7.08 5.95 7.04 6.08
SD 2.89 2.79 3.01 2.90 3.32 3.29 3.00
N 277 192 210 26 39 69 813
2. Socio-cultural specialists
mean 5.29 5.75 6.43 6.38 5.86 5.70 5.78
SD 2.86 3.09 2.41 4.60 3.59 2.32 2.90
N 105 111 80 8 14 20 338
3. Routine non-manual occupations
mean 6.02 5.45 6.55 6.20 7.24 6.07 6.16
SD 3.11 2.92 2.55 4.39 3.07 3.05 2.96
N 129 91 132 10 33 42 437
4. Small employers
mean 6.55 5.85 6.73 8.00 7.53 7.29 6.83
SD 3.12 2.65 2.72 3.34 2.98 2.88 2.98
N 142 91 160 66 38 94 591
5. Manual supervisors and skilled manual 
occupations
mean 6.42 5.46 6.25 7.14 7.14 6.88 6.44
SD 2.88 3.16 2.80 3.61 3.10 2.78 2.96
N 169 102 197 21 83 147 719
6. (Semi-)unskilled manual occupations
mean 6.42 5.38 6.55 6.19 6.78 7.19 6.54
SD 2.46 2.78 2.78 2.98 2.70 3.02 2.83
N 85 68 163 21 65 125 527
7. Total
mean 6.04 5.57 6.52 7.27 6.89 6.94 6.34
SD 2.94 2.89 2.76 3.43 3.07 2.95 2.96
N 907 655 942 152 272 497 3425
Mobility type: Educational Mobility; Dependent variable: Stereotypes; Data source: SOCON
Respondent’s education
Father’s education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. University
mean 1.24 1.26 1.88 1.46 2.20 1.00 1.36
SD 0.81 0.65 0.84 0.57 0.85 0.57 0.77
N 56 40 17 12 2 2 129
2. Professional college
mean 1.30 1.32 1.15 1.46 1.48 1.63 1.34
SD 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.83 0.72 0.65
N 47 87 26 35 12 9 216
3. O and A levels
mean 0.97 1.29 1.39 1.59 2.01 1.85 1.41
SD 0.74 0.72 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.92 0.76
N 30 53 29 24 17 14 167
4. Secondary vocational
mean 1.02 1.29 1.57 1.55 1.63 1.52 1.43
SD 0.66 0.73 0.91 0.66 0.67 0.86 0.74
N 25 66 20 90 20 21 242
5. Lower general secondary
mean 1.07 1.24 1.28 1.59 1.55 1.79 1.41
SD 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.84 0.65 0.75
N 28 66 36 57 35 26 248
6. Elementary school and lower vocational 
school
mean 1.25 1.31 1.41 1.58 1.67 1.92 1.65
SD 0.71 0.66 0.73 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.75
N 52 213 94 307 203 468 1337
7. Total
mean 1.18 1.29 1.41 1.56 1.67 1.89 1.54
SD 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.75
N 238 525 222 525 289 540 2339
Continued on next page
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Appendix 2.3 continued
Mobility type: Educational Mobility; Dependent variable: Ethnic threat; Data source: SOCON
Respondent’s education
Father’s education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. University
mean 1.22 1.18 1.59 1.77 2.75 1.50 1.33
SD 0.81 0.71 1.08 0.90 0.35 0.00 0.85
N 57 41 17 11 2 2 130
2. Professional college
mean 1.29 1.34 1.34 1.69 1.32 1.33 1.39
SD 0.84 0.87 0.62 0.89 0.84 0.71 0.84
N 46 87 25 36 11 9 214
3. O and A levels
mean 0.98 1.09 1.18 1.72 1.94 2.07 1.34
SD 0.81 0.75 0.83 0.88 0.93 1.07 0.91
N 30 55 28 25 16 14 168
4. Secondary vocational
mean 1.13 1.23 1.55 1.60 1.70 1.64 1.46
SD 0.73 0.79 1.15 0.84 0.78 0.73 0.85
N 26 66 19 86 20 22 239
5. Lower general secondary
mean 0.87 1.11 1.07 1.43 1.73 2.02 1.33
SD 0.85 0.73 0.71 0.76 0.80 0.70 0.82
N 27 65 36 56 35 25 244
6. Elementary school and lower vocational 
school
mean 1.10 1.28 1.43 1.72 1.84 2.10 1.76
SD 0.76 0.75 0.90 0.85 0.93 0.94 0.94
N 50 214 95 308 200 479 1346
7. Total
mean 1.13 1.24 1.35 1.67 1.81 2.06 1.60
SD 0.81 0.77 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.93 0.92
N 236 528 220 522 284 551 2341
Mobility type: Educational Mobility; Dependent variable: Ethnic intermarriage; Data source: NKPS
Respondent’s education
Father’s education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. University
mean 4.86 6.08 5.93 5.05 7.20 5.38 5.48
SD 3.37 2.88 2.81 3.33 1.64 4.60 3.19
N 111 96 28 22 5 8 270
2. Professional college
mean 5.72 5.71 5.35 5.97 7.13 7.32 5.83
SD 3.02 2.82 2.88 2.93 3.28 3.32 2.94
N 134 248 55 107 23 19 586
3. O and A levels
mean 5.69 6.38 7.00 6.44 7.12 5.73 6.42
SD 2.64 3.05 3.37 2.67 2.48 3.61 2.96
N 67 99 62 55 33 11 327
4. Secondary vocational
mean 6.08 6.11 6.49 6.91 6.90 7.55 6.58
SD 2.98 3.07 2.60 3.03 2.44 3.20 3.01
N 59 215 45 225 50 44 638
5. Lower general secondary
mean 5.39 5.86 6.63 6.66 6.94 7.32 6.37
SD 3.21 3.05 2.95 2.96 2.98 3.03 3.08
N 77 174 71 141 80 66 609
6. Elementary school and lower vocational 
school
mean 5.66 6.16 6.37 7.10 7.09 7.85 7.07
SD 2.74 2.95 3.01 2.89 2.77 2.91 2.97
N 138 592 150 690 432 1051 3053
7. Total
mean 5.53 6.05 6.36 6.85 7.06 7.77 6.69
SD 3.02 2.96 3.01 2.95 2.77 2.96 3.04
N 586 1424 411 1240 623 1199 5483
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APPENDIX 2.4 TUTORIAL DIAGONAL MOBILITY MODELS
********TUTORIAL Diagonal Mobility Models (DMM)******************
*********.
*********************************written by: Jochem 
Tolsma****************.
*********************************last modifi ed: 04-10-
08******************.
********INTRODUCTION********
This SPSS Tutorial on Diagonal Mobility Models (DMM) accompanies 
the publication: 
 
Tolsma, J., De Graaf, N.D. and L. Quillian. 2009 ‘Does Social 
Mobility affect Antagonistic Attitudes towards Ethnic Minorities?’, 
British Journal of Sociology, 60(2) 
In this tutorial I will illustrate how to estimate the Diagonal 
Mobility Models used in this paper with SPSS as well as some other 
common DMMs
You can run this script on the fi ctive dataset which is included in 
the electronic version of the tutorial, see www.jtolsma.nl.
 
I refer to the following publications for more background information 
on DMM:
 
Hendrickx, J., De Graaf, N D., Lammers, J., and Ultee, W. 1993 
‘Models for status inconsistency and mobility: a comparison of the 
approaches by Hope and Sobel with the mainstream square additive 
model’, Quality and Quantity, 27(4): 335-352
Sobel, M. E. 1981 ‘Diagonal Mobility Models: A Substantively 
Motivated Class of Designs for the Analysis of Mobility Effects’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 46(6): 893-906
Sobel, M. E. 1985 ‘Social Mobility and Fertility Revisited: Some 
New Models for the Analysis of the Mobility Effects Hypothesis’, 
American Sociological Review, 50(5): 699-712
Weakliem, D. L. 1992 ‘Does Social Mobility Affect Political 
Behaviour?’, European Sociological Review, 8(2): 153-166
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The major SPSS commands used in this tutorial are “NLR” and “CNLR”, 
I refer to SPSS’ command syntax reference for a detailed overview 
of these command.
*This tutorial has the following sections:
*INTRODUCTION*.
*MEANS AND OLS*.
*DMM WITH NLR.
 *BASIC MODEL.
 *MODEL WITH COVARIATES.
 *MODEL WITH ORIGIN AND DESTINATION DEPENDENT ACCULTURATION 
EFFECTS.
  *status dominance model.
  *depY dominance model. 
 *MODEL WITH MOBILITY EFFECTS INDEPENDENT OF ORIGIN AND 
DESTINATION.
 *ORIGIN OR DESTINATION DEPENDENT SALIENCE PARAMETERs.
 *WEAKLIEM MODEL. 
*DMM WITH CNLR.
 *ADDING CONTRAINTS.
 *LOGISTIC DMMs.
*****************************************************************
*********.
*In this tutorial I suppose that:
*”depY” is your (normally distributed) dependent variable (for 
example, let depY represent tolerance. The higher the value of depY 
the more tolerant attitudes people hold towards ethnic migrants).
*”origin” is the variable that refers to the social origin (for 
example father’s social class or fi rst occupation of respondent or 
spouse’s social class).
*”destination” is the variable that refers to the social destination 
(for example respondent’s social class or current occupation of 
respondent).
*both the origin and destination consist of six categories, we thus 
have a 6 by 6 table with 6 diagonal cells (d1 to d6).
*”cov” is a covariate (for example church attendance a year).
*The examples below make use of the fi ctive dataset included in the 
electronic version of this tutorial (see www.jtolsma.nl)
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*********MEANS and OLS***********.
*let us fi rst have a look at the data.
MEANS
  TABLES=depY BY destination  BY origin
  /CELLS MEAN STDDEV COUNT .
*This is of course similar to an OLS regression analyses in which 
we defi ned every cell of the destination by origin table.
*make the 36 dummies for combinations of origin and destination: 
fi rst origin then destination. 
do repeat x=0 to 35 / y=orides1 to orides36.
if origin eq (1+ trunc((x)/6)) & destination=( 1 + ((x) - 
(trunc((x)/6))*6)) y=1.
if not ((origin eq (1+ trunc((x)/6))) & (destination=( 1 + ((x) - 
(trunc((x)/6))*6))))  y=0.
end repeat.
exe.
REGRESSION
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
  /NOORIGIN
  /DEPENDENT depY
  /METHOD=ENTER orides2 orides3 orides4 orides5 orides6 orides7 
orides8 orides9 orides10 orides11 orides12 orides13 orides14
  orides15 orides16 orides17 orides18 orides19 orides20 orides21 
orides22 orides23 orides24 orides25 orides26 orides27 orides28
  orides29 orides30 orides31 orides32 orides33 orides34 orides35 
orides36 .
*Do you already see mobility effects in our fi ctive dataset? I 
don’t. 
*Unfortunately, there is nothing in between the square additive 
model above and the model with main effects only.
*Why? See the papers referred to above. 
*For completeness lets estimate the OLS regression model with main 
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effects only:.
*Of course we need to make dummies of our origin and destination 
variables.
do repeat x=1 to 6 / y=ori1 to ori6 /z=des1 to des6.
if origin eq x y=1.
if not (origin eq x) y=0.
if destination eq x z=1.
if not (destination eq x) z=0.
end repeat.
exe.
REGRESSION
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
  /NOORIGIN
  /DEPENDENT depY
  /METHOD=ENTER  ori2 ori3 ori4 ori5 ori6 des2 des3 des4 des5 
des6.
*********DMM with NLR*********************.
*Model 1: BASIC MODEL. 
*The parameters that are going to be estimated are defi ned together 
with their starting values in the MODEL PROGRAM command.
*Remember that our social category has 6 categories, we thus have 
6 diagonal cells.
*The diagonal cells d1 to d6 receive the starting value “2” in this 
example, normally you could choose to use the grand mean of depY in 
your sample as starting value.
*p is the salience parameter.
*Our null hypothesis is that the origin does not have any impact on 
depY hence we give p the starting value “0”.
MODEL PROGRAM p=0 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=p*d(origin) + (1-p)*d(destination).
NLR depY.
*interpretation: 
*We have to refute our hypotheses that the origin does not have an 
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impact on depY. 
*The relative impact of the origin is approximately p*100% and of 
the destination thus (1-p)*100%. 
*Note also that our social categories (social class or educational 
level for example) has an non-linear effect on depY.
*Model 2: MODEL WITH COVARIATES.
*adding covariates to the model is fairly straightforward: you 
have to defi ne the parameter to be estimated and include it in the 
equation for PRED.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.5 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2 bcov=0.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=p*d(origin) + (1-p)*d(destination) + bcov*cov.
NLR depY.
*interpretation:
*The interpretation of the parameter estimate of bcov is exactly 
the same as within OLS regression models. 
*Since we assume that the standard errors of our dependent variable 
are distributed normally, the improvement of fi t between models 
can be calculated by a standard F-test (See for example Greene 
Econometric Analysis Chapter 6 “Inference and Prediction”).
*MODELS WITH ACCULTURATION EFFECTS.
*Model 3: status dominance model.
*Assume that the higher the origin/destination the higher the 
status. 
*We want to test the status dominance hypotheses: that the impact 
of the highest status - whether origin or destination - will have 
the largest impact on depY.
*We thus need to calculate the impact for the origin/destination if 
its the highest status and if it is the lowest status. 
*We create a dummy “hso” that is 0 if the destination has a higher 
status than the origin and 1 otherwise.
*Formally our hypotheses is that p+bhso>(1-(p+bhso)) and 1-p>p, 
thus 0.5 - b < p < 0.5
compute hso=(origin>destination). 
value labels hso 1 ‘origin highest status’ 0 ‘destination highest 
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status’. 
MODEL PROGRAM p=.5 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2 bcov=0 bhso=0.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=(p + bhso*hso)*d(origin) + (1-(p+ bhso*hso))*d(desti
nation) + bcov*cov.
NLR depY.
*Interpretation:
*Based only on the estimate of bhso we directly see that we have 
to refute our hypotheses.
*The correct F-statistic to test that p<0.5 & p + b> 0.5 is 
described in for example Greene Econometric Analysis Chapter 6 
“Inference and Prediction”  
*Model 4: DepY dominance model.
*Our next hypotheses is that it is easier to acculturate to less 
tolerant norms. Thus the impact of origin/destination depends on 
which one could be characterised as being more tolerant.
*In our article we have exactly the opposite hypotheses, this is 
just a hypotheses to illustrate the point.
*The assumption within DMM is that stable members represent the 
reference attitudes of each category (diagonal mobility models are 
also referred to as diagonal reference models). 
*We thus defi ne tolerance on the basis of the attitudes of the stable 
members.
*The mean attitudes of the stable members (the diagonal cells in 
our table) are parameters in our model. 
*The defi nition of the dummy is thus somewhat more complicated since 
it depends on the parameter estimates of the model.
*dtol is our tolerance dummy and formal hypotheses is that 
dtol<0.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.5 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2 bcov=0 bdtol=0.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE dtol=(d(origin)>d(destination)).
COMPUTE PRED=(p + bdtol*dtol)*d(origin) + (1-(p+ bdtol*dtol))*d(d
estination) + bcov*cov.
NLR depY.
*Interpretation:
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*The impact of the destination is larger when it is the less 
tolerant category than when it is the more tolerant category: btol 
larger.
*We thus fi nd corroborative evidence of our (fi ctive) hypotheses.
*MODEL WITH MOBILITY EFFECTS INDEPENDENT OF ORIGIN AND 
DESTINATION.
*It is of course possible that mobility has an effect independent 
of the origin and destination.
*For example, our hypotheses could be that everyone who is 
downwards mobile experiences the same kind of frustration and that 
this frustration in turn leads to less tolerance towards ethic 
migrants. 
*We have to compute a downwards mobility parameter, but we already 
did this above when testing the status dominance parameter, the 
variable “hso”.
*Model 5: downwards mobility model.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.5 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2 bcov=0 bdm=0.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=(p )*d(origin) + (1-(p))*d(destination) + bcov*cov + 
bdm*hso.
NLR depY.
*Interpretation:
*We fi nd corroborative evidence for our hypotheses.
*Downwards mobility does not cause people to adopt the attitudes of 
the highest (or lowest!) status category but has a negative effect 
on tolerance independent of origin and destinations.
*check if this also holds if we include the downwards mobility 
dummy in model 4. 
*Model 6: combi of model 4 and 5.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.5 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2 bcov=0 bdtol=0 
bdm=0.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE dtol=(d(origin)>d(destination)).
COMPUTE PRED=(p + bdtol*dtol)*d(origin) + (1-(p+ bdtol*dtol))*d(de
stination) + bcov*cov + bdm*hso.
NLR depY.
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*Interpretation:
*What we see now is that the impact of the origin/destination does 
not depend signifi cantly anymore on which one contains the more 
tolerant core members.
*for a two by two table it can be shown that model 3 and 5 are 
mathematically equivalent. 
*It is thus sometimes diffi cult (depending on the mobility taking 
place / and the ‘real’ effects going on) to empirically distinguish 
mobility effects which are due to origin and destination dependent 
acculturation
and mobility effects that are independent of origins and 
destinations.
*ORIGIN OR DESTINATION DEPENDENT SALIENCE PARAMETERS.
*It is of course possible that the impact of the origin varies 
across origin categories (for example due to different sizes of 
categories).
*We may want to calculated origin dependent salience parameters.
*model 7: DM1 model.
MODEL PROGRAM p1=.5 p2=.5 p3=.5 p4=.5 p5=.5 p6=.5 
d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2.
vector d = d1 to d6.
vector p = p1 to p6.
COMPUTE PRED=(p(origin))*d(origin) + (1-p(origin))*d(destination)
.
NLR depY.
*interpretation:
*We see that origin category 3 has the largest impact of all origin 
categories (regardless of the destination category).
*Once again we have to use the... statistic to assess if differences 
between two categories are signifi cant. 
*or we may want to calculate destination dependent salience 
parameters. 
*model 8: DM2 model.
MODEL PROGRAM p1=.5 p2=.5 p3=.5 p4=.5 p5=.5 p6=.5 
d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2.
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vector d = d1 to d6.
vector p = p1 to p6.
COMPUTE PRED=(p(destination))*d(origin) + (1-p(destination))*d(de
stination).
NLR depY.
*WEAKLIEM MODEL. 
*It is also possible to formulate a parsimonious model for origin/
destination weights that depend on the specifi c origin-destination 
combination. 
* We defi ne the origin weight as: f*p(origin)/(f*p(origin) + 
p(destination)).
* We use the following constraint: p(6)=p1*p2*p3*p4*p5.
MODEL PROGRAM p1=1 p2=1 p3=1 p4=1 p5=1 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 
d6=2 f=1.
vector d = d1 to d6.
vector p= p1 to p5. 
do if (not origin=6 & not destination=6).
COMPUTE PRED=(f*p(origin)/(f*p(origin) + p(destination)))*d(origi
n) + (1-(f*p(origin)/(f*p(origin) + p(destination))))*d(destinati
on).
end if. 
do if (origin=6 & not destination=6).
COMPUTE PRED=(f*(1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5))/(f*(1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5)) + 
p(destination)))*d(origin) + (1-(f*(1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5))/(f*(1/
(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5)) + p(destination))))*d(destination).
end if. 
do if (not origin=6 & destination=6).
COMPUTE PRED=(f*p(origin)/(f*p(origin) + (1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5))))*d
(origin) + (1-(f*p(origin)/(f*p(origin) + (1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5)))))
*d(destination) .
end if. 
do if (origin=6 & destination=6).
COMPUTE PRED=(f*(1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5))/(f*(1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5)) + (1/
(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5))))*d(origin) + (1-(f*(1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5))/(f*(1/
(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5)) + (1/(p1*p2*p3*p4*p5)))))*d(destination) .
end if. 
NLR depY.
*Interpretation:
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*Based on the parameter estimates and the fi t of the model I would 
conclude that the Weakliem model is not an improvement compared to 
model 4 and 5.
*How to interpret to f and p parameters if the model would fi t our 
data is another matter. See for example the paper of D. Weakliem 
referred to above. 
*DMM WITH CNLR.
*ADDING CONTRAINTS.
*The origin and destination weighs should theoretically lie 
within the [0,1] interval, but sometimes the data does not fi t the 
theoretical model perfectly
and obtained estimates of parameters are not theoretically 
possible.
*It could for example be that under specifi c circumstances the 
relative impact of origin/destination is (close to) zero but is 
estimated to be smaller than zero. 
*You could force/constrain your (unsound) model to stay within the 
theoretical boundaries as follows. 
*fi rst let us create a new variable to illustrate the point. 
do if origin>destination.
compute depY2=depY + rv.normal(3,1).
end if.
do if not (origin>destination).
compute depY2=depY.
end if.
exe. 
*without bonds our model would be:.
*model 8:.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.3 d1=2 d2=1.9 d3=2.1 d4=2.2 d5=2.1 d6=2.2.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=(p)*d(origin) + (1-(p))*d(destination).
CNLR depY2.
*note that without the constraints and given our initial values of 
the parameter estimates, our model would not even converge (after 
50 iterations). 
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*and with constraints our model would be:
*model 9:.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.3 d1=2 d2=1.9 d3=2.1 d4=2.2 d5=2.1 d6=2.2.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=(p)*d(origin) + (1-(p))*d(destination).
CONSTRAINED FUNCTIONS.
COMPUTE w=p.
CNLR depY2
/BOUNDS 0<=w<=1.
*The interpretation of model 8 and 9 would be that we know that we 
have a bad model but that our best educated guess is that only the 
origin matters.
*Of course our model was ill specifi ed. 
*A better model would be (seen what we have done to create 
depY2):
*model 10:.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.3 d1=2 d2=1.9 d3=2.1 d4=2.2 d5=2.1 d6=2.2 b_
ill=0.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE dtol=(d(origin)>d(destination)).
COMPUTE PRED=(p)*d(origin) + (1-(p))*d(destination) + b_ill*hso.
CONSTRAINED FUNCTIONS.
COMPUTE w=p.
CNLR depY2
/BOUNDS 0<=w<=1.
*LOGISTIC DMMs.
*To estimate DMMs for variables that are not normally distributed 
you have to defi ne a LOSS function to be minimalised by CNLR. 
*Below follows an example of a dichotomous variable.
compute depY3=(depY>=6).
fre depy3.
MODEL PROGRAM p=.5 d1=2 d2=2 d3=2 d4=2 d5=2 d6=2.
vector d = d1 to d6.
COMPUTE PRED=exp(p*d(origin) + (1-p)*d(destination))/
(1+exp(p*d(origin) + (1-p)*d(destination))).
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COMPUTE LOSS=-depy3*ln(pred)-(1-depy3)*ln(1-pred).
CNLR depY3
/LOSS=LOSS.
*****************************************************************
*********.
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APPENDIX 3.2  HIERARCHICAL LINEAR INTERCEPT MODELS ESTIMATING OPPOSITION TO ETHNIC INTERMARRIAGE (0-12), CROSS LEVEL 
INTERACTIONS, NI=6095
A
Model 1 Model 2
b  SE b  SE
Neighbourhood characteristics
percentage of ethnic minorities 0.00 0.01
change in percentage of ethnic minorities 0.00 0.02
socio-economic disadvantage -0.02 0.04
change in socio-economic disadvantage 0.14 0.06
Cross-level interactions 
education* percentage of ethnic minorities*10 -0.02* 0.01
Municipality characteristics
percentage of ethnic minorities*10 -0.15~ 0.09
change in percentage of ethnic minorities 0.07 0.07
socio-economic disadvantage -0.07* 0.04
change in socio-economic disadvantage 0.12* 0.04
Cross-level interactions
Education*percentage of ethnic minorities*10 -0.01 0.01
Variance components
Municipality 0.08* 0.04 0.03 0.03
Neighbourhood 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Individual 8.15* 0.15  8.17* 0.15
*p<0.05; ~p<0.10 (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
a controlled for individual-level characteristics
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APPENDIX 3.3  OPPOSITION TO ETHNIC INTERMARRIAGE WITH SPECIFIC ETHNIC OUTGROUPS  (SCALES 0-4), CONTEXT CHARACTERISTICS  
NI=6095A
Opposition to ethnic intermarriage with Moroccans 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b  SE b  SE B  SE
Neighbourhood characteristics
socio-economic disadvantage 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
change in socio-economic disadvantage
relative inwards moving mobility*10 -0.03* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Municipality characteristics
percentage of ethnic minorities*10 -0.04 0.03
change in percentage of ethnic 
minorities
0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
percentage of Moroccans*10 -0.14 0.09 -0.14 0.09
percentage of Turks*10 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.09
percentage of Surinamese*10 0 0.08 0.01 0.09
socio-economic disadvantage -0.02~ 0.02 -0.03~ 0.02 -0.03~ 0.02
change in socio-economic disadvantage 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 0.01
relative inwards-moving mobility*10 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01
Opposition to ethnic intermarriage with Turks (scales 0-4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b  SE b  SE b  SE
Neighbourhood characteristics
socio-economic disadvantage 0.01 0.02 0.03~ 0.02 0.01 0.02
change in socio-economic disadvantage
relative inwards moving mobility*10 0.04* 0.02 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01
Municipality characteristics
percentage of ethnic minorities*10 -0.02 0.03
change in percentage of ethnic 
minorities
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
percentage of Moroccans*10 -0.12 0.09 -0.11 0.09
percentage of Turks*10 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.09
percentage of Surinamese*10 0 0.08 0.05 0.09
socio-economic disadvantage -0.04* 0.02 -0.04* 0.01 -0.05* 0.02
change in socio-economic disadvantage 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.04* 0.02
 relative inwards-moving mobility*10 0.01 0.01  0  0.01  0  0
Opposition to ethnic intermarriage with Surinamese
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
p  SE p  SE p  SE
Neighbourhood characteristics
socio-economic disadvantage 0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.01
change in socio-economic disadvantage
relative inwards moving mobility*10 -0.02* 0 -0.02* 0.01 -0.02* 0.01
Municipality characteristics
percentage of ethnic minorities*10 -0.04~ 0.03
change in percentage of ethnic 
minorities
0.04~ 0.02 0.04~ 0.02
percentage of Moroccans*10 -0.11 0.09 -0.11 0.09
percentage of Turks*10 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09
percentage of Surinamese*10 0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.09
socio-economic disadvantage -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
change in socio-economic disadvantage 0.03~ 0.01 0.03~ 0.01 0.03* 0.01
 relative inwards-moving mobility*10 0  0  0  0.01  0  0.01
*p<0.05; ~p<0.10 (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
 controlled for individual-level characteristics
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APPENDIX 4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS    
N Range
Percentage 
(categorical 
variables)
Mean (interval 
variables)
Standard 
deviation
Dependent variables
Contact neighbours (times per year) 2746 0 - 78 44.85 32.40
Tolerance neighbours different race (It would 
bother me=1; not oppose=4)
2903 0 - 4 2.35 0.85
Generalised trust (people can be trusted=1) 2871 0 - 1 53
Voluntary work (volunteer=1) 2716 0 - 1 41
Independent variables at the individual level 2949
Age 16 - 99 47.89 17.89
Education (in years) 6 - 16.5 11.00 3.12
Missing values education 7
Sex (male=1) 47
Income (in 1000 euros) 0.4 - 10 2.10 1.14
Missing values income 21
Working status
 Employed 55
 Not employed 45
Health status (healthy=4) 1 - 4 2.87 0.77
Missing values health status 1
Denomination
 No denomination 62
 Catholic 18
 Liberal Protestants 7
 Orthodox Protestants 4
 Islam 3
 Other religion 5
Church attendance (times per year) 0 - 53 9.20 17.19
Household composition
 Single without 27
 Married with children 32
 Married without children 23
 Cohabiting with children 4
 Cohabiting without children 6
 Single with children 7
 Other household composition 2
Ethnicity
 Native Dutch 75
 Turks  2
 Moroccans 1
 Surinamese 2
 Antilleans 1
 Indonesion 3
 Other 8
 Refusal 9
Independent variables at the neighbourhood 
level
503
Ethnic heterogeneity (maximum 
heterogeneity=0.67)
0.04 - 0.60 0.30 0.15
 Native Dutch (%) 10.40 - 98.13 0.79 0.16
 Western immigrants (%) 1.05 - 29.83 0.09 0.04
 Non-western immigrants (%) 0 - 86.54 0.12 0.15
Continued on next page
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Appendix 4.1 continued
Economic heterogeneity (maximum 
heterogeneity=1)
0.06 - 0.30 0.13 0.03
Mean income (in 1000 euros) 1.31 - 4.46 1.97 0.37
Crime (Zscore) -0.43 - 1.53 0.06 0.35
 Victims of burglary (per 1000 respondents) 0 - 333.33 63.19 60.39
 Recorded offences (per 1000 residents) 0 - 3275 277.85 281.81
 Criminal suspects (per 1000 residents) 0 - 117 36.37 17.89
Residential mobility (per 1000 residents) 30.00 - 248.60 0.03 0.16
Independent variables at the municipality level 245
Ethnic heterogeneity (maximum 
heterogeneity=0.67)
0.04 - 0.59 0.23 0.11
 Native Dutch (%) 52 - 98 0.86 0.08
 Western immigrants (%) 1 - 30 0.07 0.04
 Non-western immigrants (%) 1 - 35 0.06 0.05
Economic heterogeneity (maximum 
heterogeneity=1)
0.10 - 0.34 0.14 0.03
Mean income (in 1000 euros) 1.47 - 3.34 1.96 0.27
Crime (Zscore) -1.70 - 4.18 0.35 1.14
 Victims of burglary (per 1000 respondents) 0 - 242.42 54.50 35.81
 Recorded offences (per 1000 residents) 0.35 - 815.97 233.56 135.27
 Criminal suspects (per 1000 residents) 13.09 - 60.11 28.86 7.94
Residential mobility (per 1000 residents)  48.00 - 170.50  85.79 21.49
Appendix
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APPENDIX 4.2 CORRELATIONS BETWEEN LOCALITY CHARACTERISTICSA  
Neighbourhood level (N=503) 1 2 3 4 5
1. Ethnic heterogeneity - 0.15 -0.14  0.42  0.64
2. Economic heterogeneity -  0.54  0.18  0.15
3. mean income - -0.03 -0.28
4. crime -  0.42
5. residential mobility -
Municipality level (N=245)
1. Ethnic heterogeneity - 0.55  0.25  0.77  0.67
2. Economic heterogeneity -  0.67  0.47  0.39
3. mean income -  0.19 -0.15
4. crime -  0.65
5. residential mobility -
a  all correlations signiﬁ cant at the α<0.05 level (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
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APPENDIX 4.3 VARIANCE COMPONENTS OF HIERARCHICAL RANDOM INTERCEPT REGRESSION MODELS EXPLAINING SOCIAL COHESION
Contact neighbours
Tolerance 
neighbours 
different race
Generalised trust Voluntary work
b se b se b se b se
Empty model
Municipality-level 14.31** 1.67 0.05** 0.00 0.05** 0.01 0.15** 0.03
Neighbourhood-level 14.51** 2.49 0.03** 0.00 0.22** 0.05 0.09** 0.03
Individual-level 1018.50** 1.03 0.64** 0.04
Model controlled for composition effectsa
Municipality-level 4.24 3.07 0.04** 0.00 0.05** 0.02 0.07** 0.02
Neighbourhood-level 14.11** 2.45 0.02** 0.00 0.09** 0.03 0.07** 0.03
Individual-level 977.61** 1.03 0.61** 0.04
Full modelb
Municipality-level 2.49 8.24 0.03** 0.00 0.03* 0.01 0.01~ 0.01
Neighbourhood-level 16.16** 2.26 0.02** 0.00 0.07** 0.03 0.07** 0.03
Individual-level 971.98** 1.03 0.61** 0.04
~  p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01  (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
a  Individual level characteristics included: age, sex, marital status, household composition, level of education, 
level of income, work status, 
health status, denomination, church attendance, and ethnic origin. 
b  Models include all individual level characteristics, for the included locality characteristics and cross-level 
interactions we refer to Table 2.
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APPENDIX 5.2 CELL FREQUENCIES OF ETHNICITY BY COHORT BY FINAL EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT TABLEA
  Final Educational Attainment
<PE PE LBO MAVO MBO
HAVO/
VWO HBO University Total
Turks Cohort 1917-1936 283 148 7 2 0 0 1 0 441
1937-1946 652 705 24 50 17 13 4 1 1466
1947-1956 565 834 41 114 63 44 30 17 1708
1957-1966 485 1321 190 362 213 210 79 42 2902
1967-1980 158 477 137 152 160 131 60 32 1307
Total 2143 3485 399 680 453 398 174 92 7824
Moroccans Cohort 1917-1936 571 40 2 1 1 0 1 0 616
1937-1946 1239 235 12 27 8 11 7 3 1542
1947-1956 1039 355 30 71 26 33 22 10 1586
1957-1966 934 588 92 110 74 117 55 72 2042
1967-1980 214 333 100 73 154 67 56 36 1033
Total 3997 1551 236 282 263 228 141 121 6819
Surinamese Cohort 1917-1936 207 231 28 60 25 10 34 9 604
1937-1946 167 238 79 178 101 13 83 19 878
1947-1956 196 439 196 394 264 61 203 52 1805
1957-1966 119 522 370 476 391 177 209 88 2352
1967-1980 22 119 164 129 207 93 86 42 862
Total 711 1549 837 1237 988 354 615 210 6501
Antilleans Cohort 1917-1936 52 106 19 35 15 4 21 11 263
1937-1946 61 163 83 83 43 28 51 15 527
1947-1956 58 188 209 158 153 49 89 41 945
1957-1966 86 277 299 169 264 135 158 80 1468
1967-1980 21 72 105 69 116 61 105 60 609
Total 278 806 715 514 591 277 424 207 3812
Native Dutch Cohort 1917-1936 33 464 261 139 379 29 127 42 1474
1937-1946 9 227 279 119 429 26 176 67 1332
1947-1956 5 232 325 134 637 52 305 136 1826
1957-1966 6 132 288 118 747 109 341 156 1897
1967-1980 1 34 100 43 356 44 170 88 836
 Total 54 1089 1253 553 2548 260 1119 489 7365
a N=32322; native Dutch weighted; students included; respondents younger than 25 excluded
Source: SPVA 1988, 1991, 1998, 2002. 
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APPENDIX 5.3 ROBUSTNESS OF ES ASSOCIATION PARAMETERSA
 EC SC ES (Model M2)
EC SC ES ESC(1) 
(Model M3) Saturated model
Etnicityb
Final educational 
attainmentc ES z-value ES z-value ES z-value
Turks <PE 4.90** 38.01 4.75** 25.02 4.67** 23.91
Moroccans <PE 5.89** 45.60 5.74** 30.18 5.52** 28.55
Surinamese <PE 3.13** 24.30 2.9** 15.28 2.74** 14.65
Antilleans <PE 2.70** 19.86 2.53** 13.04 2.38** 12.52
Turks PE 1.70** 36.77 1.87** 31.89 1.93** 21.54
Moroccans PE 1.25** 24.81 1.34** 20.79 1.31** 14.55
Surinamese PE 0.48** 10.53 0.49** 9.26 0.49** 8.48
Antilleans PE 0.31** 6.09 0.29** 4.96 0.31** 4.80
Turks LBO -1.18** -19.62 -1.28** -14.53 -0.94** -8.15
Moroccans LBO -1.38** -19.47 -1.55** -13.74 -1.30** -8.67
Surinamese LBO -0.65** -13.53 -0.72** -12.72 -0.68** -10.85
Antilleans LBO -0.34** -6.77 -0.34** -5.91 -0.42** -6.17
Turks MAVO 0.33** 5.37 0.28** 3.64 0.15 1.07
Moroccans MAVO -0.21** -2.93 -0.11 -1.14 -0.28 -1.63
Surinamese MAVO 0.64** 11.97 0.65** 11.23 0.60** 9.43
Antilleans MAVO 0.23** 3.78 0.25** 3.77 0.26** 3.68
Turks MBO -1.91** -34.50 -1.94** -22.83 -2.15** -8.17
Moroccans MBO -2.15** -32.37 -2.63** -20.25 -2.20** -12.45
Surinamese MBO -1.29** -29.79 -1.26** -24.42 -1.27** -21.63
Antilleans MBO -1.34** -26.86 -1.34** -22.45 -1.40** -19.8
Turks HAVO/VWO 0.11 1.39 0.2~ 1.76 0.06 0.21
Moroccans HAVO/VWO -0.13 -1.51 0.24~ 1.94 -0.02 -0.06
Surinamese HAVO/VWO -0.13~ -1.72 -0.19* -1.96 -0.09 -0.87
Antilleans HAVO/VWO 0.08 0.93 0.18~ 1.84 0.15 1.24
Turks HBO -2.0** -25.47 -2.01** -16.76 -1.89** -10.04
Moroccans HBO -1.9** -22.20 -1.83** -13.99 -1.67** -9.22
Surinamese HBO -0.92** -17.63 -0.76** -13.23 -0.75** -12.00
Antilleans HBO  -0.83** -14.24  -0.8** -11.86  -0.69** -9.65
** p<0.01 * p<0.05; ~ p<0.10 (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
a N=32322, native Dutch weighted. 
b Native Dutch are reference category.
c Deviation contrast, university is redundant category
Source: SPVA 1988, 1991, 1998, 2002.
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APPENDIX 5.4  MULTI-NOMINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE AFTER PRIMARY EDUCATION, BIRTH COHORTS 1960-1985AB
Model C
LBO/stop MAVO/LBO
(HAVO+VWO)
/MAVO 
ß p ß p ß p
Constant 2.50** 0.00 1.49** 0.00 1.01** 0.00
Ethnicity
  Turks (1st  generation) -4.97** 0.00 1.38** 0.00 -0.42~ 0.09
  Turks (2nd  generation) -1.69** 0.00 -0.03 0.94 -0.17 0.71
  Moroccans (1st  generation) -4.09** 0.00 0.89** 0.00 0.15 0.63
  Moroccans (2nd  generation) -1.54* 0.01 1.03* 0.01 -0.42 0.39
  Surinamese (1st  generation) -2.17** 0.00 1.09** 0.00 -1.39** 0.00
  Surinamese (2nd  generation) -1.09* 0.04 0.70** 0.01 -0.24 0.36
  Antilleans (1st  generation) -1.86** 0.00 0.29 0.11 -0.46* 0.02
  Antilleans (2nd  generation) -1.38~ 0.06 0.56 0.11 0.40 0.19
Cohort (birth year 1960=0)c -1.21** 0.00 0.44** 0.00 -0.02 0.85
  Cohort*Turks (1st  generation) 2.18** 0.00 -0.76** 0.00 0.18 0.40
  Cohort*Turks (2nd  generation) 0.94* 0.01 0.26 0.28 -0.10 0.69
  Cohort*Moroccans (1st  generation) 1.76** 0.00 -0.52* 0.02 -0.21 0.41
  Cohort*Moroccans (2nd  generation) 0.73~ 0.06 -0.23 0.36 0.01 0.96
  Cohort*Surinamese (1st  generation) 1.49** 0.00 -0.72** 0.00 0.41* 0.02
  Cohort* Surinamese (2nd  generation) 0.77* 0.03 -0.16 0.43 -0.17 0.35
  Cohort*Antilleans (1st  generation) 1.15** 0.00 -0.29 0.12 0.15 0.41
  Cohort*Antilleans (2nd  generation) 1.42* 0.01 -0.22 0.41 -0.36 0.12
Male (Female=ref.cat.) 0.35 0.39 -0.15 0.38 0.10 0.55
  Male*Cohort 0.00 0.99 -0.26 0.13 0.02 0.88
  Male*Turks (1st  generation) 1.20** 0.01 -0.18 0.49 0.12 0.67
  Male*Turks (2nd  generation) 0.77 0.36 -0.23 0.69 0.84 0.20
  Male*Moroccans (1st  generation) 0.26 0.59 -0.37 0.27 1.07** 0.00
  Male*Moroccans (2nd  generation) 0.06 0.96 0.11 0.87 -0.16 0.86
  Male*Surinamese (1st  generation) -0.06 0.90 -0.65** 0.01 0.42 0.13
  Male*Surinamese (2nd  generation) 1.24 0.18 -0.53 0.19 -0.10 0.81
  Male*Antilleans (1st  generation) 0.61 0.24 -0.73** 0.01 0.68* 0.02
  Male*Antilleans (2nd  generation) 0.94 0.43 0.21 0.69 0.03 0.96
    Male*Cohort*Turks (1st  generation) -0.43 0.26 0.42 0.10 -0.31 0.26
    Male*Cohort*Turks (2nd  generation) -0.61 0.25 0.33 0.36 -0.56 0.15
    Male*Cohort*Moroccans (1st  generation) 0.03 0.93 0.51~ 0.07 -1.06** 0.00
    Male*Cohort*Moroccans (2nd  generation) 0.10 0.88 0.07 0.87 -0.01 0.99
    Male*Cohort*Surinamese (1st  generation) 0.44 0.32 0.42~ 0.09 -0.24 0.37
    Male*Cohort* Surinamese (2nd  generation) -0.63 0.27 0.24 0.41 0.08 0.77
    Male*Cohort*Antilleans (1st  generation) -0.39 0.38 0.46~ 0.09 -0.40 0.15
    Male*Cohort*Antilleans (2nd  generation) -0.99 0.21 -0.17 0.67 0.04 0.91
Parental education (University=ref.cat.)
  Primary -0.15 0.79 -1.74** 0.00 -1.96** 0.00
  Lower secondary 0.27 0.64 -1.41** 0.00 -1.57** 0.00
  Higher secondary 0.21 0.72 -1.17** 0.00 -1.46** 0.00
  Tertiary vocational -0.33 0.59 -0.45 0.16 -0.79** 0.00
Father’s job status (status 32=0)b -0.11** 0.01 0.15** 0.00 0.07* 0.01
Cox and Snell 0.29
-2LL 26108 141
Δ-2LL 172
**p<0.01; * p<0.05; ~ p<0.10 (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
a N=16219, native Dutch weighted
b Control variables in model: survey year; mean substitution parental education; coding difference in father’s job 
status; mean substitution of father’s job status; unemployed father.
c Cohort parameter * 10 
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APPENDIX 5.5  MULTI-NOMINAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF EDUCATIONAL CHOICE AFTER HIGHER SECONDARY EDUCATION, 
BIRTH COHORTS 1960-1980AB
Model C
HBO/stop University/HBO
ß p ß p
Constant 1.08 0.10 -0.05 0.94
Ethnicity
  Turks (1st  generation) -2.95** 0.00 0.98~ 0.08
  Turks (2nd  generation) -1.27 0.12 0.37 0.66
  Moroccans (1st  generation) -3.89** 0.00 1.10 0.18
  Moroccans (2nd  generation) -3.35* 0.03 2.23 0.12
  Surinamese (1st  generation) -1.45** 0.00 1.07** 0.00
  Surinamese (2nd  generation) -0.48 0.35 0.89* 0.03
  Antilleans (1st  generation) -0.59 0.11 0.33 0.31
  Antilleans (2nd  generation) -1.51* 0.01 0.69 0.15
Cohort (birth year 1960=0)c -0.22 0.41 0.55** 0.01
  Cohort*Turks (1st  generation) 0.29 0.46 -0.22 0.60
  Cohort*Turks (2nd  generation) 0.64 0.29 -0.42 0.48
  Cohort*Moroccans (1st  generation) 1.55** 0.00 -0.79 0.14
  Cohort*Moroccans (2nd  generation) 1.90~ 0.05 -1.19 0.17
  Cohort*Surinamese (1st  generation) 0.41 0.28 -0.60~ 0.07
  Cohort* Surinamese (2nd  generation) 0.13 0.75 -0.72* 0.03
  Cohort*Antilleans (1st  generation) 0.55 0.14 -0.70* 0.02
  Cohort*Antilleans (2nd  generation) 0.69 0.17 -0.38 0.33
Male (Female=ref.cat.) 0.62* 0.03 0.54* 0.01
  Male*Cohort -0.48* 0.04 0.05 0.81
  Male*Turks (1st  generation) -0.04 0.93 -0.30 0.51
  Male*Turks (2nd  generation) -0.07 0.91 -0.34 0.57
  Male*Moroccans (1st  generation) 0.86 0.11 -0.05 0.93
  Male*Moroccans (2nd  generation) 0.54 0.53 0.08 0.91
  Male*Surinamese (1st  generation) -0.02 0.95 -0.39 0.21
  Male*Surinamese (2nd  generation) -0.51 0.27 -0.03 0.94
  Male*Antilleans (1st  generation) -0.06 0.88 -0.31 0.31
  Male*Antilleans (2nd  generation) 0.15 0.78 0.25 0.52
Parental education (University=ref.cat.)
  Primary -0.26 0.35 -1.01** 0.00
  Lower secondary -0.27 0.30 -0.79** 0.00
  Higher secondary -0.01 0.96 -0.79 0.00
  Tertiary vocational 0.52~ 0.07 -0.48* 0.01
Father’s job status (status 32=0)b 0.00 0.50 0.01* 0.02
Cox and Snell 0.25
-2LL 4073 78
Δ-2LL 17
** p<0.01; * p<0.05; ~ p<0.10 (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
a N=2589,  native Dutch weighted
b Control variables in model: survey year; mean substitution parental education; coding difference in father’s job 
status; mean substitution of father’s job status; unemployed father.
c Cohort  parameter * 10
Source: SPVA, 1988, 1991, 1994, and 1998.
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APPENDIX 7.2  PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF MULTIPLE MEDIATOR MODELS PREDICTING IDENTIFICATION WITH THE ORIGIN COUNTRY (DIRECT EFFECTS OF 
EDUCATION ON MEDIATOR VARIABLES AND DIRECT EFFECTS OF CONTROL VARIABLES ON IDENTIFICATION WITH THE ORIGIN COUNTRY)
1st gen. Turks
1st gen. 
Moroccans
1st gen. 
Surinamese
1st gen. 
Antilleans
b  se b  se b  se b  se
Direct effect of education on mediators  see appendix 7.1
Direct effects control variables
Age -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.15** 0.04
Sex (female=ref.) -0.14 0.08 -0.04 0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.05 0.09
Language proﬁ ciency -0.31** 0.06 -0.25** 0.06 -0.02 0.13 -0.33** 0.11
Church attendance 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02
Labour market position (un- and non-employed=ref.)
Technician -0.14 0.22 0.07 0.21 -0.15 0.17 0.07 0.19
Socio-cultural specialists 0.02 0.23 -0.44* 0.20 -0.13 0.16 -0.17 0.18
Routine non-manual 0.12 0.17 -0.35* 0.15 -0.10 0.13 0.06 0.15
Small self-employed 0.00 0.19 0.34 0.25 -0.16 0.30 0.50 0.40
Manual supervisors / skilled manual labourers -0.04 0.15 -0.02 0.15 0.08 0.19 -0.05 0.19
Unskilled manual labourers 0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.10 0.13 0.13 -0.06 0.13
Students -0.01 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.26 0.11 0.16
2nd gen. Turks
2nd gen. 
Moroccans
2nd gen. 
Surinamese
2nd gen.  
Antilleans
b  se b  se b  se b  se
Direct effect of education on mediators see appendix 7.1
Direct effects control variables
Age -0.08 0.14 -0.17 0.12 -0.15 ~ 0.08 -0.20 0.15
Sex (female=ref.) 0.10 0.13 0.33* 0.15 -0.13 0.13 -0.06 0.16
Language proﬁ ciency -0.45~ 0.25 0.01 0.31 0.29 0.37 0.26 0.30
Church attendance 0.04* 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 ~ 0.04 0.01 0.04
Labour market position (un- and non-employed=ref.)
Technician 0.67~ 0.36 0.20 0.50 0.02 0.28 -0.18 0.35
Socio-cultural specialists 0.31 0.37 -0.06 0.37 0.05 0.31 -0.27 0.43
Routine non-manual 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.05 0.24 -0.28 0.33
Small self-employed 0.07 0.48 0.45 0.62 -0.38 1.00
Manual supervisors / skilled manual laborers 0.87* 0.35 0.10 0.41 -0.11 0.43 -0.10 0.44
Unskilled manual labourers 0.44~ 0.24 -0.06 0.36 0.26 0.34 0.08 0.36
Students 0.36~ 0.21 0.11 0.24 0.20  0.24 -0.18  0.36
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; ~p<0.10 (two sided test of signiﬁ cance)
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH / NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING
Inleiding
Iedereen probeert de wereld overzichtelijker te maken door zowel dingen als individuen in hokjes, 
groepen of categorieën in te delen. Dit categorisatie-proces leidt er automatisch toe dat men 
relatief positief denkt over de groep waartoe men zichzelf rekent en dat men relatief negatief 
denkt over en weerstand voelt tegen groepen waartoe men zichzelf niet rekent. De groepen 
waartoe men zichzelf niet rekent noem ik in het onderstaande de uitgesloten groepen.1 Grenzen 
tussen categorieën of groepen kunnen binnen verschillende dimensies getrokken worden. Voor 
veel mensen is etniciteit een belangrijke dimensie. Duidelijke grenzen tussen de eigen etnische 
groep en uitgesloten etnische groepen maken de wereld niet alleen eenvoudiger maar dragen 
bovendien bij aan een positieve groepsidentiteit, iets waarnaar iedereen streeft. Hoewel iedereen 
dus categoriseert, zal, als etnische groepen concurreren om economische goederen, (politieke) 
macht, en ruimte voor culturele normen en waarden, het categorisatie-proces met betrekking tot 
etniciteit sterker zijn en eerder optreden. 
Doordat iedereen categoriseert en bovendien concurrentie tussen etnische groepen veel 
voorkomt, zal iedereen een bepaalde weerstand voelen tegen bepaalde (leden van) uitgesloten 
groepen. Toch verschillen mensen binnen een etnische groep wel in de mate van weerstand tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen. De redenen voor deze verschillen zijn tot nu toe nog niet helemaal 
duidelijk. In dit proefschrift heb ik geprobeerd om beter te verklaren waarom mensen verschillen 
in de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Deze vraag is onderdeel van de 
sociologische onderzoekstraditie waarin veel onderzoek is verricht naar de sociale samenhang en 
het ontbreken daarvan tussen en binnen groepen. 
Tot nu toe werden redenen voor verschillen in de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
groepen vooral gezocht in relatief statische kenmerken van personen (bijvoorbeeld: geslacht, 
leeftijd, opleidingsniveau, arbeidsmarktpositie, mate van religiositeit, persoonlijkheidskenmerken, 
enzovoort) of in kenmerken van de groepen waartoe deze mensen zichzelf rekenen (bijvoorbeeld: 
groepsstatus, groepsgrootte, autochtoon of allochtoon, enzovoort). Hoewel deze kenmerken 
zeer belangrijk zijn om verschillen in de mate van weerstand te verklaren, volstaan zij niet in 
de verklaring. Voor een beter begrip van de verschillen in de mate van weertand zijn tevens 
andersoortige verklaringen nodig.
In hoofdstuk 2 beargumenteer ik dat ervaringen van intergenerationele sociale mobiliteit 
– het stijgen of dalen op de beroeps-, of onderwijsladder in vergelijking met je ouders – van 
invloed kan zijn op de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnisch groepen. In hoofdstuk 2 
neem ik dus ook meer ‘dynamische’ kenmerken van individuen in ogenschouw. In hoofdstuk 3 
en 4 zoek ik additionele verklaringen voor weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen in de 
leefomgeving van het individu; in eigenschappen van de buurt en gemeente waarin men woont. 
Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 vormen samen het eerste deel van dit boek.
Één van de meest consistente bevindingen binnen de sociologie is dat hoger opgeleiden 
binnen autochtone bevolkingsgroepen minder weerstand tegen etnische minderheden hebben dan 
relatief lager opgeleiden binnen de autochtone bevolking. Enigszins verbazingwekkend is het 
Summary in Dutch / Nederlandstalige samenvatting
252
dan ook dat de relatie tussen opleidingsniveau en weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen binnen 
allochtone bevolkingsgroepen weinig wetenschappelijke aandacht heeft genoten. In het tweede 
deel van dit boek probeer ik dit goed te maken. 
Er zijn verschillende redenen waardoor hoger opgeleiden minder weerstand tegen etnische 
minderheden hebben dan lager opgeleiden. Zo ervaren hoger opgeleide autochtonen minder 
(economische en culturele) groepsdreiging van etnische minderheidsgroepen dan lager opgeleiden, 
hebben zij in het algemeen een positievere sociale identiteit dan lager opgeleiden en is etniciteit een 
minder belangrijk onderdeel van hun sociale identiteit dan voor lager opgeleiden. Hierdoor zullen zij 
minder behoefte hebben om duidelijke grenzen te trekken tussen mogelijke etnische categorieën. Met 
minder duidelijke groepsgrenzen krijgt weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen minder kans. Ervaringen 
en vaardigheden opgedaan binnen het onderwijssysteem zouden ook bijdragen aan de relatieve 
tolerantie van hoger opgeleiden. Zo zouden hoger opgeleiden op school bepaalde vaardigheden 
leren die hen in staat stellen een complexere wereld aan te kunnen, waardoor de behoefte om te 
categoriseren verder afneemt. Ook hebben hoger opgeleiden langer de tijd gekregen om de dominante 
norm van tolerantie, die binnen de school wordt overgedragen, zich eigen te maken.
Ik beargumenteer in deel 2 van dit boek dat etnische onderwijsongelijkheid kan 
leiden tot verschillen in (de sterkte van) de samenhang tussen opleidingsniveau en de mate van 
weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Tot op heden ontbrak echter een gedetailleerde 
beschrijving van etnische onderwijsongelijkheid in Nederland. Dit heb ik daarom zelf onderwerp 
van onderzoek gemaakt in Hoofdstuk 5. In Hoofdstuk 6 zijn verklaringen voor onderwijsverschillen 
tussen etnische groepen in Nederland verder onderzocht. Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 passen binnen de 
sociologische onderzoekstraditie die zich bezighoudt met sociale ongelijkheid. In dit boek dienen 
zij tevens als opmaat voor hoofdstuk 7. Hier heb ik opnieuw verschillen in de mate van weerstand 
tegen uitgesloten groepen als onderzoeksobject genomen. Meer precies, in hoofdstuk 7 onderzoek 
ik, ditmaal onder allochtone bevolkingsgroepen binnen Nederland, in welke mate en waarom 
opleidingsniveau samenhangt met weerstand tegen (andere) uitgesloten etnische groepen.
In het onderstaande zal ik kort per hoofdstuk de behandelde onderzoeksvraag bespreken en 
de belangrijkste bevindingen samenvatten. Tot slot geef ik aan welke richting toekomstig onderzoek 
met betrekking tot weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen mijns inziens op zou moeten gaan. 
Hoofdstuk 2: sociale mobiliteit en weerstand tegen etnisch uitgesloten groepen
Het genoten opleidingsniveau en iemands positie op de arbeidsmarkt zijn zeer belangrijke 
voorspellers van de mate van weerstand tegen etnisch uitgesloten groepen. Zoals gezegd geven 
relatief hoger opgeleiden minder blijk van weerstand dan lager opgeleiden. Ook kleine zelfstandigen 
en (ongeschoolde) arbeiders hebben meer weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen dan mensen met 
posities in de hogere regionen van de arbeidsmarkt. Naast de eigen sociale positie waren er uit 
eerder wetenschappelijk onderzoek ook indicaties dat het opleidingsniveau van de ouders en 
de arbeidsmarktpositie van de ouders van invloed zouden zijn op de mate van weerstand. Het 
relatieve belang van de eigen sociale positie in vergelijking met de sociale positie van de ouders 
voor de verklaring van de mate van weerstand was echter tot nog toe onbekend, evenals mogelijke 
effecten van unieke combinaties van sociale posities van ouders en hun kinderen op de mate van 
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weerstand. Beiden heb ik onderzocht in hoofdstuk 2 en deze twee onderwerpen worden gevangen 
in de volgende algemene onderzoeksvraag: 
In welke mate draagt intergenerationele sociale mobiliteit bij aan de verklaring voor weerstand tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen? 
 
Naar aanleiding van mijn studie concludeer ik dat de invloed van de sociale positie van de ouders 
tot op heden onderschat is geweest. Vooral als een zoon of dochter een sociale positie bezit 
waarvan de mensen over het algemeen minder tolerant zijn dan de sociale positie van hun vader, 
lijkt hun mate van weerstand meer op de gemiddeld relatief tolerante houding van leden van 
de sociale positie van hun vader. Ik merk daarbij op dat die positie van de zoon of dochter niet 
noodzakelijk een lagere status dan de sociale positie van hun vader inhoudt. Bovendien komt 
de mate van etnische weerstand in deze gevallen soms zelfs sterker overeen met de houding 
indicatief voor de sociale positie van de vader dan met de houding indicatief voor de eigen sociale 
positie. Met andere woorden, voor individuen die sociaal mobiel zijn naar een positie waarbinnen 
de mate van weerstand over het algemeen sterker is dan de positie van hun vader, is de sociale 
positie van hun vader een betere voorspeller voor de eigen mate van weerstand dan de eigen, 
huidige positie.2 Kortom, tolerante houdingen worden makkelijker overgedragen via de (context 
van de) sociale positie dan intolerante houdingen. Een plausibele verklaring hiervoor is dat in de 
Nederlandse samenleving als geheel tolerantie de norm is. 
Hoofdstuk 3: de directe leefomgeving en weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen
Naast kenmerken of eigenschappen van individuen was het reeds bekend dat ook zogenoemde 
contextkenmerken van invloed zijn op houdingen ten aanzien van uitgesloten etnische groepen. 
Tot dusverre onderzocht men echter vooral kenmerken van landen en dan met name de invloed van 
immigratie en indicatoren voor de economische gesteldheid van een land op deze weerstand. 
Immigratie en een slechte of verslechterende nationale economie zou namelijk volgens 
de Etnische Competitie Theorie (ECT) samenhangen met (objectieve) groepscompetitie en dus 
ook met ervaren groepsdreiging. Uiteindelijk zou dit volgens de ECT leiden tot een toename in de 
weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Echter, vanuit dezelfde theorie kan mijns inziens 
afgeleid worden dat niet alleen kenmerken van landen maar ook van gemeenten of buurten van 
invloed kunnen zijn op de individuele weerstand die men heeft tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. 
Bovendien beargumenteer ik dat onder autochtonen de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
groepen, naast de relatieve grootte van uitgesloten etnische groepen in een buurt of gemeente 
of de economische gesteldheid van een buurt of gemeente, ook zal samenhangen met de mate 
van veiligheids-dreiging (criminaliteit in de leefomgeving en de verhuismobiliteit) en culturele 
dreiging (de aanwezigheid van moskeeën). Dit inzicht leidde tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag: 
In welke mate dragen kenmerken van Nederlandse gemeenten en buurten die indicatief zijn voor de 
mate van ervaren economische, culturele en veiligheids-dreiging bij aan de verklaring van weerstand 
tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen? 
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De invloed van de lokale leefomgeving op de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen 
bleek zwak te zijn in vergelijking met kenmerken van het individu. Wel concludeer ik op basis van 
mijn studie dat de lokale leefomgeving ertoe doet: als identieke mensen (bijvoorbeeld: mensen 
van dezelfde leeftijd, geslacht, opleidingsniveau, enzovoort) wonen in verschillende buurten of 
gemeenten, is ook hun gemiddelde weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen anders. 
Ik vond geen ondersteuning voor het idee dat kenmerken waarvan ik verwacht dat ze 
samenhangen met culture groepsdreiging of met veiligheidsdreiging de weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
etnische groepen doen toenemen. Alleen kenmerken die samenhangen met economische dreiging 
beïnvloeden, zoals de Etnische Competitie Theorie voorspelde, weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
etnische groepen. Ik vond ook geen bewijs voor het idee dat de aanwezigheid van speciﬁ eke 
uitgesloten etnische groepen in de buurt of gemeente juist weerstand tegen deze speciﬁ eke 
etnische groep doet toenemen.
Het is te eenvoudig om te stellen dat zodra men woont in een gemeente of buurt 
met relatief veel allochtone Nederlanders, men meer weerstand voelt tegen deze groepen. Uit 
mijn onderzoek blijkt dat de aanwezigheid van leden van uitgesloten groepen wel bijdraagt aan 
een toename in groepsdreiging maar vooral voor lager opgeleiden. Tegelijkertijd echter nemen 
contactmogelijkheden tussen verschillende groepen toe als er meer leden van uitgesloten groepen 
in de buurt of de gemeente wonen. Positieve contactervaringen met leden van uitgesloten 
etnische groepen zullen de weerstand die men initieel had tegen deze groep doen verzwakken. 
Een toename van groepsdreiging door de aanwezigheid van uitgesloten etnische groepen in de 
directe leefomgeving waardoor weerstand toeneemt, wordt dus waarschijnlijk deels teniet gedaan 
door meer positieve intergroepscontacten. Bovendien is het waarschijnlijk dat zodra men de buurt 
of gemeente als onprettig ervaart vanwege de bevolkingssamenstelling, men uiteindelijk naar een 
betere buurt verhuist. Deze ‘selectieve verhuismobiliteit’ bemoeilijkt het correct in kaart brengen 
van de invloed van buurt- en gemeentekenmerken op weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen.
Hoofdstuk 4: de directe leefomgeving en de mate van sociale samenhang
De studie die ik in hoofdstuk 3 beschreven heb, riep verschillende vervolgvragen op. In hoofdstuk 3 
keek ik in hoeverre buurt- en gemeentekenmerken invloed hebben op weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
etnische groepen. Dit heb ik gemeten door te kijken naar de weerstand tegen etnisch gemengde 
huwelijken, de weerstand die men heeft om verblijfsvergunningen toe te kennen aan migranten en 
door te bepalen in hoeverre men een negatieve houding heeft ten opzichte van de multiculturele 
samenleving. In grote lijnen kwamen de verklaringsmodellen voor deze drie indicatoren voor 
weerstand tegen etnisch uitgesloten groepen overeen. Recentelijk is geopperd dat wanneer door 
het leven binnen etnisch diverse leefomgevingen de sociale samenhang tussen verschillende 
etnische groepen afneemt ook de sociale samenhang binnen de eigen etnische groep afneemt. 
In hoofdstuk 4 stelde ik me daarom de vraag in hoeverre de verklaringsmodellen voor weerstand 
tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen ook bruikbaar zijn voor de sociale samenhang in Nederland in 
meer algemene zin. 
Waar ik in hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht in hoeverre de autochtone bevolking verschilt in de 
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mate van weerstand tegen speciﬁ eke uitgesloten etnische groepen, onderzocht ik in hoofdstuk 4 
in hoeverre iemands eigen etniciteit van invloed is op de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
etnische groepen en sociale samenhang in algemene zin. 
In hoofdstuk 4 heb ik de invloed van etnische en economische diversiteit, het gemiddeld 
inkomen, het criminaliteitsniveau en de mate van verhuismobiliteit binnen buurten en gemeenten 
op de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen en op verschillende indicatoren 
voor de sociale samenhang in meer algemene zin onder de loep genomen. De enigszins lange 
onderzoeksvraag van hoofdstuk 4 luidde: 
In welke mate en voor wie dragen kenmerken van Nederlandse gemeenten en buurten zoals 
etnische en economische diversiteit, het gemiddeld inkomen, het criminaliteitsniveau en de mate 
van verhuismobiliteit bij aan de verklaring van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen en 
verschillende indicatoren voor de sociale samenhang in Nederland in meer algemene zin? 
Opnieuw bleek dat de invloed van de lokale leefomgeving in vergelijking met kenmerken van het 
individu relatief zwak zijn, maar dat de lokale leefomgeving er wel degelijk toe doet. Ik vond dat 
mensen die in een etnische diverse buurt wonen niet per deﬁ nitie meer weerstand hebben tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen – in overeenstemming met mijn resultaten uit hoofdstuk 3 – of 
minder sociale samenhang vertonen in meer algemene zin. Vooral de laatste bevinding spreekt 
eerder onderzoek uit Amerika duidelijk tegen en heeft daarom de aandacht getrokken van zowel 
lokale als nationale beleidsmakers in Nederland.
Van de andere onderzochte buurt- en gemeentekenmerken bleek alleen een gunstige 
lokale buurteconomie samen te hangen met meer sociale samenhang. De overige kenmerken 
bleken irrelevant. De sterkte van de invloed van buurt- en gemeentekenmerken (of de af- en 
aanwezigheid daarvan) op de onderzochte indicatoren van sociale samenhang verschillen niet per 
etnische groep. 
Met hoofdstuk 4 sluit ik deel 1 van dit boek af. In dit deel heb ik aangetoond dat om 
verschillen in de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen beter en vollediger 
te begrijpen het nodig is om ervaringen van sociale mobiliteit en de invloed van de lokale 
leefomgeving in beschouwing te nemen. In het tweede deel van dit boek richt ik me op één van 
de belangrijkste, meer traditionele verklaringen voor weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen, te 
weten het hoogst behaald (of gevolgd) opleidingsniveau.
Keer op keer wordt door middel van empirisch onderzoek bevestigd dat leden uit 
autochtone bevolkingsgroepen toleranter zijn naarmate zij meer jaren onderwijs hebben genoten. 
Echter, onder allochtone bevolkingsgroepen is de richting en de sterkte van het verband tussen 
jaren opleiding en mate van tolerantie onbekend. In deel 2 zal ik zowel de verschillen tussen 
etnische groepen in behaalde opleidingniveaus centraal stellen alsmede de verschillen in de 
samenhang tussen jaren opleiding en mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. 
Hoofdstuk 5: trends in onderwijsongelijkheid tussen etnische groepen in Nederland
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek ik geboortecohort trends in onderwijsongelijkheid op basis van etniciteit. 
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Hiermee verlaat ik de hoofdvraag van dit boek naar de verklaringen voor de verschillen in de mate 
van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Hier zijn twee belangrijke redenen voor. 
Ten eerste, er zijn aanwijzingen dat de sterkte van het verband tussen opleidingsniveau 
en mate van weerstand bij autochtone bevolkingsgroepen afhangt van de verdeling van 
onderwijsdiploma’s onder de bevolking. Als gevolg van de onderwijsexpansie behalen steeds minder 
mensen geen of een relatief lage opleiding. De mensen met een relatief lage opleiding zijn hierdoor 
steeds sterker op elkaar gaan lijken als het gaat om (academische) vaardigheden. Waarschijnlijk 
mede als gevolg hiervan is het verband tussen opleidingsniveau en mate van weerstand onder 
autochtone Nederlanders de afgelopen decennia sterker geworden; de mensen met een lage en 
een hoge opleiding zijn steeds meer van elkaar gaan verschillen in de mate van weerstand tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen. Nu verwachtte ik dat als er verschillen tussen de etnische groepen 
in Nederland bestaan in de verdelingen van opleidingniveaus, het verband tussen opleidingniveau 
en mate van weerstand ook goed zou kunnen verschillen tussen etnische groepen. Om echter een 
toetsbare voorspelling te doen over de verschillen in dit verband tussen autochtone en allochtone 
Nederlanders, was het nodig om de verdeling in opleidingniveaus tussen en binnen etnische 
groepen in Nederland in kaart te brengen aangezien zo een studie tot op heden ontbrak.
 Ten tweede, één van de vernieuwende aspecten van dit boek is dat ik zowel de mate van 
weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen onderzoek onder autochtone Nederlanders als onder 
allochtone Nederlanders. De mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten groepen onder allochtone 
Nederlanders vertelt iets over de mate van culturele integratie. Zoals reeds eerder gesteld zou de 
mate van onderwijsintegratie – in hoeverre allochtone Nederlanders in vergelijkbare mate zijn 
vertegenwoordigd binnen opleidingniveaus als autochtone Nederlanders – sterk samenhangen met 
de mate van culturele integratie. Om een completer beeld te krijgen van de integratie van allochtone 
Nederlanders binnen onze gedeelde samenleving is het mijn inziens echter onvoldoende om alleen 
te kijken naar de mate van culturele integratie (de mate van afwezigheid van weerstand tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen) en de relatie tussen onderwijsintegratie en culturele integratie, 
maar verdient de mate van onderwijsintegratie ook apart aandacht. 
 Het bovenstaande heeft geleid tot de volgende concrete onderzoeksvraag die in hoofdstuk 
5 beantwoord wordt: 
Hoe zien de geboortecohort-trends in onderwijsverschillen tussen etnische groepen met betrekking 
tot het hoogst-bereikte opleidingsniveau en overgangen na het primaire onderwijs en het secundaire 
onderwijs eruit, en in welke mate zijn verschillen in sociale herkomst hier verantwoordelijk voor?
De belangrijkste conclusie die ik op basis van mijn studie kan trekken is dat de onderwijsverschillen 
tussen autochtone Nederlanders en allochtone Nederlanders niet over de gehele linie aan het 
afnemen zijn. Turkse, Marokkaanse, Surinaamse en Antilliaanse Nederlanders blijven (vooral) 
ondervertegenwoordigd binnen het tertiaire onderwijs. Bovendien lijkt er een tweedeling te 
ontstaan binnen het Nederlandse onderwijsstelsel waarbinnen de algemene opleidingsrichtingen 
(dat is: HAVO, VWO en universiteit) het domein worden – of beter gezegd: blijven – voor autochtone 
Nederlanders en de beroepsopleiding (VMBO, MBO en in minder mate het HBO) wel toegankelijk 
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blijken voor allochtone leerlingen.
De tweede generatie allochtone Nederlanders doet het beter dan de eerste generatie, 
maar de verschillen tussen de generaties zijn met de tijd wel steeds kleiner geworden. Het is 
daarom nog maar de vraag of met de volgende generatie de etnische onderwijsongelijkheid verder 
afneemt. De verschillen in sociale herkomst tussen allochtone en autochtone leerlingen kunnen 
lang niet alle etnische onderwijsongelijkheid verklaren. Dit betekent dat er gezocht moet worden 
naar andere verklaringen. De studie van hoofdstuk 5 geeft aanleiding om deze te zoeken in een 
uitbreiding van het zogenoemde Breen-Goldthorpe-model. 
Hoofdstuk 6: verklaringen voor etnische onderwijsongelijkheid
De centrale stelling van het Breen-Goldthorpe-model is dat studenten samen met hun ouders 
keuzes maken over de te nemen route door het onderwijsstelsel die zij baseren op: de sociale 
opbrengsten van de mogelijk te behalen niveaus (sociale status), de kosten behorende bij de 
verschillende onderwijstrajecten en de verwachte kansen om succesvol de verschillende mogelijke 
trajecten succesvol af te ronden. Ik gebruik dit model om verschillen tussen etnische groepen, 
mannen en vrouwen, en sociale klassen te verklaren in keuzes na het hoger algemeen secundair 
onderwijs (VWO). 
 Ik verwachtte dat mannen en vrouwen en etnische groepen binnen Nederland verschillende 
verwachtingen zouden hebben over hun slaagkansen, zelfs als we studenten vergelijken die dezelfde 
schoolprestaties hebben neergezet. Als de inschattingen van toekomstig schoolsucces verschillen 
tussen groepen, zou dit volgens het Breen-Goldthorpe-model dus een aannemelijke verklaring zijn 
voor verschillen in de keuzes die gemaakt moeten worden na het succesvol afronden van het VWO. 
De studie die ik beschreven heb in hoofdstuk 6 is om drie redenen vernieuwend. Ten 
eerste, hoewel het Breen-Goldthorpe-model vaak is toegepast om verschillen tussen sociale klassen 
in schoolkeuzes te verklaren, is het vrij uniek om dit model toe te passen voor de verklaring van 
verschillen in schoolkeuzes tussen mannen en vrouwen en tussen etnische groepen. Ten tweede, tot 
op heden worden inschattingen van slaagkansen voor de verschillende opleidingopties zelden ook 
daadwerkelijk zelf gebruikt om schoolkeuzes te verklaren.4 Ten slotte, ik pas het model niet alleen 
toe om keuzes tussen onderwijsniveaus te verklaren maar ook om keuzes voor onderwijsrichtingen 
te verklaren. De onderzoeksvraag van hoofdstuk 6 luidde: 
In welke mate kunnen verschillen tussen sociale posities, mannen en vrouwen, en etnische groepen 
in inschattingen van slaagkansen de aanwezige verschillen tussen deze groepen verklaren in de 
studiekeuze binnen het hoger onderwijs? 
Ik heb aangetoond dat studenten inderdaad verschillende inschattingen maken van hun 
slaagkansen, ook nadat we rekening houden met eerdere prestatieverschillen. Bovendien verklaren 
deze inschattingen van slaagkansen beter waarom groepen verschillen in hun schoolkeuzes dan de 
eerdere schoolprestaties. Een belangrijke conclusie is daarom dat de assumptie binnen het Breen-
Goldthorpe-model, dat eerdere schoolprestaties voldoende zijn om schoolkeuzes te verklaren (en 
verschillen hierin tussen groepen), bijgesteld moet worden. 
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 Verwachtingen over toekomstig schoolsucces bleken vooral van belang voor het verklaren 
van verschillen tussen mannen en vrouwen (maar ook, hoewel in iets mindere mate, tussen sociale 
posities) in keuzes voor opleidingsrichtingen. Met het Breen-Goldthorpe-model kan ik voor een 
aanzienlijk deel verschillen in schoolkeuzes verklaren, maar toch bleek ik met dit model maar 
nauwelijks in staat om verschillen in schoolkeuzes tussen studenten met een verschillende 
etnische achtergrond te verklaren. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 toonde ik reeds aan dat de onderwijsintegratie van etnische minderheden 
niet volledig is en bovendien stokt. Dit kan er voor zorgen dat opleidingseffecten met betrekking 
tot weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen anders kunnen zijn (zwakker is de verwachting) 
onder Turkse, Marokkaanse, Surinaamse en Antilliaanse Nederlanders dan onder autochtone 
Nederlanders. Na hoofdstuk 6 waarin ik aangetoond heb dat verschillen in schoolkeuzes tussen 
etnische groepen niet verklaard kunnen worden door het Breen-Goldthorpe-model, is het des 
te aannemelijker dat opleidingseffecten verschillen tussen etnische groepen. In het laatste 
empirische hoofdstuk van dit boek, hoofdstuk 7, maak ik de verschillen in opleidingseffecten 
tussen etnische groepen tot mijn onderzoeksobject. 
Hoofdstuk 7: genoten opleiding en weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen
Waar bij autochtone Nederlanders meer opleiding consistent samengaat met minder weerstand 
tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen, lijken hoger opgeleide allochtone Nederlanders juist 
meer discriminatie te ervaren, en meer culturele verschillen te ervaren met de autochtone 
bevolking. Verschillende onderzoekers zien hierin aanwijzingen voor de aanwezigheid van een 
integratieparadox, waarmee zij bedoelen dat juist structureel geïntegreerde allochtone Nederlanders 
minder sociaal- en cultureel geïntegreerd zouden zijn. Toch is het tot op heden niet aangetoond 
dat hoger opgeleide allochtone Nederlanders in het algemeen meer weerstand tegen autochtone 
Nederlanders ervaren of zich minder als Nederlander identiﬁ ceren.
 Er zijn verschillende redenen om aan te nemen dat het opleidingseffect – het effect dat 
men met meer jaren genoten opleiding, minder weerstand tegen (andere) uitgesloten etnische 
groepen ervaart – verschilt tussen etnische groepen. Één reden is reeds aan bod gekomen, 
namelijk als het zo is dat de gemiddelde verschillen in cognitieve vaardigheden tussen lager en 
hoger opgeleiden groter zijn bij autochtone Nederlanders dan bij allochtone Nederlanders, zou dit 
tot gevolg kunnen hebben dat opleidingseffecten kleiner zijn bij allochtone Nederlanders dan bij 
autochtone Nederlanders. Andere belangrijke verklaringen voor het opleidingseffect bij autochtone 
Nederlanders kunnen gevonden worden in de mate van ervaren etnische dreiging die verschillen 
tussen opleidingscategorieën en in de mate van contacten met leden uit uitgesloten etnische 
groepen. In hoeverre deze redenen voor het opleidingseffect onder autochtone Nederlanders 
ook geldig zijn om het al dan niet aanwezige opleidingseffect onder allochtone Nederlanders te 
verklaren was echter onbekend. Dit heeft geleid tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag: 
In welke mate en waarom hangt onder allochtone Nederlanders genoten opleiding samen met de 
mate van weerstand tegen autochtone Nederlanders (in dit verband de belangrijkste uitgesloten 
etnische groep) en met de mate van identiﬁ catie als Nederlander? 
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Op grond van de resultaten van hoofdstuk 7, heb ik laten zien dat, zoals verwacht, over het 
algemeen het opleidingseffect onder allochtone Nederlanders zwakker is dan onder autochtone 
Nederlanders. Voor de tweede generatie etnische minderheden in Nederland gaat de hoogte van de 
genoten opleiding niet samen met een afname in de weerstand tegen autochtone Nederlanders. 
Vooral voor Turkse en Marokkaanse Nederlanders van de tweede generatie valt dit te verklaren 
door het feit dat onder de hoger opgeleiden niet meer positieve contactervaringen voorkomen 
dan onder de lager opgeleiden en bovendien ook niet minder negatieve contactervaringen. Wel 
dien ik op te merken dat de tweede generatie over het algemeen minder weerstand voelt tegen 
autochtone Nederlanders en zich meer identiﬁ ceert als Nederlander dan de eerste generatie. Toch 
geeft het afwezige positieve effect van opleidingsniveau op interetnische tolerantie reden tot 
zorgen. Sociale stijging onder allochtone Nederlanders zal – ook al gaat dit gepaard met een 
sterkere Nederlandse identiteit - niet noodzakelijk leiden tot minder weerstand tegen autochtone 
Nederlanders.
In tegenstelling tot hetgeen ik verwachtte op basis van eerdere resultaten bij autochtone 
Nederlanders, bleek ervaren groepdreiging niet samen te gaan met meer weerstand tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen onder allochtone Nederlanders. Tot slot vond ik dat allochtonen die 
meer Nederlandse media en minder media uit het respectievelijke herkomstland consumeren minder 
weerstand hebben tegen autochtone Nederlanders en zich meer identiﬁ ceren als Nederlander. 
Alleen bij tweede generatie Marokkaanse Nederlanders lijkt de consumptie van Nederlandse media 
bij te dragen aan meer weerstand. Een voor de hand liggende reden zou kunnen zijn dat vooral de 
Marokkaanse bevolkingsgroep negatief belicht wordt in de media. 
Hoe nu verder?
Een belangrijk theoretisch model waar ik in dit boek gebruik van heb gemaakt om weerstand 
tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen te verklaren is de Etnische Competitie Theorie. Deze theorie 
stelt dat competitie tussen etnische groepen om economische goederen, (politieke) macht, en 
normen en waarden zal leiden tot een ervaren groepsdreiging. Deze groepsdreiging kan weer 
leiden tot een toename in weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Naar aanleiding van 
hoofdstuk 2, waarin ik heb aangetoond dat men zich sterker aanpast aan tolerante houdingen 
dan aan intolerante houdingen, vermoed ik dat feitelijke competitie tussen etnische groepen 
niet in alle omstandigheden tot een zelfde mate van ervaren groepsdreiging zal leiden. Concreter 
verwacht ik dat een toename in feitelijke competitie (bijvoorbeeld door toegenomen migratie of 
een economische recessie) minder snel zal leiden tot een toename van ervaren groepsdreiging in 
relatief tolerante samenlevingen dan in relatief intolerante samenlevingen. 
 Waarom hangt onder allochtone Nederlanders groepsdreiging – gemeten als 
waargenomen groepsdiscriminatie – niet samen met meer weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische 
groepen zoals de Etnische Competitie Theorie voorspelt? Of anders gezegd: waarom zijn allochtone 
Nederlanders die geen groepsdiscriminatie waarnemen, niet toleranter ten aanzien van autochtone 
Nederlanders? Waar onder autochtone Nederlanders vooral de mensen in lagere sociale posities 
meer groepsdreiging ervaren, zijn het onder allochtone Nederlanders vooral de mensen in relatief 
hogere sociale posities. Ik vermoed dan ook dat groepsdreiging minder snel tot uiting komt in 
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weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen, naarmate men persoonlijk meer hulpbronnen heeft 
om de gevolgen van groepsdreiging te verzachten.
Ik heb in dit boek aangetoond dat er een invloed uitgaat van de lokale leefomgeving 
op de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Het juist in kaart brengen van 
de reactie die de aanwezigheid van uitgesloten etnische groepen in een buurt oproept, is echter 
lastig aangezien door de aanwezigheid van leden van uitgesloten etnische groepen tegelijkertijd 
groepsdreiging kan ontstaan, er meer positieve contactmogelijkheden zijn en inwoners kunnen 
besluiten om de buurt of gemeente de rug toe te keren. Op basis van mijn studies verwacht ik dat 
deze drie ‘verklarende mechanismen’ (groepsdreiging, positief contact en selectieve residentiële 
verhuismobiliteit) in ongelijke mate en op een ander moment optreden onder relatief hoog en 
relatief laag opgeleiden. 
Bovengenoemde drie verwachting zou ik graag in toekomstig onderzoek aan een kritische 
toets onderworpen willen zien. 
Tot slot
In dit boek heb ik aangetoond dat wanneer men de processen die leiden tot weerstand tegen 
uitgesloten etnische groepen beter wil begrijpen, het dan nodig is om naar de invloed van sociale 
mobiliteit te kijken. Mensen nemen eerder relatief tolerante houdingen over waarmee men in 
aanraking komt als gevolg van sociale mobiliteit dan intolerante houdingen. Als men juist zelf 
afkomstig is van een relatief tolerante sociale positie, dan neemt men niet (of in ieder geval 
minder) de intolerante houdingen van de nieuwe sociale positie over.
  Ook de lokale leefomgeving is van invloed op de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten 
etnische groepen. Vooral binnen economisch zwakkere en verzwakkende buurten is de mate van 
weerstand hoger. Ik vond geen bevestiging voor de verwachting dat dit ook zo zou zijn binnen 
buurten en gemeenten met relatief grote groepen etnisch uitgeslotenen. 
 De hoogte van iemands opleiding is onder autochtone bevolkingsgroepen een belangrijke 
voorspeller van de mate van weerstand tegen uitgesloten etnische groepen. Dit is in minder 
mate het geval onder allochtone bevolkingsgroepen. Voor een deel is dit te begrijpen doordat 
de onderwijsintegratie nog niet voltooid is. Het is echter niet te verwachten dat dit in de nabije 
toekomst zal gebeuren, aangezien vooral op de hogere niveaus onderwijsachterstanden robuust 
bleken te zijn. Verschillen tussen etnische groepen in de keuzes omtrent onderwijscarrières zijn 
nog steeds slecht te verklaren middels een rationele keuze benadering. 
Hopelijk heeft deze Nederlandse samenvatting de lezer een idee kunnen geven over hoe 
ik ons (wetenschappelijk) begrip omtrent weerstand tegen etnisch uitgesloten groepen heb willen 
vergroten en inspireert het u om er zelf verder over na te denken. 
261
Noten 
1. In het Engels wordt de groep waartoe men zichzelf rekent de ingroup genoemd en uitgesloten 
groepen outgroups. Deze termen zijn moeilijk te vertalen naar het Nederlands. Ik gebruik voor 
de ingroup de term eigen groep en voor outgroup de term uitgesloten groep. Met uitgesloten 
groepen bedoel ik simpelweg alle groepen waartoe men zichzelf niet rekent. Het woord 
uitgesloten refereert in dit verband niet naar actieve processen van discriminatie. In het 
dagelijks taalgebruik spreekt men in dit verband ook wel over wij en zij.
2. Dat de sociale positie van de vader een belangrijkere voorspeller is gaat alleen op als we kijken 
naar intergenerationele beroepsmobiliteit. Wel is het zo dat zowel voor beroepsmobiliteit als 
onderwijsmobiliteit de positie van de vader meer invloed heeft op de mate van weerstand 
voor zonen en dochters die zelf een relatief intolerante positie bekleden. 
3. In plaats van de werkelijke slaagkansen te gebruiken, gebruiken onderzoekers – veelal 
vanwege beperkingen opgelegd door de beschikbare data – de schoolprestaties tijdens de 
eerdere schoolloopbaan. De assumptie die deze onderzoekers moeten maken is dat verschillen 
in schoolprestaties overeenkomen met verschillen in inschattingen van slaagkansen. Ik zette 
vraagtekens bij deze assumptie en dit bleek terecht; schoolprestaties zijn niet voldoende om 
verschillen in inschattingen van schoolsucces te verklaren. 
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Why do some individuals express more ethnic hostility than others? The 
quest for sociological explanations for ethnic hostility is not new but 
many previous scholars focused predominantly on static characteristics of 
individuals of dominant ethnic groups that would presumably affect ethnic 
hostility. In Part 1 of this book I will contend that experiences of social 
mobility should be taken into account as well. Furthermore, in Part 1, I 
will show that conditions of the local living environment have an impact on 
ethnic hostility, next to characteristics of individuals. 
Educational attainment is an important determinant of ethnic hostility 
among society’s dominant ethnic group, with higher education being 
associated with less ethnic hostility. In part 2 it becomes clear that not 
only educational integration of ethnic minorities lags behind but also that 
the relationship between educational attainment and ethnic hostility is 
(much) weaker for ethnic minority groups. Possible reasons for this weaker 
relationship are being investigated. 
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